

**In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL AND THE
COMPASSIONATE

TELEGRAMS NO. TEHRAN 452 , TEHRAN 4791 , TEHRAN 6160 , AND
TEHRAN 0025 WERE THE LAST COPIES OF THEIR ORIGINAL TEXTS
AND , THUS , VERY DULL IN COLOR , THEREFORE THEIR PRINTING
AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS WERE NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR
THIS REASON , THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE RE-TYPED.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 652
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9133
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1728
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1874
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7222
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 380
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 6016

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/7/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, AF, US, PINR
SUBJ: MY MEETING WITH THE NEW AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER DR.
SHAH WALI

REF: STATE 201375

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. LATE YESTERDAY, I PAID A COURTESY CALL ON DR. SHAH WALI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. I HANDED HIM SECRETARY VANCE'S LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS, AND IN RESPONSE SHAH WALI ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS THANKS FOR IT. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I INFORM THE DEPT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS DESIROUS OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THAT IT DOES NOT SEE ITSELF AS A THREAT TO AMERICA, AND THAT HE WAS SURE THE U.S. COULD NOT BE AGAINST THE DRA'S BASIC SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT "UNFRIENDLY AND DISTORTED" VOA AND AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE OF AFGHANISTAN, BUT DID NOT DWELL ON THIS. DURING THE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH CAME UP AND I BRIEFED HIM ON HIS GOVT'S LACK OF COOPERATION WITH US IN TRYING TO CLEAR UP SOME OF THE MYSTERIES OF THE AFFAIR. RE THE DRA'S DEMAND THAT WE REDUCE THE SIZE OF OUR MISSION, I DECIDED THIS WAS NOT THE OCCASION TO RAISE IT AND HE DID NOT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEAVES TODAY FOR A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO BULGARIA. END SUMMARY.

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3. MY CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER CAME ONE DAY AFTER THE ABORTIVE ARMY MUTINY OF AUGUST 5. THE NERVOUSNESS OF THE REGIME WAS EVIDENT IN SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY. AT THE FRONT DOOR, TWO HEAVY MACHINE GUNS ON TRIPODS POINTED OUT THROUGH THE GLASS WINDOWS WITH UNIFORMED SOLDIERS STANDING NEARBY. IN THE ANTEROOM OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, I SHARED THE SPACE WITH A SOLDIER WHO SAT AT AN IMPROVISED DESK WITH AN AK-47 RESTING ON THE TABLE TOP AND POINTED AT ME. WHEN I WAS ESCORTED INTO THE MINISTER'S OFFICE, THE SOLDIER PICKED UP HIS WEAPON AND WALKED BEHIND ME TO THE DOOR. SUCH IS KABUL TODAY.

4. DR. SHAH WALI SEEMED PLEASED TO RECEIVE SECRETARY VANCE'S MSG. HE READ IT CAREFULLY AND SEEMED GLAD THE SECRETARY HAD SENT IT. I THINK IT WAS A TIMELY GESTURE, ALTHOUGH I AM NOT SURE THAT SHAH WALI CAUGHT ANY OF THE NUANCES IN THE PIECE. THE IMPROTANT THING TO HIM WAS PROBABLY THAT THE SECRETARY HAD TROUBLED TO SEND IT.

5. AS I STATED IN THE SUMMARY, SHAH WALI ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS GOVT'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. ASSUMING THE POSTURE OF AN AGGRIEVED AND MISUNDERSTOOD PARTY, HE PLEADED THAT HIS GOVT HAD NEVER DONE ANYTHING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, WAS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO BE A THREAT TO THE U.S., AND WAS SURE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COULD NOT OBJECT TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS THE REGIME HAD TAKEN TO ABOLISH "FEUDALISM". I TOLD HIM I WOULD TRANSMIT THIS MSG.

6. WE TALKED FOR ABOUT 50 MINUTES. I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE MUCH EARLIER, BUT EVERY TIME I STARTED TO RISE, HE WOULD INTERJECT A NEW QUESTION. AT THIS SENSITIVE JUNCTURE IN OUR RELATIONS, I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO SEEM INTERESTED AND RESPONSIVE, AND TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MAN.

7. SHAH WALI IS SHY AND DIFFIDENT PERSON ILL AT EASE WITH OUTSIDERS, BUT LIKE OUR LAST TALK, LAST APRIL, HE WARMS UP IN TIME. HE SPEAKS SOFTLY - ALMOST IN A WHISPER. NEVER DOES HE SAY MUCH, AND HE IS OFTEN EVASIVE IN HIS ANSWERS. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH WELL. AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MEETING, WE HAD OUR PICTURES TAKEN, AND WE'LL SEE WHETHER THESE WILL BE CARRIED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. HE HAD NO NOTE-TAKER PRESENT.

8. AFTER SAYING THE DRA WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., SHAH WALI COMPLAINED BRIEFLY ABOUT TWO THINGS: VOA BROADCASTS, AND THE CRITICAL AMERICAN PRESS. HE DID NOT DWELL ON EITHER, AND I SAY NO POINT IN ENTERING A DEBATE.

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9134
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EXDIS

9. DURING THE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH CAME UP. I SEIZED MENTION OF THE NAME TO BRIEF HIM ON OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DRA'S COOPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE AFFAIR. I TOLD HIM THAT FROM THE OUTSET OF THAT UNHAPPY FEBRUARY 14 INCIDENT, HIS GOVT HAD BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE. HIS MINISTRY HAS TILL NOT RESPONDED TO OUR LAST THREE DIP NOTES REQUESTING SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT DUBS' DEATH. I TOLD HIM THAT AN IMPORTANT REASON BEHIND CONGRESS' ACTION TO TERMINATE ECONOMIC AID WAS HIS GOVT'S PERFORMANCE IN THIS AFFAIR. SHAH WALI'S RESPONSE WAS NOT RANCOROUS. HE SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT WE STOPPED AID WAS OUR BUSINESS. HOWEVER, IF THE USG, WITH ALL ITS RESOURCES COULDN'T CLEAR UP THE MYSTERIES ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION, HOW COULD WE EXPECT THE DRA TO DO BETTER WITH RESPECT TO AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH.

10. I ALSO TOLD SHAH WALI THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WE WERE NOT PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE DRA OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED EVIDENT TO US, FROM STATEMENTS IN THE DRA GOVT-CONTROLLED RADIO AND PRESS, THAT ELEMENTS IN HIS GOVT BELIEVED WE WERE DOING SO AND CERTAINLY SOUGHT TO CONVEY THIS IMPRESSION TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. I SAID THIS HARDLY HELPED THE CLIMATE FOR BETTER US-AFGHAN RELATIONS. IF HE HAD EVIDENCE OF US INVOLVEMENT, I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT IT. SHAH WALI MADE NO COMMENT.

11. COMMENT. I PLAN TO USE SHAH WALI'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS A LEVER TO TRY SOLVE SOME OF OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. I SUSPECT THAT WITHIN A FEW DAYS I WILL HAVE TO CALL ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST TO TRY TO PRY LOOSE OUR MARINE GUARDS' PASSPORTS WHICH HE HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO RETRUN TO US. THIS IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DRA'S DEMAND THAT WE REDUCE THE SIZE OF OUR MISSION. I WILL TELL DOST THAT IF SHAH WALI'S MSG OF DESIRING GOOD RELATIONS WAS SINCERE, I HOPE THIS CAN BE REFLECTED BY THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE PASSPORTS WITH THE REQUESTED ENTRY/EXIT VISAS.

12. I AM NOT SURE AT THIS STAGE HOW MUCH CLOUT SHAH WALI HAS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HAFAZULLAH AMIN IS STILL VERY MUCH THE STRONG MAN IN THE GOVT, AND WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT HE CONTINUES TO EXERT A LARGE ROLE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I'M ALSO NOT SURE ABOUT DR. SHAH WALI'S VIEWS ABOUT THE U.S., NOTWITHSTANDING HIS EFFORT TO BE FRIENDLY TO ME. HE PROFESSED TO BE AN ADMIRER OF AMERICA, BUT I THINK HE WAS DISSEMBLING THERE. DURING THE TIME HE WAS MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACTING PLANNING MINISTER, HE WAS CONSISTENTLY OBSTRUCTIVE IN HIS DEALINGS WITH OUR USAID MISSION. GENERALLY, WE HAVE ASSESSED HIM AS BEING AMONG THE MORE HARD-LINE POLITBURO MEMBERS, AND NO FRIEND OF THE U.S. WE'LL SEE.

13. I HAVE JUST HAD A TALK WITH UK AMBASSADOR CROOK. HE MET WITH SHAH WALI SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER, AND TELLS ME THEY HAD A ROUGH SESSION (ESPECIALLY ON BBC) AND THAT TIMPERS WERE BARELY CONTROLLED. AMSTUTZ

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S E C R E T SECTION 21 OF 06 USNATO 05615

E.O.12065: RDS-1 08/09/89 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, AF, NATO
SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (S)

REF: (A) STATE 202431 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 204724

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT AUGUST 7 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, U.K., FRG, CANADA AND TURKEY SUBMITTED WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. TEXTS ARE TRANSMITTED PARA 6. U.K. REP WHO HAD SUGGESTED EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDED THAT POLADS, IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, DISCUSS SUBJECT AT NEXT MEETING AS WELL. THIS WAS AGREED.

3. U.S. REP UNDERLINED PER REF A WASHINGTON INTEREST IN ALLIED ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN (WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN PART), AND SAID THERE SHOULD BE A CONTINUING EXCHANGE ON THIS WITHIN THE COMMITTEE. CANADIAN REP, IN RESPONSE TO U.S. DESCRIPTION OF SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION OF U.S. DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM KABUL, SAID THAT CANADIANS TOO WERE "INTERESTED" IN EVACUATION ISSUE. HE WENT ON TO NOTE OTTOWA'S VIEW THAT REBEL MOVEMENT WOULD REMAIN FRAGMENTED AND INEFFECTIVE UNTIL A SINGLE ANTI-TARAKI LEADER EMERGED WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE TO DATE. CANADIAN REP ASKED FOR ANY VIEWS OR INFORMATION OTHERS MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ASPECT.

4. ITALIAN REQUESTED THAT AUGUST 5 COUP BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSION AT NEXT POLADS MEETING. FRG REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT SURE WHETHER RECENT GOVERN-

MENT RESHUFFLE WAS DUE TO DESIRE TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OR WAS DIRECTED AGAINST A POSSIBLE USSR INTERNAL "PLOT".

5. ACTION REQUESTED: NEXT POLADS MEETING WILL BE AUGUST 21. WE WOULD APPRECIATE NLT OOB AUGUST 21 ANY WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE ALLIED PAPERS AND THE VARIOUS POINTS RAISED ORALLY.

6. BEGIN TEXTS OF ALLIED PAPERS:

BEGIN TEXT OF CANADIAN DELEGATION PAPER:

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

INTERNAL OPPOSITION

1. THE TRIBAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IS SLOWLY BUT STEADILY INCREASING IN AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE MAJOR URBAN CENTRES AND THE MAIN ROAD NETWORK, IT HAS SURRENDERED ITS AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

2. ALTHOUGH ARMED OPPOSITION IS INCREASING, IT CONTINUES TO BE FRAGMENTED WITH LITTLE READILY APPARENT PROSPECT OF MERGING INTO A COHESIVE FORCE. IT HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED THE CAPACITY FOR SUSTAINED CO-ORDINATED MILITARY QUESTIONS SUFFICIENT TO KNOCK OUT THE TARAKI REGIME. DESPITE AN ELEMENT OF DISLOYALTY IN THE ARMED FORCES AND PROBLEMS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES, THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS ABLE TO MAINTAIN ITSELF IN THE URBAN CENTRES WHICH ARE VITAL TO ITS EXISTENCE.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

3. PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO RECEIVE AND TO HELP SUSTAIN AFGHANISTAN REFUGEES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DOING ITS BEST TO LIMIT THE REFUGEES' POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE PAKISTAN ATTEMPTS IN THIS AREA MIGHT BE BEARING SOME FRUIT IN THAT THE USSR REPRESENTATIVES AND TASS HAVE IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS BEEN DROPPING VERBAL BOUQUETS ABOUT PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN/USSR RELATIONS. WE SAY MIGHT BECAUSE SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD BE INSPIRED BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, I.E. TO MAKE INROADS IN CHINA'S COMPARATIVELY FAVOURED POSITION IN PAKISTAN.

4. THE RECENT REDUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF PAKISTAN'S CONNIVANCE WITH THE REBEL FORCES THROUGH THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF REFUGEE AGITATORS MAY BE EASING ONE ASPECT OF BORDER TENSIONS. NEVERTHELESS, AN ESTIMATED 125,000 REFUGEES IN CAMPS AS WELL AS THOUSANDS

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OF OTHER AFGHANISTAN REFUGEES RESIDING WITH BORDER AREA KINSFOLK, IS A DRAIN ON PAKISTAN'S PATIENCE AND RESOURCES. PAKISTAN'S OBSESSION WITH THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IS UNPREDICTABLE AND A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. THE IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING ITS "ISLAMIC" DIMENSION ALSO PLAY A PART.
SOVIET ROLE

5. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AS FAR AS THE SOVIET POSITION IS CONCERNED LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS.
6. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT RUMOURS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP THE TARAKI LEADERSHIP IN FAVOUR OF A GROUP WHO MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHANISTAN MASSES, THERE HAS BEEN NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS ASSERTION. INDEED, THE FOREMOST SOVIET OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN CLOSELY UNDER THE SOVIET THUMB AS ANY CHANGE IN POWER WITHIN THE COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THE "NEW LEVEL" OF SOVIET/AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS. AT THE MOMENT, THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DEFINITELY DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME UP TO A POINT SHORT OF DIRECT INTERVENTION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MAY BE CASTING ABOUT FOR NEW LEADERSHIP WHEREBY THEY CAN MAINTAIN THEIR ACTIVE PRESENCE WHILE OFFERING A MORE PALATABLE GOVERNMENT TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

CONCLUSION

7. THE CALL OF AFGHAN MULLAHS FOR A "JIHAD" AGAINST THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME HAS NOT LED TO THE EMERGENCE OF ONE LEADER FROM WITHIN THE GUERRILLA RANKS. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT ONE WILL APPEAR, AND SO LONG AS THE OPPOSITION REMAINS DISORGANIZED THE STRUGGLE APPEARS BOUND TO BE PROTRACTED.
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF FRG PAPER:

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SPEAKING NOTES

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN; COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET ENGAGEMENT

1. AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IS RAPIDLY WORSENING. THE PRO-MOSCOW TARAKI REGIME IS APPARENTLY FACING DIFFICULTIES. IN SPITE OF MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPORT BY THE SOVIETS IN THE FORM OF LARGE-SCALE DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND THE USE OF BETWEEN 3,000 AND 3,500 MILITARY ADVISERS - SOME OF THEM IN LEADING POSITIONS - THE AFGHAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BREAK THE PREDOMINANTLY RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED RESISTANCE OF LARGE PARTS OF THE POPULATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE RESISTANCE GROUPS ARE ACHIEVING GROWING SUCCESSES. WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, THE REGIME WOULD PROBABLY HAVE FALLEN A LONG TIME AGO.

2. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CONCERNED, THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL SOON BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A DECISION CONCERNING ITS FUTURE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

3. IT CAN PROBABLY BE RULED OUT THAT MOSCOW WILL DROP THE PRESENT REGIME SINCE THIS MIGHT MEAN THE LOSS OF AN IMPORTANT ZONE OF INTEREST FOR THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE - BY WINNING AFGHANISTAN - THE DISTANCE SEPARATING THEM FROM THEIR GEOSTRATEGIC AIM, THE INDIAN OCEAN, HAS SHRUNK TO 500 KMS. IF AFGHANISTAN WERE TO RETURN TO A MORE OR LESS ISLAMIC STATE, MOSCOW WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY HAVE AN ANTI-SOVIET NEIGHBOUR. APART FROM SUCH A POLITICAL SET-BACK, IMPLICATIONS ON OTHER SOVIET ZONES OF INFLUENCE AND THE MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET POPULATION COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED.

4. THE POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT RULERS IN KABUL BY A GOVERNMENT WHICH APPEARS IN A LESS PRO-MOSCOW LIGHT TO THE OUT-SIDE WORLD - THIS IS WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE APPARENTLY TRYING TO DO AT THE PRESENT TIME - WOULD HARDLY HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THEY ARE FIGHTING NOT SO MUCH AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT REGIME BUT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY WHICH, FOR THEM, IS PRIMARILY REPRESENTED BY THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY.

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6425
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5. THEREFORE, IF MOSCOW WANTS TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION, IT MUST REINFORCE ITS COMMITMENT EVEN FURTHER. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE ACTIVE USE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF THE TARAKI REGIME MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ENTITLED - AFTER MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS - TO TAKE ACTION TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN. THIS COULD BE PREPARED POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY BY PUBLICATIONS IN THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN PRESS ON THE SUPPORT OF "REBELS" AND THE "AGGRESSION" BY PAKISTAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME, AFGHANISTAN IS DESCRIBED IN THE SOVIET PRESS AS A MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, WHICH WOULD MAKE HER SUBJECT TO THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

6. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WILL STEP UP HER ENGAGEMENT TO THE LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION SINCE THIS WOULD LEAD TO SERIOUS RISKS. FIRST OF ALL, SUCH A STEP WOULD BE BOUND TO PROVOKE NEGATIVE REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD. BUT MOSCOW MIGHT STILL BE PREPARED TO RUN THAT RISK.

7. MORE SERIOUS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE THE RESISTANCE TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOVIETS. THE AFGHAN POPULATION REGARDS NOTHING AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ITS FREEDOM; UP TO NOW, IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ALL FOREIGN CLAIMS OF SUPREMACY AND HAS NEVER BEEN FORCED UNDER ANY FORM OF COLONIAL RULE. IN CASE OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION, THE POPULATION IS LIKELY TO IGNORE ALL THE EXISTING TRIBAL

QUARRELS AND TO RISE AS ONE MAN AGAINST THE SOVIET INVADERS.

8. IT APPEARS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THIS RESISTANCE. THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN - 80 OF AFGHANISTAN ARE COVERED BY MOUNTAIN COUNTRY WITHOUT ROADS AND ARE FAVOURABLE FOR GUERRILLAS - THE MENTALITY OF THE WARLIKE MOUNTAIN TRIBES AND THEIR FORM OF WARFARE MAKE THIS UNLIKELY. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT AN INTERVENTION WOULD LEAD TO A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR WHOSE OUTCOME WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN AND WHICH WOULD TIE DOWN SOVIET FORCES FOR A LONG TIME.

9. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME IN KABUL. ADDITIONAL ARMS WILL BE SENT, AND THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS WILL INCREASE. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT MOSCOW MAY USE SOVIET TROOPS FROM UZBEKISTAN AND TADCHIKISTAN WHO, WHEN PUT INTO AFGHAN UNIFORMS, WOULD REMAIN UNCONSPICUOUS FROM A PHYSICAL AND A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AT PRESENT WHETHER MOSCOW IS REALLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RISK OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION.
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF TURKISH PAPER:

AFGHANISTAN

THE GENERAL IMPRESSION AFTER THE COUP IN APRIL 1979 WAS THAT THE NEW REGIME WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME TAKING ROOT AND THAT THE CONSERVATIVE AND INDEPENDENT CHARACTER OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT TAKE EASILY TO THE SOVIET-INCLINED AND COMMUNIST NATURE OF THE REGIME.

THIS FORECAST HAS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE: FIRST THE NOMADIC TRIBES ALONG THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS REFUSED TO COME UNDER THE RULE OF THE REGIME; THEIR RESISTANCE SPREAD GRADUALLY UNTIL THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN HERAT IN MARCH 1979 AND THEN IN KABUL ON 23 JUNE AND OVER THE LAST WEEKEND. DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN AWAY THIS UNREST AS FOREIGN-INSTIGATED, THE MAIN FORCE BEHIND IT SEEMS TO BE THE DISCORDANCE MENTIONED ABOVE.

IT IS PLAIN THAT IRAN AND PAKISTAN DO NOT VIEW THE AFGHAN REGIME WITH A WARM HEART, AND REGARD IT AS A CONTRADICTION OF THEIR OWN ISLAM-INSPIRED REGIMES. NOTWITHSTANDING, NEITHER COUNTRY IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE ACTION.

PAKISTAN: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HER ISOLATION IN

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THE REGION CONSTITUTE DETERMINING FACTORS IN HER ATTITUDE. IT IS TRUE THAT HER NOMAD POPULATION ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER UNDERTAKE ACTION DIRECTED AT AFGHANISTAN; WITH OR WITHOUT AFGHANISTAN, THIS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR PAKISTAN FOR, TO BRING ORDER AND GOVERNMENT RULE TO THAT REGION, SHE HAS TO RESORT TO AN EXTENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION ALONG THE LONG AND RUGGED BORDER REGION.

IRAN: VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONDEMNING THE PRESSURE BEING EXERCISED ON THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN AFGHANISTAN NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE MORE SUBSTANTIAL IRANIAN MOVES IN HER PRESENT DAY CONDITIONS.

ALONGSIDE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE AFGHAN REGIME, VARIOUS GROUPS HAVE BEEN FORMED ABROAD, WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN INDIA. THE MAIN ATTRIBUTE OF OPPOSITION GROUPS AT HOME OR ABROAD, ARMED OR NOT, IS THEIR INDEPENDENT NATURE FROM EACH OTHER, LACK OF CO-ORDINATION AMONG THEM AND THEIR LACK OF LEADERSHIP. THESE SHORTCOMINGS MAKE SUCCESS LESS LIKELY.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE FACE OF STRONGER DOMESTIC OPPOSITION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE OF SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT. THROUGHOUT JUNE THIS YEAR, RUMOURS CONCERNING A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAVE CIRCULATED IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN KABUL. AN ARAB AMBASSADOR TOLD HIS TURKISH COUNTERPART THAT TARAKI WENT TO MOSCOW ON 9TH JUNE TO ASK FOR SOVIET TROOPS, AND THAT THE SOVIETS TURNED THIS REQUEST DOWN, ONLY REASSURING THE AFGHAN LEADER THAT ECONOMIC AID WILL CONTINUE. THE CLAUSE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' FRIENDSHIP TREATY PROVIDING FOR THE EXPEDITION OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF AN AFGHAN REQUEST. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS SEE THIS AS A LAST RESORT, AND

EVEN THEN WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY, BEARING IN MIND THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- SUCH A STEP COULD LEAD CHINA-PAKISTAN-IRAN AND THE USA TO CLOSE RANKS.

- THE SOVIETS COULD THUS END UP PLAYING INTO CHINESE HANDS.

- THE SOVIETS COULD BE DIRECTLY CONFRONTED WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN A VIETNAM-TYPE ADVENTURE.

IN THE CASE OF A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN TARAKI'S POSITION, THE SOVIET'S COULD HOWEVER PROCEED TO A RESHUFFLE OF THE AFGHAN MARXISTS, THUS TRYING TO RETAIN A SYMPATHETIC APPEARANCE. THIS SEEMS TO BE A STRONGER POSSIBILITY. THEY MAY, FOR INSTANCE, THINK ABOUT INSTALLING SOMEBODY ELSE BELONGING TO TARAKI'S PEOPLE'S PARTY (KHALQ PARTY), OR EVEN ABOUT SUBSTITUTING THE PERCEM PARTY, PREVIOUSLY OUSTED BY KHALQ PARTY. WHETHER OR NOT THESE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT BLOODSHED IS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. ALSO IF A POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE MARXISTS WERE TO TAKE PLACE THIS COULD OFFER THE OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME GOOD PROSPECTS.

INDICATIONS THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE NOT ALL THAT HAPPY WITH TARAKI HAVE ALREADY STARTED TO SURFACE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE FOLLOWING REMARKS MADE TO THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR BY THE GDR AND THE NEWLY-ARRIVED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADORS, ARE ILLUMINATING:

- (GDR) "THE REASONS FOR THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES LIE IN THE STRING OF MISTAKES MADE. IN THE FACE OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE REGIME, THERE IS NO MORE ROOM FOR NEW MISTAKES. THE LEADERS HAVE TO BE VERY WARY FROM NOW ON. THE FIRST WRONG STEP WILL, JUST AS IN CHESS, COST THEM THE GAME. THOSE WHO RESIST ARE PUT UNDER ARREST WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION FOR CHILDREN AND WOMEN. EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THIS CANNOT WORK. ALL THE SAME, SOVIET SUPPORT SEEMS TO CONTINUE. PERHAPS IN A SHORT WHILE, INTERNALLY AND IN PARTICULAR FROM THE PARTY ITSELF, SOME ALTERNATIVES COULD APPEAR."

- (THE VIETNAMESE) "DESPITE MY RECENT ARRIVAL, IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO OBSERVE THE INTERNAL CRISIS. THIS STEMS FROM THE DISTANCE SEPARATING THE LEADERS AND THE POPULATION, THE TOUGH LINE ADOPTED VIS-A-VIS THE REBELS AND FINALLY REFORMS BEING MADE WITHOUT THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES. THESE MAY ALSO BE THE REASON BEHIND THE LATEST GOVERNMENT RESEUFFLE."

AFGHANISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CANNOT BE SAID TO BE GOOD. ALTHOUGH UNTIL A SHORT WHILE

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1546
INFO RUFHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0022
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6427
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0113
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0015
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0075
BT
SECRET SECTION 05 OF 06 USNATO 05615

AGO. THE LEADERS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WANTED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USA, SINCE THE MURDER OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THE FOLLOWING COOLING OF RELATIONS, THEY HAVE, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TENDED TO NAME FRANCE, THE UK AND THE USA FIRST AMONG THE COUNTRIES "AGAINST THE REGIME".

. AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO BE TENSE. ON EVERY OCCASION, THE AFGHAN SIDE CALLS THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS AS THE "REACTIONARY AND FANATICAL LEADERS OF IRAN" AND BEHIND EVERY UPRISING LOOK FOR A SHIITE OR IRANIAN FINGER.

. THE JULY ISLAMABAD VISIT BY DOST, THE AFGHAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, CONSTITUTED AN OPENER FOR A DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN. PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES STRESSED TO THE TURKISH EMBASSY THEIR IMPRESSION THAT DOST DID NOT HAVE MUCH AUTHORITY AND THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANYTHING DURING THE VISIT. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS ONLY AFTER THIS VISIT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, MR. AGHA SHAHI, IN PREPARATION FOR A SUMMIT BETWEEN TARAKI AND GENERAL ZIA, APPEARED.
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

AFGHANISTAN

1. RECENT REPORTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TARAKI REGIME'S ABILITY TO KEEP CONTROL IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT. THE MAINTENANCE OF A FRIENDLY AND CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN THE MAINTENANCE OF TARAKI AND AMIN. BUT WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE SOVIET COMMIT-

MENT TO THE "AFGHAN REVOLUTION" AS SUCH.

2. THE RUSSIANS HAVE INVESTED MUCH IN THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE HAS BEEN A REVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT IT REPRESENTS A MAJOR GAIN FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THAT IT CONFERS A "QUALITATIVELY NEW CHARACTER" ON SOVIET/AFGHAN RELATIONS. IF A SUCCESSOR REGIME WERE TO DISAVOW THE REVOLUTION, THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEE THIS AS A SET-BACK, WHETHER OR NOT AFGHANISTAN REMAINED IN PRACTICE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. THEY WOULD BE THE MORE CONCERNED IF THEY HAD REASON TO FEAR AN ANTI-SOVIET BACKLASH.

3. IF THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO TARAQI AND AMIN WHICH IS LIKELY TO PROVE VIABLE AND TO PAY AT LEAST LIP SERVICE TO REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO PRESERVE THE PRESENT REGIME. THE DISADVANTAGES OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, IN THE SENSE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS OPERATING DIRECTLY AND VISIBLY UNDER SOVIET COMMAND, ARE MANY AND THE RUSSIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO CONSIDER IT EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT. THE PROBABLE SOVIET PREFERENCE, AND THE ONE FOR WHICH THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE IS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, MORE ESPECIALLY IN SO FAR AS A DETERIORATING INTERNAL SITUATION CAN BE BLAMED ON EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THERE IS A THREAT TO THE "SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF AFGHANISTAN WITHIN THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE SOVIET/AFGHAN TREATY.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAVE REACHED OUT IN AFGHANISTAN FOR MORE THAN THEY REALLY NEED, BUT ARE NOW IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CANNOT EASILY RETREAT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FACE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR INTERESTS.

5. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO SWITCH HORSES, IF AN ALTERNATIVE TO TARAQI AND AMIN WERE AVAILABLE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE SET OF LEADERS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH A POPULAR BASE UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE INDEPENDENT OF THE RUSSIANS THAN TARAQI AND AMIN. EVEN WERE THE RUSSIANS PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ALLOWING A SUCCESSOR REGIME A LOOSER REIN, THERE IS NO POLITICAL GROUPING AVAILABLE TO TAKE ON THE ROLE. A MILITARY REGIME MIGHT BE AN ALTERNATIVE. THE ARMY MIGHT BE SEEN BY THE POPULATION AT LARGE AS BEING SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE KHALQ NOT TO BE TARNISHED WITH THE SAME BRUSH. FOR THEIR PART THE RUSSIANS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-373

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MIGHT BE SATISFIED THAT THE LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WITH
TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ENSURE THE CONTINUATION
OF THEIR INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE RELA-
TIVELY EASY FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ENGINEER A COUP, THERE
IS GOOD REASON TO DOUBT WHETHER THE CALIBRE AND RELIA-
BILITY OF THE ARMY ARE SUFFICIENT TO BEAR THE ADDITIONAL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1547

INFO RUEHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0023

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6428

RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0114

RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0016

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0076

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S E C R E T SECTION 36 OF 06 USNATO 05615

INCREASE IN RESPONSIBILITY.

END TEXT. GLITMAN

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEKMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1806
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 664
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 32
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9136
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7205
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 382
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5127

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6223

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8-7-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINK, PINS, AF, UR, GE
SUBJECT: (C) HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET VISITOR REPORTEDLY VISITED KABUL
LAST OCTOBER

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. A SOUTH ASIAN AMBASSADOR AT KABUL HAS TOLD US THAT EAST
GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERMANN SCHWIESAU RECENTLY REVEALED TO
HIM THAT "THE FOURTH-RANKING MAN IN THE SOVIET POLITBURE
VISITED KABUL LAST OCTOBER." THE SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT
THOUGH SCHWIESAU MIGHT HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO KIRILENKO.

3. DO EMBASSY MOSCOW OR THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY IDEA TO
WHOM SCHWIESAU WAS REFERRING?

AMSTUTZ

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POL
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15 AUGUST 1979
RUMHR
IS RUMHR #5866 220143Z
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O P 081425Z AUG 79
BY AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7796
INFO RUSSBOO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3606
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1833
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6133

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 5866

E.O. 12065: GDS: 8/8/75 (XUY, DENNIS) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, TU, AF
SUBJ: (U) TURKISH VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN

CN 362

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1. (C) -ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN INFORMATION MESSAGE; NO ACTION REQUIRED.

3. SUMMARY: COMMENTS FROM JFA OFFICIALS IN RECENT DAYS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE GOT'S PERCEPTION OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION ARE GENERALLY SIMILAR TO US ANALYSES. THE TURKS WELCOMED BREZINSKI'S STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE OF FIRM US INTEREST IN THE SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

4. DURING SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ENBOFFS ON AUGUST 7 AND 8, MFA SOUTH ASIA SECTION CHIEF MITHAT BALKAN AND DIRGEN FOR POL AFFAIRS MUSEYIN CELEM, WELCOMED BREZINSKI'S RECENT STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT PERCEIVES THE STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE OF US WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN. CELEM, HOWEVER, DOUBTED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD DETER THE SOVIETS FROM MAKING "EVERY EFFORT" TO MAINTAIN A COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL.

5. IN CELEM'S OPINION, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT PASS UP THE "HISIORIC OPPORTUNITY" TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT DOES NOT FORESEE OUTRIGHT COMMITMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY UNITS, THOUGH CELEM BELIEVED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT MAY GRADUALLY ESCALATE IN THE FORM OF INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND "ADVISORS". THE TURKS STILL HAD ONLY FRAGMENTARY REPORTS OF THE RECENT FIGHTING IN KABUL, BUT THEY BELIEVE THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT IS IN DEEP TROUBLE. CELEM BELIEVED THE SOVIETS CAN DO LITTLE TO MUTE KHOMEINI'S OUTSPOKEN OPPOSITION TO THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL, BUT THAT THEY WILL TRY TO EXERT DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN.

6. OTHER TURKISH MFA OFFICIALS EXPERIENCED IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE RECENTLY EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS. MFA MIDDLE EAST BUREAU SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOZMANOGLU NOTED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE TARAKI COUP, THE GOT AND THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT WERE ABOUT TO REESTABLISH THEIR EARLIER TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR AFGHAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS. THE TURKS BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME HAS IMPRISONED MOST OF THE TURKISH-TRAINED OFFICERS OR PLACED THEM UNDER HOUSE ARREST, AND REPLACED THEM WITH RUSSIAN-TRAINED OFFICERS.

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FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 522
PUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 958
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 645
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 596
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 004
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 105
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 007
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 195

POL

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065 RDS-4 08/08/95 (ARCHARD, D.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, AF, PK
SUBJ: (C) AFGHAN DISSIDENTS' RADIO TRANSMITTERS

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 8629, (B) ISLAMABAD 8780, (C) STATE 203803

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ACCORDING TO AFGHAN-BORN AMCIT ZIA NASSERY, THERE SOON WILL BE A SECOND AFGHAN DISSIDENT RADIO TRANSMITTER, IN ADDITION TO RADIO ASMAR IN OPERATION IN THIS AREA. NASSERY IS CURRENTLY IN PESHAWAR IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NEW PUSHTUN-AMERICAN CLINIC FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES. (REFTEL A. ALSO, SEPARATE MEMCON WILL BE POUCHED.)

3 NASSERY CLAIMS TO HAVE BROUGHT WITH HIM FROM THE U.S. A SMALL RADIO TRANSMITTER WITH A RANGE OF 80 KILOMETERS. RADIO, WHICH OPERATES OFF AN AUTO STORAGE BATTERY, REPORTEDLY IS SMALL ENOUGH TO FIT INTO A SUITCASE. NASSERY WAS A BIT VAGUE AS TO ITS SOURCE, SAYING ONLY THAT HE HAD PICKED IT UP IN THE U.S. HE DID NOT OFFER TO LET ME SEE THE RADIO, NOR DID I ASK TO DO SO.

4. ZIA NASSERY WAS ALSO VAGUE AS TO THE INTENDED USE OF THE TRANSMITTER. IT WILL BE OPERATED IN THE BORDER AREA, EITHER ON THE PAK SIDE OR IN A "LIBERATED" AREA OF AFGHANISTAN. THE RADIO, LIKE THE CLINIC HE IS ESTABLISHING, WOULD NOT BE AFFILIATED WITH ANY PARTICULAR DISSIDENT GROUP BUT WOULD INSTEAD BE "NEUTRAL." IT IS INTENDED FOR "HUMANITARIAN" PURPOSES, HE SAID.

5. GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS AWARE THAT NASSERY BROUGHT THE TRANSMITTER INTO THE COUNTRY, ACCORDING TO NASSERY.

6. THE DISSIDENT-CONTROLLED TRANSMITTER (RADIO ASMAR) WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATING SPORADICALLY FOR ABOUT A MONTH IS A PICE OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT, NASSERY TOLD ME. REPORTEDLY, RADIO IS A JEEP-MOUNTED, RUSSIAN-MADE TRANSMITTER CAPTURED FROM THE AFGHAN ARMY AND MODIFIED FOR GENERAL BROADCASTS. RADIO IS CONTROLLED BY GUL BADEEN HIKMATIYAR'S HIZB ISLAMI.

7. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD ADDS: THIS REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN PESHAWAR BEFORE POUCH CONTAINING COPIES OF REFS (B) AND (C) ARRIVED THERE; HENCE, CONSUL WAS NOT AWARE OF THAT EXCHANGE.

ARCHARD

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ACTION

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S E C R E T

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TO RUEFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8392
INFO RUEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5129
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 5766
RUSPQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0820
RUEBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2212
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4264
BT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 194166/1

ACTION-
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INFO:
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LIMDIS

R.O. 11652: X-GDS

TAGS: PEPR, SA, IN, IR, AF, US

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S TRIP TO SOUTHERN ASIA

MISSION MAY DRAW ORALLY ON FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS CONCERN-
ING UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S JULY 8-19 TRIP TO SOUTHERN
ASIA IN POLADS AUGUST 2:

1.A. AFGHANISTAN: AFGHAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE
FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EMPHASIZ-
ED THEIR POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE
REVIEWING VARIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS THE FRONTIERS WITH
PAKISTAN AND THE WATER AGREEMENT WITH IRAN AND HAD NOT
YET DETERMINED THEIR POLICIES. THEY STATED THAT WHATEVER
THEIR DECISIONS THEY HOPED TO RESOLVE ISSUES WITH THEIR
NEIGHBORS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

B. ON INTERNAL MATTERS, THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE DRAWING
UP A FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THAT THEIR FIRST PRIORITY WOULD
BE LAND REFORM. THEY SAID THEY FAVORED COOPERATIVES OVER
COLLECTIVES.

C. WHILE THERE IS GENERAL IMPRESSION AROUND WESTERN
EMBASSIES IN KABUL THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS
IS INCREASING, THIS WAS NOT MENTIONED BY AFGHAN OFFICIALS.
ALTHOUGH SORANS POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD HAD GOOD
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR SIXTY YEARS AND LOOK-
ED FORWARD TO SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION.
THEY HOPED TO GET SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM OTHERS AS WELL.

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D. WE DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE MAY INCREASE BUT BELIEVE THE OVERTURES FROM THE NEW GOVERNMENT FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE RESPONDED TO POSITIVELY. THE US WILL BE CONTINUING ITS PRESENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SITUATION SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE US IF ITS PROGRAMS AND PERSONNEL ARE NOT GIVEN TREATMENT AND ACCESS COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF OTHER DONORS, IF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTS FROM GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT OR UNDERTAKES POLICIES WHICH CREATE PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN.

F. PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE CONCERNED BY INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT BELIEVE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE PRESENCE THERE AND THAT COUNTRIES IN REGION SHOULD AVOID PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS WHICH COULD PUSH AFGHANS INTO GREATER DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS. INDIANS TAKE MORE RELAXED VIEW, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL AND POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED INSTABILITY ALONG AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER.

2. A. PAKISTAN: CONVERSATIONS WITH PAKISTANI OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PERSUADED THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW CONTROLS AFGHANISTAN AND THEY FEEL EXTREMELY EXPOSED AS A RESULT. THE PAKISTANIS ALSO REMAIN DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF INDIA, AND RESERVED TOWARD IRAN. THEY ARE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE WEST AND CENTO. GIVEN THESE FACTORS, THE PAKISTANIS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THEIR POLICIES, INCLUDING LOOKING AT A POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OBSERVER STATUS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THEY SUGGESTED THEY ARE EXAMINING SUCH OPTIONS AS LEAVING CENTO IN ORDER TO REDUCE PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. BUT NEWSOM WAS ASSURED BY GEN. ZIA THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION.

B. ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING ISSUE, PAKISTANIS INDICATED RELUCTANCE TO GIVE UP IDEA OF NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT DESPITE OUR URGING THAT, IN LIGHT OF CHANGED AFGHAN CIRCUMSTANCES, PAKISTAN'S OWN POSITION MIGHT BE DIFFERENT AND THAT IF THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS RESOLVED, WE CAN GET ON WITH PREVIOUS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. ZIA GOVERNMENT

DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL STRENGTH TO OVERTURN BHUTTO'S ORIGINAL DECISION TO ACQUIRE A REPROCESSING CAPABILITY.

PAGE THREE S E C R E T 11128

3. SAUDI ARABIA/YEMENS: SAUDI OFFICIALS CONVEYED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE RECENT COUP IN ADEN WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET EFFORT TO ENCIRCLE THEIR OIL-RICH PENINSULA WITH REGIMES HOSTILE TO MODERATE GOVERNMENTS. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE AN INFLUX OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN FOLLOWING THE COUP. WE COMPLIMENTED THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ROLE IN JULY 2 ARAB LEAGUE MEETING WHICH RESULTED IN A CONDEMNATION BY A MAJORITY OF LEAGUE MEMBERS OF PDY'S ROLE IN THE ASSASSINATION OF NORTH YEMEN PRESIDENT GHASHMI AND FURTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF THE ADANI REGIME. WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THE SAG.
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S E C R E T 11128

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INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5130

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0821

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2211

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4265

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 194166/2

LIMITS

TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ALREADY APPROVED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO NORTH YEMEN AND DO NOT INTEND TO RESPOND AT THIS TIME TO ANY PDY INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US.

VANCE

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7: 30 AM - 8: 30 AM

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1. "DURING THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE HAD VISITED THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE KGB (KGB OFFICE), BUT HE ASKED ABOUT [REDACTED] THAT A [REDACTED] HAD VISITED [REDACTED] LAST OCTOBER. [REDACTED] LAUGHED AND REPLIED: 'I CAN TELL YOU THAT NO POLITICAL MEMBER FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN IN AFRICA SINCE THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION.'"

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 PP RUOMH
 DE RUSSIA #0251/1 2200745
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 P R 160700Z AUG 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5266
 RUONGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3693
 RUSGQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9177
 RUMJFG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 621
 RUCMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 365
 RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1751
 RUEHNO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1828
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7246
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3217
 RUSMIR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 461
 RUHQQA/CINCPAC
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USKATG 33
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KABUL 6251

CR 666

POL

CHG

CHRON

ECON
RF

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

D.O. 1200: GDS 6-15-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
 TAGS: PCOV, FINS, FINI, AF
 SUBJ: (CLOU) NATURE OF THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE KHALCI REGIME OF
 PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH
 AMIN IS POSED BY MANY DISPARATE ELEMENTS WHO ARE MOTIVATED
 BY DIFFERING GRIEVANCES. FEARS REGARDING THE REPRESSION
 OF ISLAM AND RESENTMENT OF WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS A SELL-OUT
 TO MOSCOW OF AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL SOUL ARE THE PRIMARY
 INGREDIENTS FUELING THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS STRUGGLING
 FOR A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. SHORT OF
 MEETING SOME DEMANDS FOR JUST SUCH A DRASTIC CHANGE, THE TARAKI-
 AMIN LEADERSHIP HAS LITTLE MANEUVERING ROOM AND FEW OPTIONS
 WHICH WOULD PRESENT VIABLE CHANCES OF REVERSING THE CURRENT
 TREND. HEIGHTENED COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THEREFORE,
 ARE PROBABLY ON THE HORIZON, COUPLED WITH A LARGER SOVIET
 EFFORT TO SAVE THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION ITSELF, IF NOT THIS
 PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP. DESPITE ITS SUCCESSSES THUS FAR, THE
 OPPOSITION REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND ESSENTIALLY WITHOUT LEADER-
 SHIP.

3. FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES CONFRONT THE INSURGENTS IN THEIR EFFORT TO OVERTHROW A DETERMINED, BUT LESS, AND WELL-ARMED REGIME, AND THE OPPOSITION'S GOALS REMAIN GENERALLY UNARTICULATED AND VAGUE. NONETHELESS, A "VICTORY" BY THE OPPOSITION (WHICH IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED) COULD HAVE MIXED BLESSINGS FOR UNITED STATES' HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND POLITICAL INTEREST IN THIS COUNTRY AND REGION. THE FALL OF A RADICAL ~~BOULAT AND COURT BACKED REGIME~~ ~~WILL HAVE POSITIVE~~ REPERCUSSIONS FOR US THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD BY DEMONSTRATING THAT OUR ADVERSARIES' VIEW OF THE "INEVITABLE" COURSE OF HISTORY IS NOT NECESSARILY ACCURATE. LIKEWISE, DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION, AN OPPOSITION-LED REGIME MIGHT WELL BE MUCH MORE AMENABLE TO THE RETURN OF A U.S. PRESENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL FIELD IN THIS COUNTRY. CONVERSELY, A REGIME BASED ESSENTIALLY ON THE "FUNDAMENTALIST" TENETS OF ISLAM WOULD PROBABLY NOT PLACE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM (E.G., THE "MANIFESTO" OF THE "ISLAMIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN" CALLS FOR THE RE-POSITION OF "PURDAH," THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO A LIFE OF ISOLATION), AND THE PROBABLY INEVITABLE WIDESPREAD VENGEANCE AIMED AT KHALQIS WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS, NO MATTER HOW JUSTIFIED RETRIBUTION AGAINST SOME KHALQI OFFICIALS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, OUR LARGER INTERESTS, GIVEN THE DRA'S EXTREMELY CLOSE TIES TO MOSCOW, WOULD PROBABLY BE SERVED BY THE DECISE OF THE TARAKI AND AMIN REGIME.

END OF SUMMARY.

4. INTRODUCTION: SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) SIXTEEN MONTHS AGO, THE LEADERSHIP AND RANK AND FILE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) -- THE KEY POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY, WHOSE PRINCIPAL ROOTS LIE IN A SMALL GROUP IN THE MILITARY, A SEGMENT OF THE INTELLENTSIA, AND YOUNG YOUTH -- HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ALTER DRAMATICALLY AFGHANISTAN'S "TRADITIONAL" POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. GIVEN AFGHANISTAN'S POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS, THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'S GOALS WOULD, UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THEMSELVES, DESERVE SOME SUPPORT FROM MOST AMERICANS INTERESTED IN MITIGATING THE LOT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. BEING IN POLITICAL DISTRESS, A POLICY OF NEUTRALITY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE POSITION. THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY, HOWEVER, IS NOT A POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE.

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PP RUEHHR.
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5261
RUEHGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3694
RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9178
RUEHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 682
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 366
RUEHDC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1752
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1829
RUEHBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7247
RUEHNPB/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3218
RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 402
RUEHQA/CINCPAC
RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 34
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 KABUL 6251
CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD.

OPPOSITION MOVEMENT WHOSE INSURGENCY OPERATIONS HAVE NIBBLED AWAY AT THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY OUTSIDE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS -- ALTHOUGH THE REGIME CAN STILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND FORCEFULLY (AS DEMONSTRATED IN KABUL ON AUGUST 5) TO DIRECT CHALLENGES NEAR THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL HEART. NONETHELESS, THE OPPOSITION, ALBEIT STILL FRAGMENTED AND GENERALLY LEADERLESS, IS WIDESPREAD AND APPARENTLY FUELED BY DEEPLY-HELD GRIEVANCES THAT HAVE CAUSED THOUSANDS OF

INSURGENTS TO RISK ALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW A REGIME WHICH PROFFERS THAT IT HAS ONLY THE WELFARE OF THE AFGHAN MASSES AT HEART.

5. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION EQUATION: THE APPPOSITION TO THE DRA IS NOT A MONOLITHIC AND COORDINATED INSURGENCY, SINCE A NUMBER OF DISPARATE ELEMENTS ARE STRUGGLING FOR VARIOUS REASONS FOR A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THIS REGIME. THE REBEL GROUPS ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN COMBAT AGAINST THE AFGHAN ARMY APPEAR TO DRAW THEIR MANPOWER FROM VILLAGES AND TRIBES, WHICH CONSTITUTE ANYWHERE FROM 80-90 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S POPULATION. THESE GENERALLY ILLITERATE SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN SOCIETY ARE TRADITIONAL FOES OF ANY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AT KABUL, ALTHOUGH MANY ARE APOLITICAL IF LEFT ALONE. HOWEVER, SOME VILLAGERS -- FOR VARIOUS REASONS (E.G., ECONOMIC) -- UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORT THE DRA, SINCE THE RURAL POPULATION ALSO SERVES AS THE GOVERNMENT'S MANPOWER POOL FOR ITS MILITARY ENLISTED RANKS. THUS, RESISTANCE, HOWEVER WIDESPREAD, HAS NOT YET COMPLETELY STYMIED THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO MEET ITS NEEDS FOR UNSKILLED TROOPS, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS HAVE INDEED BEEN ENCOUNTERED.

TO THE OPPOSITION'S EFFORTS. RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR OTHERWISE PERSECUTED BY THIS REGIME UNDOUBTEDLY SEEK RETRIBUTION, AS IS THE TRADITION IN THIS REVENGE-MINDED SOCIETY. THE LONGER THIS LEADERSHIP SURVIVES TO PURSUE ITS PAST POLICIES, THE LARGER THIS PARTICULAR GROUP WILL BECOME. DISORIENTED AND ISOLATED LEFTISTS (MOSTLY PARACHUTISTS, BUT ALSO SOME DISAFFECTED KHALQIS) ALSO SEEK CHANGE, NOT LEAST OF ALL BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM HAS BETRAYED THE GENUINE SPIRIT OF THE REVOLUTION, AND HAS SQUANDERED THE INITIAL GOOD-WILL WHICH GREETED THE ADVENT OF A REFORMIST GOVERNMENT SIXTEEN MONTHS AGO. DISILLUSIONED ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY, WHO MAY SEE NO END TO THE FIGHTING AND KILLING, REPRESENT A POTENTIALLY CRITICAL SEGMENT OF THE OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY IF DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS INCREASE, OR IF FURTHER EXPLOSIONS LIKE AUGUST 5 OCCUR. THE OPPOSITION GROUPS HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR REPRESENT DISSENT FROM THE FORMER "ESTABLISHMENT," WHO GENERALLY LOOK WITH DISDAIN UPON THE KHALQIS, MOST OF WHOM DO NOT TRACE THEIR LINEAGE TO THE ELITE CLASSES. IN THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, THESE PARTICULAR "LIBERATION FRONTS" PROBABLY DO NOT POSE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE DRA, AND FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ANLF), ET AL, TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT FUTURE ROLE THEY WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN INTRAGROUP DIFFERENCES, AND ESTABLISH SOME CONVINCING BONA FIDES FOR CARRYING OUT INSURGENT OPERATIONS NEARER THE POLITICAL HEART OF THE COUNTRY. GROUPS WITH LESS THAN 5000 GOALS ARE ALSO HARASSING THE GOVERNMENT, AS REGULAR BANDITS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ELEMENTS STEP UP THEIR OPERATIONS ALONG SEVERAL OF THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL HIGHWAYS, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE OVERALL BREAKDOWN IN LAW AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

7. MAJOR OPPOSITION GROUPS OPERATING WITHIN AFGHANISTAN: MAJOR AREAS OF SUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN: THE EASTERN PROVINCE OF NURISTAN (WHERE THE NURISTANIS FOR MONTHS APPEARED INTERESTED ONLY IN DENYING THE REGIME ACCESS TO THEIR RUGGED HOMELAND, BUT WHO MAY NOW ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIGHTING IN THE PANJSHIR VALLEY MUCH NEARER KABUL); PAKHTIA PROVINCE SOUTHEAST OF THE CAPITAL (WHOSE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS MAY BE MOST CLOSELY RELATED TO THE REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, AS WELL AS TO THE VARIOUS "FORMAL" GROUPS (ESPECIALLY TO THAT OF GULBUDDIN HEKMATIYAR AND SEYED AHMAD GAILANI) HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR, AND WHERE EFFORTS MAY HAVE REACHED THE CITIES OF GARDEZ AND GHAZNI); THE LUNAR-LIKE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (WHOSE HAZARA/SHI'A POPULATION, THE LOWEST RUNG ON THE AFGHAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LADDER, IS

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 P R 160700Z AUG 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5262
 RUQMOU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3695
 RUSBOU/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9179
 RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 683
 RUSMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 367
 RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1753
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1830
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7248
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3219
 RUQMHF/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 403
 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO 35
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 KABUL 6251

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

PROBABLY FIGHTING IN ORDER TO AVENGE PAST REPRESSIONS SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF PUSHTUN-DOMINATED CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS; THE AREA AROUND HERAT CITY (WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT IRANIAN "INFLUENCE" OR "EXPERIENCE" MAY BE AIDING THE FARSIWAN AND PUSHTU INSURGENTS); AND, THE TURKOMEN AND UZBEK AGRICULTURAL REGIONS NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH (ALTHOUGH THESE REGIONS ARE LESS HEAVILY-MANNED BY THE AFGHAN ARMY, THE FIGHTING HAS NOT REACHED THE PROPORTIONS OF THAT ALONG THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER). EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION OF THESE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, REMAINS ELUSIVE, AND, SO FAR AT LEAST, THESE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS HAVE PRINCIPALLY BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY LOCAL INHABITANTS FIGHTING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN TURF. IF THE INSURGENTS BEGIN MOUNTING MAJOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THESE INDIVIDUAL REGIONS (AS MAY BE THE CASE NOW WITH THE NURISTANIS), THE REGIME'S PROBLEMS MAY BECOME MANIFESTLY MORE DIFFICULT.

8. FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION GRIEVANCES APPEAR SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM FIGHTING; TWO FUNDAMENTAL PERCEPTIONS TRANSCEND THESE "COMPLAINTS" MOTIVATING INDIVIDUAL OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, AND FUEL THE OVERALL INSURGENCIES TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION. THESE ARE THE VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL PERCEPTIONS THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP IS MADE UP OF "GODLESS COMMUNISTS," AND THAT THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM HAS SOLD AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL SOUL AND FUTURE TO MOSCOW. FEARS OF THE ULTIMATE REPRESSION OF THEIR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS A LA SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT MANY MUSLIMS FLED THOSE AREAS TO AFGHANISTAN IN THIS CENTURY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THEIR RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY), AND TRADITIONAL AFGHAN HATRED FOR THE OVERLY POWER-

RETTY HEAVY STUFF WHEN MIXED WITH MODERN WEAPONS AND A WILL FOR REVENGE. THEY ARE EMOTIONS UNLIVELY TO FINISH QUICKLY, AND ARE, LIKEWISE, EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO STAMP OUT BY FORCE.

9. BY CONTRAST, THE REGIME'S PRINCIPAL REFORM PROGRAMS (REDUCING ILLITERACY, LAND REFORM, ELIMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL "BRIDE PRICE," AND BANNING OF USURY PRACTICES) PROVOKED SOME SCATTERED OPPOSITION, BUT THE ONGOING INSURGENCY IS NOT PRIMARILY SUSTAINED BY HOSTILITY TO THESE PROGRAMS, NO MATTER HOW UNPOPULAR THEY MAY HAVE BEEN. WHAT SEEMS CLEAR IS THAT DEEPLY-FELT EMOTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO CAUSE EVEN AFGHANS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST MODERN WEAPONS WIELDED BY A DETERMINED AND RUTHLESS GOVERNMENT, AND WHAT SUCH EMOTIONS DO, IN FACT, PREVAIL ON THE CURRENT AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE.

10. FEW POLICY OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE REGIME TO REVERSE THE PRESENT TREND: THE DRA LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO HAVE VERY FEW POLITICAL OPTIONS AT ITS DISPOSAL WHICH, IF ADOPTED, WOULD HAVE VIABLE CHANCES OF REVERSING THE CURRENT TIDE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED A NUMBER OF ITS PROGRAMS (MOST NOTABLY LAND REFORM) "SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED," BUT THIS ACTION HAS HAD LITTLE NOTICEABLE IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THE REGIME'S REFORMS DID NOT REPRESENT ROOT CAUSES FOR THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION.

11. TO ADDRESS THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE, THE LEADERSHIP HAS MOUNTED AN INTENSE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING REPEATED ASSURANCES BY TARAKI AND AMIN IN THEIR PUBLIC SPEECHES THAT THE DRA IS ABSOLUTELY NOT OPPOSED TO ISLAM. MOREOVER, AN EARLY AUGUST CONCLAVE IN KABUL OF OVER ONE HUNDRED "ISLAMIC SCHOLARS" ISSUED A STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE "DEVOUTNESS" OF THE REGIME AND CLAIMING THAT THE DRA ACTUALLY IS THE "PROTECTOR" OF ISLAM. NONETHELESS, THIS PARTICULAR EFFORT MAY WELL HAVE COME TOO LATE TO CONVINCE THE MASSES THAT THE KHALQI REGIME DOES NOT HAVE THE REDUCTION OF ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN AS ONE OF ITS PRIMARY GOALS.

12. MODIFICATIONS IN THE DRA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT POSSIBLY MOLLIFY THE OPPOSITION TO SOME EXTENT, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY MEANINGFUL WAYS THE KHALQIS COULD DO THIS WITHOUT RISKING THEIR OWN SELF-DESTRUCTION, SINCE THE SOVIET CONNECTION IS THE CRUCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP. THUS, THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM FACES THE QUANDARY THAT THE DRA PROBABLY COULD NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT EXTENSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT; WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, THAT VERY SUPPORT SERVES TO FAN THE FLAMES OF THE NATIONALISTIC OPPOSITION.

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...THE ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
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...WITHIN THE COUNTRY, ONE
...OF THE ISLAMIC RE-
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...PLACE.

10. CONVERSELY, THE AVAILABLE "MANIFESTOS" ISSUED BY SOME OPPOSITION GROUPS CALL FOR A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE "FUNDAMENTALIST" TENETS OF ISLAM, AND, THEREFORE, AN OPPOSITION-LED REGIME WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS (SO NECESSARY FOR THIS BACKWARD COUNTRY) HIGH ON ITS PRIORITY LIST. THOUSANDS OF PERSONAL VENDETTAS WOULD PROBABLY BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SURVIVING KHALQI OFFICIALS, THEREBY PROBABLY TARNISHING A POST-DRA REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, NO MATTER HOW JUSTIFIED RETRIBUTION AGAINST SOME OFFICIALS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE. AN UNFRIENDLY STANCE TOWARD THE USSR (NOT INEVITABLE, BUT CERTAINLY MORE PROBABLE GIVEN THE FORCES MOTIVATING THE CURRENT OPPOSITION) COULD HAVE DESTABILIZING RESULTS FOR THE REGION, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES PREVAILING IN AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THIS EVENTUALITY, INCIDENTALLY, COULD ENTER MOSCOW'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR TO GO WITH THIS KHALQI REGIME.

17. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, OUR LARGER INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE DRA'S EXTREMELY CLOSE TIES TO MOSCOW, THIS REGIME'S ALMOST OPEN HOSTILITY TO US, AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR IT HAS CREATED THROUGHOUT THIS COUNTRY, WOULD PROBABLY BE SERVED BY THE DEMISE OF THE TARAKI AND AMIN REGIME, DESPITE WHATEVER SETBACKS THIS MIGHT MEAN FOR FUTURE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN.

AMSTUTZ

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0149

INFO RUTHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0068

RUSBCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1229

RUPLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0655

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0574

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0701

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1529

RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0223

RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7735

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 20485

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E.O. 12065: IDS 8/16/04 (GARRISON, MARK) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, MOPS, PGOV, AF, FR, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE FRENCH CHARGE IN MOSCOW, JACQUES DUPONT (PROTECT), MET RECENTLY WITH BOLDYREV, CHIEF OF MFA'S MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT, AND GAVE THE FOLLOWING READ-OUT AT THE AUGUST 14 QUADRIPARTITE MEETING:

3. POLITICAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN: BOLDYREV ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES IN THE COUNTRY, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THIS WAS NOT SURPRISING BECAUSE THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION IS IN A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BOLDYREV SAID THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ATTRIBUTED THE EVENTS IN KABUL ON AUGUST 5 TO THE INTERFERENCE OF OUTSIDE POWERS, BUT HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IS NOW IN HAND. THE SOVIETS ARE VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN'S LEADERS; RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE EXCELLENT; AND THE SOVIETS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN.

4. SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION, BOLDYREV SAID THE USSR IS OPPOSED TO ANY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM ANY DIRECTION. HE REFERRED TO BREZHNEV'S NOVEMBER 1978 STATEMENT ON IRAN AS THE BASIC SOVIET POLICY STATEMENT FOR THE AREA AND SAID IT IS APPLICABLE TO AFGHANISTAN. WHILE STATING THAT THE 1978 SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY IS NOT A MILITARY ONE, BOLDYREV ADDED THAT, IF THERE WERE A THREAT TO PEACE IN THE REGION, THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT. ANY SOVIET ACTION, HOWEVER, WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE UN CHARTER.

5. SOVIET PRESENCE TODAY: WHEN QUERIED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THERE WERE 5,000 SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN, BOLDYREV SAID THE NUMBER WAS GROSSLY EXAGGERATED.

6. PRA'S POLITICAL FUTURE: DUPONT SAID THAT BOLDYREV, THROUGH HIS STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PLANNING TO RESINDEED IT. GARRISON

BT

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PP RUOMHR

DE RUELY #6269 2310420

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P R 181114Z AUG 79

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5272

INFO RUOMBU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3698

RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 686

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9185

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1756

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1834

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7255

RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 407

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC

RUSNAAA/CINCEUR

RUFHHA/USMISSION US NATO 38

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6269

CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

CN 783

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ECON

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CRHON

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-18-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P

TACS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF, UR

SUBJECT: (C) SOVIET OFFICIAL EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT MOSCOW
WILL PROTECT ITS CITIZENS HERE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER, "ABOUT TEN" SOVIETS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN POST-REVOLUTION VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WILL DO "EVERYTHING NECESSARY" TO PROTECT ITS REPRESENTATIVES HERE. THE SOVIET DISPLAYED TESTINESS WHICH COULD REFLECT GROWING PRESSURES ON SOVIETS SERVING IN THIS COUNTRY, AS THE ANTI-SOVIET INSURGENTS APPEAR TO BE BRINGING THEIR ACT EVEN CLOSER TO KABUL. END OF SUMMARY.

3. DURING A CONVERSATION AT A SOCIAL OCCASION AUGUST 15, SOVIET DIPLOMAT ALEXANDER V. MOROZOV TOLD EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER THAT "ABOUT TEN" SOVIET CITIZENS HAD BEEN KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION. REGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET ACTIONS TOWARD AFGHANISTAN, MOROZOV STATED THAT "THE SOVIET UNION HAS A POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN." MOROZOV MADE HOSTILE ALLUSSIONS TO THE DRA, ESPECIALLY THE CUTTING OFF OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FOR CREATING MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THE TAPAKI REGIME WAS INSURED THAT "THE PRESENT OPPOSITION" COULD BE HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. SINCE MOSCOW HAD FOR YEARS, AT AFGHAN REQUEST, BE STRENGTHENED, PROVIDED ALL KINDS OF ASSISTANCE TO VARIOUS AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS, AND MOSCOW IS NOW MERELY CONTINUING PAST POLICIES, MOROZOV CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENT OPPOSITION TO THE REGIM IS "COMPLETELY IRRESPONSIBLE" AND DOOMED TO FAILURE SINCE IT IS BASED SO SIMPLY ON AN UNJUSTIFIABLY ANTI-SOVIET PRINCIPLE.

4. COMMENT: MOROZOV, GENERALLY ONE OF THE MORE AMIABLE SOVIETS HERE, WAS MARKEDLY MORE TESTY DURING THIS CONVERSATION THAN HE HAS EVER BEEN BEFORE. HE RELIED TO A GREAT EXTENT ON STANDARD CANT TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION HERE, BUT HE SEEMED CLEARLY CONVINCED THAT AMERICAN POLICIES HAD DELIBERATELY CREATED A SITUATION WHICH IS PRECARIOUS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND DANGEROUS FOR SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS COUNTRY. MOROZOV'S TESTINESS MAY HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE HEAVY PRESSURES ON HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES.

5. MOROZOV'S COMMENT REGARDING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND HE SEEMED CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD SEND TROOPS TO KABUL IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE NUMEROUS "ADVISERS" AND OTHER OFFICIALS HERE. WE DO NOT KNOW, OF COURSE, WHETHER MOROZOV WAS BUCKING UP HIS OWN SPIRITS BY SAYING THIS, OR WHETHER HE MAY ACTUALLY BE PRIVY TO SOME KIND OF SOVIET CONTINGENCY PLANNING. IN THIS REGARD, IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT, AT TIMES OF VIOLENCE IN KABUL (E.G., JUNE 23 AND AUGUST 5), THE SOVIET EMBASSY COMPOUND, AS WELL AS THE RESIDENTIAL AREA HOUSING MANY SOVIET FAMILIES, ARE IMMEDIATELY CORDONED OFF BY AFGHAN ARMY FORCES, INCLUDING TANKS AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT, A MOVE WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THE REGIME IS AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO SOVIET CITIZENS POSED BY THE INSURGENTS.

6. FINALLY, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, MOROZOV'S FIGURE OF "ABOUT TEN" IS THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF FATALITIES THAT ANY SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS YET USED WITH AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL. WE BELIEVE THE ACTUAL CASUALTY FIGURE IS PROBABLY CONSIDERABLY HIGHER.

AMSTUTZ

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 RUEBLT/AMEMBASSY KABUL 648
 INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 961
 RUSBR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 599
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 085
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 106
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 079

CN 704

POL
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BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 0199

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 02/16/99 (ARCHARD, D.B.) OR-M
 TAGS: PINR, PINS, AF, PK
 SUBJECT: (C) REBELS DENY "SHADOW CABINET" RUMORS

REF: KABUL 5023, (B) PESHAWAR

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THREE AFGHAN REBEL REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM I HAVE TALKED HAVE DENIED THAT A REBEL "SHADOW CABINET" COMPOSED OF TOP DISSIDENT LEADERS HAS BEEN ORGANIZED. DENIALS CONTRADICT RUMORS FROM KABUL SOURCES WHICH WERE REPORTEDLY BASED ON BROADCASTS FROM REBELS' RADIO ASMAR.

3. I TALKED WITH HASSAN GAILANI, NEPHEW AND CONFIDANT OF SYED AHMED GAILANI, ON AUGUST 10, AMCIT ZIA NASSERY ON THE 11TH, AND HIZB-ISLAMI, AFGHANISTAN, NUMBER TWO LEADER AMINULLAH ON THE 14TH. ALL CONSIDER ANY DISSIDENT PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OR "SHADOW CABINET" MADE UP MOSTLY OF PESHAWAR-BASED LEADERS AS UNWORKABLE. NASSERY LIKENED SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO "PUTTING FIVE DIFFERENT ANIMALS IN THE SAME CAGE;" GAILANI'S THOUGHTS WERE EXPRESSED ALONG SIMILAR LINES. AMINULLAH, WHO TOOK USUAL HIZB APPROACH OF DENIGRATING THE OTHER GROUPS, SAID HIZB WOULD NOT JOIN SUCH A COALITION.

4. CLEARLY, THE LONG-STANDING ANTAGONISMS AMONG THE BARBICUS REBEL FACTIONS HAVE NOT DIMINISHED. EACH TIME I TALK WITH DISSIDENTS, A PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION IS SPENT IN DAMNING THE COMPETITION. MOST RECENTLY, INTER-GROUP HOSTILITY WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED TO ME AT THE HOTEL KHYBER INTERCONTINENTAL SWIMMING POOL; WHILE MY FAMILY SWAM, I SAT AND CHATTED WITH NASSERY AND AN AFGHAN TRIBAL FIGURE. HASSAN GAILANI, AN ERSTWHILE FRIEND AND

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S' FOOLMATE OF MASSERY'S STALKED UP WITH ARUBI SARBELAND, THE FORMER AFGHAN DIPLOMAT NOW IN GAILANI'S CAMP. UNKIND WORDS WERE EXCHANGED IN PUSH-TU BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. GAILANI ORDERED THE TRIBESMAN AWAY. TENSIONS WERE HIGH. I FELT AS IF I WERE IN THE O.K. CORRAL.

5. MASSERY LATER EXPLAINED THAT THE TRIBESMAN, A WAZIR FROM PAKTIA, WANTED TO LEAVE THE GAILANI FACTION AND HAD ASKED HIM, MASSERY, TO TAKE COMMAND OF A NEW GROUP. NEEDLESS TO SAY, GAILANI RESENTS BOTH THE APOSTASY AND THE POACHING. I CAUTIONED MASSERY THAT, AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, HE COULD EASILY RUN AFOUL OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF HE ASSUMES A LEADERSHIP ROLE AMONG THE REBELS. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. HE DID NOT SEEM DISSUADED, HOWEVER.

6. "RADIO ASMAR:" NONE OF THE REBELS WHOM I HAVE RECENTLY MET HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR "RADIO ASMAR" FROM PESHAWAR. NEITHER HAS MY ASSISTANT, MASSOD AKRAM, BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PICKING IT UP ON THE TWO OCCASIONS WHEN HE HAS TRIED. FURTHER, THE WAZIR TRIBESMAN SAID HE COULDN'T HEAR THE STATION IN HIS VILLAGE WHICH IS NEAR MATUN (KOST) IN PAKTIA. THE DISSIDENTS DO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF THE RADIO. THEY ATTRIBUTE IT TO GUL BADEEN'S HIZB ISLAMI ORGANIZATION AND SAY IT IS A PIECE OF MODIFIED, CAPTURED EQUIPMENT. AMINULLAH OF HIZB STRESSES THAT HIS ORGANIZATION IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRANSMITTER. IT BROADCASTS ON 4.2 MEGAHERTZ, 65 AND 70 METERBANDS, BETWEEN 8 AND 9 PM PAKISTAN TIME, HE SAYS. ACCORDING TO HIM, HEAVY JAMMING BY TRANSMITTERS IN KABUL, JALALABAD AND TASHKENT MAKES RECEPTION HERE VERY DIFFICULT. ANY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE RADIO OF WHICH THE REBELS ARE AWARE ARE RECEIVED SECOND-HAND AND COME VIA KABUL. IN THE CASE OF THE REPORTED "SHADOW CABINET," HOWEVER, THE MEN I'VE TALKED WITH HAD NOT HEARD OF A BROADCAST.

ARCHARD

BT

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 R 190355Z AUG 79
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9610
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5256
 INFO RUEHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9618
 RUEHNL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 9675
 RUEHOC/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6761
 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6546
 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4151
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217276

CM 731

PCL

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L.C. 1200SRDS-1 8/16/79 (BAFRI, ROBERT L.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINK, PINS, AF, UR

SUBJECT: (C) REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET VISITOR TO AFGHANISTAN LAST OCTOBER

REF: (A) KABUL 6000, (C) MOSCOW 27252

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEPARTMENT HAS NO REPEAT NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM
 REPORT CITED REFTEL A. OUR RECORDS SHOW CIVILYKO ON
 VACATION IN THE CRIMEA DURING THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF
 OCTOBER, REAPPEARING IN MOSCOW OCTOBER 25. CHRISTOPHER
 BT

#7276

NNNNVV ESA419MJC362
RR RUGMHR
DE RUSBLK #6309 2320925
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5284
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBSSY BEIJING 688
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9190
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1758
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1836
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7265
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 409
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 36
BT
SECRET KABUL 6309
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8-20-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, PINS, AF, GE
SUBJ: (C) EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR DEPARTS KABUL SCENE

1. (LOU) ON AUGUST 16, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU WAS EVACUATED FROM KABUL TO EAST BERLIN FOR EMERGENCY TREATMENT OF WHAT HIS EMBASSY OFFICERS DESCRIBED AS THREE SERIOUS FRACTURES IN HIS LOWER LEFT LEG. SCHWIESAU WAS TAKEN BY AMBULANCE TO BE PLACED DIRECTLY ABOARD AN AEROFLOT FLIGHT; THUS HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WERE DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BID HIM FAREWELL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HIS TREATMENT IN THE GDR WILL TAKE "AT LEAST SIX MONTHS."

2. (S) ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 12, WHILE SCHWIESAU AND THE A/DCM WERE DEPARTING A PARTY TOGETHER -- SHORTLY BEFORE THE CURFEW, THE EAST GERMAN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SEE THE LATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT AN URGENT MATTER. THE A/DCM REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CALL HIM THE NEXT DAY TO ARRANGE A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME. WHEN THE A/DCM CALLED THE EAST GERMAN EMBASSY ON AUGUST 13, HE WAS TOLD THAT SCHWIESAU HAD BROKEN HIS LEG IN A HOUSEHOLD ACCIDENT THE PRECEDING EVENING AND COULD NOT RECEIVE VISITORS.

3. (S) COMMENT: SCHWIESAU WILL BE MISSED IN KABUL'S DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. EITHER OPERATING ON HIS OWN -- OR, MORE PROBABLY, AT SOVIET DIRECTION, HE KEPT HIS WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD COLLEAGUES "INFORMED" ABOUT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN INSURRECTION.

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TO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7034

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3282

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9619

RUSBDQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6779

RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4161

RUSHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5316

BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 218144/01

CN 336

POL
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E.O. 12065: GDS, 8/17/85

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, UR, NATO

SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN

REF: USNATO 5615

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED ORALLY AND IN ALLIED PAPERS DURING AUGUST 7 POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN:

-- WE AGREE WITH CANADIAN REP'S OBSERVATIONS THAT AFGHAN REBEL MOVEMENT IS FRAGMENTED AND LACKS AN AGREED-UPON LEADER. THESE WEAKNESSES, ALONG WITH ONLY RUDIMENTARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND LACK OF HEAVY WEAPONRY, HAVE PREVENTED THE INSURGENCY FROM BEING ABLE TO COORDINATE ATTACKS ON THE REGIME OR TO HOLD MAJOR TOWNS OR INSTALLATIONS FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. NONETHELESS, INSURGENCY CANNOT BE CALLED "INEFFECTIVE." IT HAS WHITTLED AWAY AT DRA CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE AND NOW THREATENS THE HEART OF DRA POWER--I.E., THE MILITARY, THE MAJOR ROADS, AND URBAN AREAS. THE DRA STILL RETAINS MILITARY SUPERIORITY AS LONG AS THE ARMED FORCES (ESPECIALLY KEY ARMORED AND AIR FORCE UNITS IN KABUL) REMAIN WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THE REGIME AGAINST INSURGENTS AND MILITARY DISSIDENTS.

-- RE FRG REP'S INTEREST IN JULY CABINET RESHUFFLE, OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT IT WAS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED TO ALLOW TARAKI AND AMIN MORE TIME FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY MATTERS

AND DIRECT PERSONAL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY. POOR MORALE AND REPORTS OF DEFECTIONS AND DESERTIONS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR ALARM IN THEIR MINDS. AND THEY MAY WELL HAVE CONCLUDED THAT AFGHAN DEFENSE MINISTER NATAJAR WAS INCAPABLE OF EFFECTING THE NECESSARY REFORMS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CABINET CHANGES WERE IN RESPONSE TO ANY USCP INTERNAL PLOT.

-- CANADIAN PAPER: RE PARA 4, WE NOTE THAT AFGHAN AND SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ONCE AGAIN STEPPED UP ACCUSATIONS OF PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT WITH AFGHAN REBEL ACTIVITIES.

-- FRG PAPER: (A) WE WOULD WELCOME ELABORATION OF FRG'S FIGURES OF 3,022-3,500 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS. WE HAVE SEVERAL FIGURES OF ABOUT 2,000 MILITARY AND AN ESTIMATED 3,000 CIVILIAN ADVISERS. (B) WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIET PRESS HAS INDICATED ACTIVE USE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF THE TARAKI REGIME MIGHT BE CONSIDERED OR THAT IT DESCRIBES AFGHANISTAN REGULARLY AS A SOCIALIST STATE.

-- TURKISH PAPER: WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENSE CONSULTATION CLAUSE OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY WAS INSERTED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHANS. COULD THE TURKISH REP ELABORATE ON THIS ASSERTION?

3. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

-- YOU MAY DRAW FROM KABUL 6251, WHICH IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE TARAKI REGIME AS WELL AS A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PASS ON KABUL'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERESTS OR THE DESIRABILITY OF THE DEMISE OF THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME.

-- WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE FOR THE REGION. RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THE CURRENT REGIME. THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT ON A GRADUATED BASIS.

-- THE GENESIS OF THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING IN KABUL AS WELL AS THAT WHICH OCCURRED THERE ON AUGUST 15 REMAINS UNCLEAR. IT APPEARS THAT SOME MILITARY ELEMENTS AND PERHAPS CIVILIAN INCURGENTS WERE INVOLVED IN THE BALA HISSAR FIGHTING (AUGUST 3) BUT DETAILS ARE TOO FRAGMENTARY TO BE PRECISE. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE DRA CAN STILL COUNT ON ITS KEY UNITS (ARMORED AND AIR) TO COME TO ITS DEFENSE WHEN NEEDED.

-- PAKISTANI FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER AGHA SHAHI HAS CANCELLED HIS MID-AUGUST TRIP TO KABUL. THE COP HAS CITED RENEWED ANTI-PAKISTANI PROPAGANDA, ANOTHER AFGHAN INCURSION OF PAKISTANI AIR SPACE, AND THE DRA'S DECISION TO PUBLICIZE THE DEFECTION (THE PAKS SAY KIDNAPPING) OF A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT IN KABUL AS REASONS FOR CANCELLING A TRIP--AT LEAST FOR NOW--TO THE KABUL-ISLAMABAD DIALOGUE IN THE CHINA RELATIONSHIP. WITH AFGHAN PRESSURE, PAKISTAN HAS OFFERED TO VISIT TO ISLAMABAD IN EARLY SEP.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5336
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 694
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7280
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9199
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1767
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1845
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3229
RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 416
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 39
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6385

CN 926

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/21/85 (JAMES E. TAYLOR) OR-F
TAGS: PINT, AF, PROP
SUBJ: (LOU) CONTRARY TO DRA PROPAGANDA, "MASSIVE MARCHES"
NOT TAKING PLACE IN KABUL

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: DESPITE RECENT DRA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, "MASSIVE MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS" IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME ARE NOT TAKING PLACE IN KABUL, NOR WE PRESUME ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. MEETINGS WITHIN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES HAS BECOME ONE FAVORITE WAY FOR THE LEADERSHIP TO PRESENT ITS LINE. THE CESSATION OF PREVIOUSLY COMMON MARCHES WAS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF GROWING NERVOUSNESS THAT GROUPS ON THE CAPITAL'S STREETS COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. END OF SUMMARY.

3. ONE RECENT THEME OF THE KHALQI GOVERNMENT'S PROPAGANDA MACHINERY HAS BEEN THAT "MASSIVE MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS" ARE TAKING PLACE THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME'S STRUGGLE AGAINST "ENEMIES OF THE COUNTRY," PARTICULARLY PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THESE STORIES GENERALLY INCLUDE LONG LISTS OF THE CITIES, TOWNS, OR VILLAGES WHERE MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

4. IN KABUL, THE POLITICAL HEART OF THE COUNTRY, IF ANY SUCH MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE, IT MUST HAVE BEEN A VERY PRIVATE AFFAIR, SINCE WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY PUBLIC GATHERING OF A POLITICAL NATURE FOR WEEKS, AND CERTAINLY NONE SINCE BEFORE THE JUNE 23 VIOLENT OUTBREAK IN THE OLD PART OF KABUL. BEFORE THAT EXPLOSION, "SPONTANEOUS" MARCHES OF LETHARGIC AND DRAGOONED VILLAGERS AND BUREAUCRATS LED BY THE PARTY FAITHFUL HAD BEEN A FAIRLY COMMON OCCURRENCE. BUT OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THIS PROPAGANDA DEVICE HAS BEEN SET ASIDE, PROBABLY BECAUSE THE REGIME HAS BECOME MORE NERVOUS ABOUT PERMITTING GROUPS OF EVEN BORED DEMONSTRATORS CONGREGATE NEAR SENSITIVE LOCATIONS IN THE CAPITAL. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON US PREVENT AUTHORITATIVE COMMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE OTHER MAJOR CITIES OR IN THE VILLAGES, WE SUSPECT THAT SUCH EVENTS ARE NOW RARE THERE AS WELL.

5. WE DO KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE REGIME IS PRESENTING ITS PROPAGANDA LINE WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY VIA REGULAR MEETINGS OF VARIOUS MINISTRIES' EMPLOYEES WHO ARE "EDUCATED" BY AN AUTHORIZED PARTY REPRESENTATIVE. THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THESE MEETINGS IS UNKNOWN, BUT THEY DO KEEP PEOPLE OFF THE STREETS, WHICH APPARENTLY IS THE REGIME'S PRIMARY GOAL AT THIS POINT.

AMSTUTZ

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FM USMISSION USNATO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1732

INFO RUEHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0224

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6440

RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0115

RUEGHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0017

RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0077

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 05863

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 08/23/89 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, UR, NATO

SUBJECT: (C) POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 218144, (B) USNATO 5615

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT AUGUST 21 POLADS DISCUSSION US REP DREW ON GUIDANCE ON AFGHANISTAN CONTAINED REF A AS WELL AS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN KABUL 0251 AND TEHRAN 0020. HE POSED QUESTIONS IN FOURTH AND FIFTH TICKS, PARA 2 REF A TO FRG AND TURKISH REPS WHO SAID THEY WOULD CHECK WITH THEIR CAPITALS. REGARDING US QUESTION TO FRG ABOUT NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN, UK REP SAID LONDON'S ESTIMATES WERE 3,003 TOTAL ADVISORS OF WHICH 1,502 WERE MILITARY, I.E., BELOW US ESTIMATE AND CERTAINLY WELL BELOW FRG ESTIMATE OF 3,000 MILITARY ADVISORS.

3. CANADIAN REP AGAIN RAISED (REF B) QUESTION OF EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS. OTTAWA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SITUATION DEMANDS IT AS YET BUT IF WIDESPREAD FIGHTING DOES OCCUR, THIS VIEW COULD CHANGE. UK REP SAID THAT WHILE THERE WAS POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT OF PROBLEMS ARISING INADVERTENTLY FOR FOREIGNERS, FOREIGNERS PRINCIPALLY AT RISK AT PRESENT WERE SOVIETS THEMSELVES.

4. CANADIAN REP NOTED THERE WAS STILL NO EVIDENCE OF COHERENT REBEL LEADERSHIP BUT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REBEL SUCCESSES. REASON FOR THIS MAY BE, ACCORDING TO CANADIANS, THAT TRIBAL DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN PUT ASIDE BY REBELS FOR TIME BEING IN ORDER TO FIGHT TOGETHER AGAINST TARAKI REGIME. DUTCH REP SUPPORTED THIS ANALYSIS.

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5. CANADIAN REP REPORTED ON CONVERSATION BETWEEN NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND CANADA'S AMBASSADOR FORD. NEW AMBASSADOR HAD SPENT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN EXILE BEFORE RETURNING TO IRAN WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMENI. IN DISCUSSING SOVIET DISPLEASURE WITH IRAN, FOD REFECRXIXELTOPPAGE IN GAS DELIVERIES. IN RESPONSE, NEW AMBASSADOR REFERRED VAGUELY TO VARIOUS KINDS OF OVERLAPPING CONTRACTS, BUT ADDED THAT THESE WERE PERSONAL AGREEMENTS WITH SHAH. USSR, AS OTHERS, WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR DEALING WITH SHAH AND PARTICIPATING IN ARRANGEMENTS UNFAVORABLE FOR IRAN. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, NEW AMBASSADOR SAID HE DOUBTED USSR WAS CONCERNED ABOUT IMPACT OF ISLAMIC "FUNDAMENTALISM" OF IRAN ON THE USSR. AMBASSADOR FORD IN ANALYZING THIS CONVERSATION FELT THAT IRANIAN AMBASSADOR WAS TRYING TO PUT BEST FACE POSSIBLE ON IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. HOWEVER, FORD FELT THAT "TROUBLE WAS BREWING".

6. UK AND DUTCH CIRCULATED ADDITIONAL WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN. THESE ARE CONTAINED IN PARA 7 BELOW.

7. BEGIN TEXTS:

BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN

1. IN CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE'S EXCHANGE ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, YOU, AND OUR COLLEAGUES ON THE COMMITTEE, MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF SOVIET VIEWS WHICH WAS PRODUCED BY OUR EMBASSY AT MOSCOW.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO GIVE TARAKI AND AMIN JUST SUFFICIENT COVERAGE TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESENT REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN IS IN CHARGE AND IS DOING A GOOD JOB. THE LULL IN PROPAGANDA AGAINST PAKISTAN WAS BROKEN BY A PETROV ARTICLE IN "PRAVDA" OF 28 JULY, WHICH TOOK UP AGAIN THE STANDARD THEME THAT THE PROBLEMS OF AFGHANISTAN ARE DUE TO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

3. AN OFFICIAL IN THE SOVIET MFA RECENTLY GAVE OUR EMBASSY AT MOSCOW THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SOVIET POLICY. HIS STARTING POINT WAS THAT SOVIET POLICY REMAINED AS EXPRESSED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT SIGNED BY MR. BREZHNEV AND MR. DESAI DURING THE LATTERS VISIT. HE DID NOT DENY THAT THE TROUBLES IN AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTED AN EXPRESSION BY SOME AFGHANS OF DISAPPROVAL FOR THE PRESENT REGIME BUT CLAIMED THIS WAS NORMAL IN A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND VOLUNTEERED THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE RESOLVED QUICKLY.

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PP RUMER
DE RUFHNA #5863/02 2351936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0025
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6441
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0116
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0018
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0278
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 23 USNATO 05863

HE WOULD NOT HOWEVER BE DRAWN ON WHETHER THE SITUATION WAS GOING TO GET BETTER OR WORSE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE OFFICIAL BLAMED THE PRESENT TROUBLES LARGELY ON THE REACTIONARY CLERGY IN AFGHANISTAN (IN CONTRAST TO CONCILIATORY COMMENTS ABOUT ISLAM - "THE KORAN WAS THE FIRST SOCIALIST WORK" - WHICH HE HAS OFFERED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS).

4. ON THE LATEST CABINET CHANGES THE SOVIET OFFICIAL PLAYED DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TARAKI AND AMIN TAKING ON THE DEFENCE PORTFOLIO AND HE SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT WATANJAR HAD BEEN DEMOTED OR THAT HE HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF HIS ORGANISING AN ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP BASED ON ARMY POWER. IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THAT IN A DIFFICULT SECURITY SITUATION THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENCE SHOULD BE ASSUMED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. WATANJAR'S NEW RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WERE STILL IMPORTANT.

5. THE OFFICIAL WAS SCATHING ABOUT THE US DECISION TO WITHDRAW DEPENDENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN THE ONLY ONES TO TAKE SUCH ACTION, AND HAD CREATED A WORSE ATMOSPHERE AND INCREASED TENSION.

6. FINALLY, THE OFFICIAL TOUCHED ON DOST'S TALKS IN ISLAMABAD. WHILE HE DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HELD OUT MUCH HOPE FOR IMPROVED PAKISTAN/AFGHAN RELATIONS, HE REPEATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS. ON IRAN/AFGHAN RELATIONS, HE SAID IN ANSWER TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION ABOUT THE MUCH PUBLICISED INTERVIEW BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN COM THAT IT WAS STRANGE FOR KHOMEINI TO CRITICISE SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE AFGHANS WERE NOT AFTER ALL IN THE SOVIET POCKET.

7. THE PUBLIC LINE FROM THE PRESS AND THE MFA THUS APPEARS TO BE THAT TARAKI AND AMIN ARE IN CONTROL AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION ARE CONTENT THAT THEY SHOULD REMAIN SO. NEITHER ON THIS LEVEL, NOR THROUGH SECONDARY SOURCES IN MOSCOW LIKELY TO HAVE GOOD ACCESS, HAVE WE RECEIVED INDICATIONS OF PLANS TO REPLACE TARAKI AND AMIN. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT NO SUCH PLANS EXIST. THE MORE WORRIED THE RUSSIANS AND THE MORE THEY MAY BE PLOTTING BEHIND THE SCENES, THE LESS LIKELY THEY ARE TO REVEAL THEIR HAND TO FOREIGN OBSERVERS IN MOSCOW. END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF DUTCH PAPER:

KABUL BASED CONTACTS OF OUR EMBASSY IN TEHERAN CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT AN AFGHAN ARMY BRIGADE COMPLETE WITH ITS EQUIPMENT HAD DESERTED TO THE REBELS. THE SITUATION IN KABUL IS REPORTED TO REMAIN VERY TENSE AND IT SEEMS THAT THE REGIME EVEN RECKONS WITH A REGULAR ATTACK ON THE CAPITAL. CURFEW REMAINS WHILE TANKS ARE POSITIONED ON ALL CROSS-ROADS IN TOWN. THE TEHERAN TIMES OF THE 16TH REPORTED THAT AGAIN 32 SOVIET CITIZENS HAD BEEN KILLED (IN KADAHAR, SOUTH AFGHANISTAN). THE TEHERAN TIMES ISSUED THE NEWS THAT FOUR OUT OF SIX REBEL GROUPINGS (NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, JAMIAE ISLAMI, MOVEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, AND A FACTION OF THE HEZBE ISLAMI) HAD DECIDED TO UNITE UNDER THE NAME "FIGHTERS OF ISLAM".

THE GENERAL SITUATION SEEMS AGAIN TO DETERIORATE FURTHER FOR THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME, AND LITTLE MORE THAN KABUL AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS ARE UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND THE INSURRECTION STILL LACKS LEADERSHIP, COORDINATION AND A CLEAR POLICY AS WELL AS EXTERNAL HELP ON ANY LARGER SCALE. THIS MEANS AMONGST OTHER THINGS THAT THE REBELS PRESUMABLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RAISE A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON THE URBAN CENTERS NOW UNDER CONTROL OF THE REGIME. WHICH AGAIN MEANS THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER FOR THE REGIME OF LOSING ITS PRESENT - BE IT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE - POSITION. MAYBE THE BIGGEST IMMEDIATE THREAT IS THAT OF THE ARMY, OR A LARGE PART OF IT (SEE ABOVE), TURNING AGAINST IT.

WITH THE REGIME ITS SOVIET ALLY FOR WHICH IS MUCH AT STAKE (IN THE WORDS OF GERMAN SPEAKING NOTES: "BY WINNING AFGHANISTAN THE DISTANCE SEPARATING THEM FROM THEIR GEO-STRATEGIC AIM THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS SHRUNK TO 500 KM".) MUST FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE. STEPPING UP ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT CONSIDERABLY, HOWEVER, HAS SERIOUS AND DISAGREEABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM.

NNNNVV ECA2C9BRA227
PP RUEMHR
DE RUEHNA #5863/03 2351915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231806Z AUG 79
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1734
INFO RUEHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS
RUEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0026
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6442
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0117
RUEMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0019
RUEBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0079
BT

CN 986

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 05863

- EVEN WITH A MUCH BIGGER SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IT IS UNLIKELY TO BE EASY TO PACIFY AFGHANISTAN
- FULL SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTION IS LIKELY TO HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR MOSCOW'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AND, MAYBE MORE IMPORTANT, WITH PAKISTAN
- INTERVENTION MIGHT HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN ASIA
- INTERVENTION WOULD HARM MOSCOW'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD
- INTERVENTION WOULD INFLUENCE CHINA'S POSITION ON THE CONTINENT
- INTERVENTION WILL HAVE CERTAIN REPERCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, WHICH, WITH SALT II STILL UNRATIFIED, MAY BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

AS VIRTUALLY ALL CIRCULATED DOCUMENTS POINT OUT THE BEST SOLUTION FOR MOSCOW MIGHT BE A POLITICAL ONE: A CHANGE OF REGIME TOWARDS ONE WITH A BROADER BASIS, BUT STILL "REVOLUTIONARY" AND LOYAL TO MOSCOW. THE PROBLEM HERE SEEMS TO BE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH IS COMMUNIST, ANTI ISLAM AND, ABOVE ALL, PRO USSR WOULD HAVE BROADLY BASED POPULAR BACKING.

OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW REPORTED ON CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS ALREADY PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE POLITICAL MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN; IN A PRAVDA ARTICLE OF JULY 29, UNLIKE PREVIOUSLY, NO MENTION HAS BEEN MADE OF THE FACT THAT AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR ARE NEIGHBOURING STATES; WHILE PRAVDA OF AUGUST 7 REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE CLASHES IN KABUL. OUR EMBASSY'S CONCLUSION IS THAT MOSCOW, FACED WITH DIFFICULT OPTIONS, MIGHT WATCH THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME BEING TOPPLED WITHOUT INTERVENING.

WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, MOSCOW SEEMS TO HAVE REACHED CROSSROADS AND WILL HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE: EITHER LIMIT ITS INTERFERENCE AND RUN CERTAIN RISKS AS FAR AS SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IS CONCERNED, OR GO THE "VIETNAM WAY". THE IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN FOR MOSCOW NEEDS NO FURTHER EXPLANATIONS.

THE FACT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS A BORDER STATE OF THE USSR CAN HARDLY BE OVEREMPHASIZED. REPORTS FROM OUR EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD CONTINUE TO HAMMER ON THE FACT THAT PAKISTANI OFFICIALS WITHOUT EXCEPTION BRAND AS WISHFUL THINKING ALL WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES WHICH RECKON WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOSCOW MIGHT CONSIDER LOOSENING ITS HOLD ON AFGHANISTAN.

AS TO THE POPULAR COMPARISON WITH US INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM: MANY DIFFERENCES ARE OBVIOUS, AMONGST WHICH:

- THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS THIS HAS FOR EASY LOGISTICS
- THE FACT THAT THE REBELLION SO FAR LACKS LEADERSHIP, COHESION AND POLICY
- THE FACT THAT THE REBELLION SO FAR HAS NO IMPORTANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT. END TEXT. GLITMAN

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TO RUEBCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6821
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9653
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5495
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1525
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9141
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4218
RUEBCD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3782
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7638
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4159
RUEHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8484
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 221826

STADIS/ NNNXX IMDIS

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STADIS
LIMDIS

E.O. 12965: CDS, 8/23/85 (COON, JANE A.), NEA

TAGS: SREF, SHUM, PEPR, AF, US, PK

SUBJECT: (LOU) AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 8335, (B) GENEVA 13234

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THANKS TO COMPREHENSIVE REPORTING FROM EMBASSY AND CONSULATE PESHAWAR, DEPARTMENT IS WELL AWARE OF GROWING PROBLEMS FACED BY GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (GOP) IN CARING FOR INCREASING NUMBERS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT GOP HAS BEEN EXPLORING WITH THE UNHCR WAYS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HELP THOSE REFUGEES, WHICH BY SOME ACCOUNTS NOW TOTAL 150,000 TO 200,000. WE REALIZE THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED ON THE PART OF ALL CONCERNED PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THE PAKISTANIS, AFGHANS AND THE SOVIETS.

3. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN SEEING THAT ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED TO THOSE REFUGEES AND WE THINK THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE AN INTERNATIONAL ONE. WE WOULD LIKE THE UNHCR TO MOVE MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD INITIATING A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE. NATURALLY, WHATEVER IS UNDERTAKEN MUST MEET WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE GOP.

4. DEPTOFF RON DAVIDSON (S/R) WILL BE IN GENEVA THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 3 AND PLANS TO CONSULT WITH UNHCR ON THE AFGHAN REFUGEE QUESTION. HIS VISIT WILL BE EXPLORATORY AND HE WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION REGARDING UNHCR'S ESTIMATE OF THE NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES. SINCE USG HAS FUNDING LIMITATIONS, HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS. WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN TOLD THAT A UNHCR APPEAL ON BEHALF OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IS LIKELY.

5. SO THAT DAVIDSON HAS AS MUCH BACKGROUND AS POSSIBLE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUMMARIZING THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AND YOUR VIEWS ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING: (A) WHAT ARE CONDITIONS REALLY LIKE FOR THE REFUGEES? (B) HOW MANY ARE IN REFUGEE CAMPS AS OPPOSED TO TRIBAL VILLAGES AND NOMADIC TENT CAMPS? (C) WHAT HARDSHIPS DO THE REFUGEES FACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VERY PRIMITIVE LIVES THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY LED? (D) HOW WILL THE ONSET OF WINTER WEATHER AFFECT THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS? (E) HOW MUCH OF A FINANCIAL BURDEN IS THE CARE OF THE REFUGEES FOR THE GOP? (F) WHAT ARE LIKELY TO BE GOP ATTITUDES TOWARD PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION (PVO) INVOLVEMENT IN ASSISTING THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY AMERICANS IN THEIR ACTIVITIES? (G) SHOULD WE CONSIDER ASKING THE GOP WHETHER THEY BELIEVE WE CAN PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN FOCUSING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM? AND (H) SHOULD U.S. PERSONNEL IN PAKISTAN CONTINUE TO AVOID VISITS TO THE

REFUGEE AREAS WHICH WE HAVE THOUGHT UNWISE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OUR MOTIVES COULD BE MISINTERPRETED?

6. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A RESPONSE PRIOR TO AUGUST 31 AND SLUG IT FOR DAVIDSON IN VIENNA AND GENEVA.

7. FOR KABUL: WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF DRA VIEWS TOWARD POSSIBLE UNHCR ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AS WELL AS TOWARD OUR PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN STIMULATING THE UNHCR TO THIS END.

8. FOR MOSCOW: WE WONDER WHAT ATTITUDE THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE TOWARD A UNHCR ROLE IN THIS SITUATION. IS MOSCOW LIKELY ACTIVELY TO OPPOSE UNHCR INVOLVEMENT?

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE INVITED FROM ALL ADDRESSEES. CHRISTOPHER

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUE C/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5352

INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2844

RUSEO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9205

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1850

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7225

RUSBOO/AMCONSIL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1323

RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0421

RUFHAI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0143

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0931

BT

CONFIDENTIAL KABUL 6400

STADIS

LIMPIS

F.O. 12265: GDS 8/25/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
T485: SREF, SHUM, PEPR, AF, US, PK, UN
BUEJ: (LOU) AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

REF: STATE 221826

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. RE THE DEPT'S QUESTION IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE REFTL, WE CAN EXPECT THE KHALQI REGIME TO OPPOSE UNHCR ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE AMNESTY CAMPAIGN KAPUL DIRECTED AT THE REFUGEES SOME MONTHS AGO, THE DRA HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THESE EXILES AS "REFUGEES," REFERRING TO THEM INSTEAD AS "CRIMINALS" WHO ARE BEING EXPLOITED BY "REACTIONARY FORCES" IN PAKISTAN TO ATTACK AFGHANISTAN FROM SAFEHAVEN BASED BEYOND THE DURAND LINE.

3. WHEN THE IDEA OF UNHCR ASSISTANCE FOR THE REFUGEES WAS RAISED TENTATIVELY SOME MONTHS AGO, THE DRA REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UN'S SO "INSULTING" A UN MEMBER. AT THAT TIME, LOCAL PAKISTAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN, NOT WANTING TO RILE THE TOUCHY AFGHANS ANY FURTHER, HAD DECIDED NOT TO PRESS FURTHER FOR UNHCR ASSISTANCE.

4. DURING A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH THE A/DCM, SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASSILIY SAFRONCHUK MENTIONED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE UNHCR WAS CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. SAFRONCHUK OBSERVED THAT THE DRA WOULD FIND THIS UN INVOLVEMENT UNACCEPTABLE.

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIS EMBASSY ENDORSES THE IDEA OF UNHCR SUPPORT FOR THE EXPENSIVE REFUGEE-RELIEF PROGRAM IN PAKISTAN, WE RECOMMEND THAT, IF POSSIBLE, THE USG NOT BE SEEN AS PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN STIMULATING UNHCR INVOLVEMENT. THIS WOULD ONLY CONSTITUTE FURTHER "PROOF" OF WHAT THE DRA REGARDS AS HOSTILE USG INTENT AGAINST THE KHALQI REGIME. THE DRA WOULD FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CONTEND WITH MUSLIM OR NONALIGNED (E.G., SAUDI ARABIA OR INDIA) URGING THAT THE UNHCR PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN HELP. AMSTUE

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 DE RUSBLK #6674 2451145
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5463
 INFO RUMJPG/A EMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0713
 RUSRCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9239
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1872
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7328
 RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2442 ✓
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NOFORN

E.O. 12365: GDS 8/13/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, PINR, MASS, PINR, AF, LR
 SUBJ: (S) PAVLOVSKIY MISSION TO KABUL

REF: STATE 228642 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GENERAL PAVLOVSKIY, COMMANDER OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES, AND TWELVE OTHER SOVIET GENERALS HAVE BEEN AT KABUL SINCE AUGUST 17 UNDER VERY TIGHT SECURITY AND HEAVY SECURITY PROTECTION. TRUSTED AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIET MISSION IS HERE FOR "FACT-FINDING" PURPOSES. PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN HAS DIRECTED THAT LOWER-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ARE EMPOWERED TO SIGN ROUTINE AGREEMENTS WITH THE VISITING SOVIET TEAM.

3. COMMENT: THE EMBASSY WOULD PREFER TO AWAIT FURTHER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION BEFORE SPECULATING TOO MUCH ABOUT THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE SOVIET TEAM. HOWEVER, THE SPECIAL AND SENIOR MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY OF ITS LEADER, THE ALREADY LENGTHY DURATION OF THE VISIT, AND THE FACT THAT SEVERAL "MIS-AND-POLIS-TYPE AGREEMENTS ARE APPARENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED," SUGGEST THAT ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR PAVLOVSKIY'S PRESENCE HERE COULD BE THAT THE USSR IS LAYING THE DETAILED CONTINGENCY GROUNDWORK FOR THE FUTURE INTERVENTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, SHOULD MOSCOW EVENTUALLY DECIDE THAT THAT STEP IS NECESSARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT PAVLOVSKIY IS HERE PRINCIPALLY TO PROVIDE EXPERT, TOP-LEVEL GUIDANCE ON COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. ANSTUTZ

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEH/SECSTATE WASHDC 5499
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 721
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9253
RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 377
RUDTC /AMEMBASSY LONDON 1792
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1883
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7346
RUFNSPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3251
RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 452
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 051
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 6672

NOFORN
CINCRAC: ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065:GDS 9-4-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (C) AN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
AND INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

1. (S- EATIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: AS THE AFGHAN INSURRECTION HAS PROGRESSIVELY SPREAD AND INCREASED IN INTENSITY, THE KHALQI REGIME HAS BECOME EVER MORE DEPENDENT UPON SOVIET MATERIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ADVISORY SUPPORT. WHETHER THE USSR WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO COMMIT COMBAT FORCES HERE IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. AS THE USSR HAS INCREASED ITS ANTE IN AFGHANISTAN, ITS POLITICAL LEVERAGE ON THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP HAS ALSO GROWN. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, THE TWO SIDES, AT THE MOMENT AT LEAST, APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED TO RIDE OUT THE CURRENT STORM TOGETHER.
END OF SUMMARY.

3. THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: AS THE KHALQI EFFORT AGAINST THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE STEADILY, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO RISE. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 500 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WHEN THE KHALQIS SEIZED POWER ON APRIL 27-28, 1978. IF THE LARGE CONTINGENT AT BAGRAM AIR BASE IS INCLUDED, THE NUMBER COULD TODAY BE BETWEEN 3,000 AND 3,500. KHALQI AND SOVIET OFFICIALS FREQUENTLY OBSERVE THAT THIS FIGURE IS FAR BELOW THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISERS THE USG HAD IN VIETNAM OR IRAN.

4. SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS (WHOSE TOTAL OTHER THAN THOSE AT BAGRAM AIR FORCE BASE IS BELIEVED TO BE SLIGHTLY OVER 2,000) ARE BELIEVED TO BE WITH EVERY AFGHAN UNIT DOWN TO BATTALION SIZE. THEY CAN ALSO BE FOUND WITH SMALLER SPECIALIZED UNITS, SUCH AS RADAR OR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. SOVIET PILOTS ASSIGNED TO AFGHAN AIR FORCE BASES ARE BELIEVED TO FLY COMBAT MISSIONS OCCASIONALLY-- ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE SOPHISTICATED NEW MI-24 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. NO PROOF OF THIS (E.G., DEAD SOVIET PERSONNEL IN A CRASHED HELICOPTER) HAS BEEN NOTED THUS FAR, HOWEVER-- AND THE OCCASIONAL SLOPPY FLYING OF MI-24S NOTED BY DAO EXPERTS RECENTLY (E.G., DURING THE AUGUST 5 MUTINY AT KABUL'S BALA HISSAR) INDICATE THAT AFGHAN PILOTS WERE MOST LIKELY DOING THE FLYING.

5.
..... AIR FORCE BASE BAGRAM, SOUTH OF KABUL, THEIR NUMBERS THERE WE ESTIMATE AT BETWEEN 500 AND 1,360. THIS SITUATION APPEARED TO HAVE DEVELOPED IN A FASHION REMINISCENT OF THE PATTERN OF INCREASING USG INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. SOVIET PERSONNEL WERE BROUGHT TO BAGRAM TO TRAIN AFGHANS TO USE THEIR NEW AIR WEAPONS. SOVIET MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE ALSO REQUIRED. BECAUSE OF THE THREAT OF NEARBY INSURGENT ACTIVITY, SOVIET FORCES HAD TO BE BROUGHT IN TO PROTECT THE TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AREAS. THIS THEN LED TO A SOVIET ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PERIMETER DEFENSE OF THE BASE.

6. AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE PRECEDING DAOUDIST ERA, SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL ON DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN WEAR REGULAR AFGHAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNIFORMS. IN SPITE OF SOME NEWSPAPER STORIES TO THE CONTRARY, MANY SOVIET ADVISERS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE FROM THE EUROPEAN NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR. ONE ONLY RARELY NOTES PERSONNEL FROM THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS OF THE USSR, SUCH AS UZBEKS, TURKOMEN, OR TAJIKS, ALTHOUGH SUCH MEN WOULD CLEARLY BE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY.

7. SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE BEING KILLED IN AMBUSHES AND IN COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS WITH REBELS, BUT WE HAVE NO FIRM CASUALTY FIGURES. ALTHOUGH THE REBELS WILL EITHER RELEASE AFGHAN SOLDIERS WHOM THEY HAVE CAPTURED--OR MOVE THEM TO HOLDING CAMPS (SOME OF WHICH ARE IN PAKISTAN), THE REBELS ARE BELIEVED TO FOLLOW A PRACTICE OF KILLING ALL THE SOVIETS THEY SEIZE.

8. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS THUS FAR OF THE CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THE FLOW OF MILITARY MATERIAL UNDOUBTEDLY OF KEY IMPORTANCE IN KEEPING THE KHALQI REGIME AFLOAT--AND BRINGING THE TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP BADLY NEEDED TIME, THE LATTER HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO HALT THE STEADY EROSION CAUSED BY THE HYDRA-HEADED INSURRECTION THEY FACE. AT SOME POINT, THE CONTINUING HEMORRHAGE OF KHALQI MILITARY MANPOWER (THROUGH DEATH, DESERTION, AND DEFECTION) MAY REQUIRE THE USSR TO MAKE SOME TOUGH DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER TO UP ITS ANTE IN THIS STRUGGLE THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES. AT THE PRESENT TIME, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ENOUGH TRAINED AFGHAN TANK CREWS TO MAN THE LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS DELIVERED BY THE USSR.

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 DE RUSBLK #6672/2 2490500
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 R 060344Z SEP 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5500
 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 722
 RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9254
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 378
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1973
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1884
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7347
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3252
 RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 453
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 052
 RUHOOA/CINCPAC
 RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
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 SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 KABUL 6672

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9. THE SOVIET CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: IT IS BELIEVED THAT THERE ARE MANY SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN THE COUNTRY, SERVING AT VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND WITH ALMOST ALL AFGHAN MINISTRIES, ALTHOUGH EVEN A BALLPARK FIGURE IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH WITH ANY ACCURACY, AS THE INSURRECTION HAS GROWN TO PROPORTIONS WHICH DOMINATE THE PRIMARY ATTENTION OF THE TOP AFGHAN AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP HERE. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIVILIAN SOVIET ADVISERS HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT ECLIPSED IN RECENT MONTHS-- PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC INDUSTRIES. FOR SECURITY REASONS, SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISERS HAVE HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM THE MORE DANGEROUS REGIONS OF REBEL ACTIVITY. THE USSR IS TRYING TO KEEP SOME PROJECTS GOING, HOWEVER, PRINCIPALLY FOR PROPAGANDA EFFECT. THESE PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS HAVE REQUIRED HEAVY AFGHAN MILITARY AND POLICE PROTECTION. BECAUSE MANY MINISTRIES AT KABUL ARE ONLY MARKING TIME AS THEIR SENIOR OFFICIALS ATTEND TO THE - DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION" (SEVERAL MINISTERS AND DEPUTY OF SOVIET ADVISERS IN THOSE MINISTRIES ARE NOT NOW AS HIGHLY VISIBL AS THEY WERE DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION, ONE EXCEPTION. HOWEVER, IS THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION & CULTURE, WHERE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EXPERTS ARE THROWING THEIR WEIGHT AROUND, ISSUING DIRECT ORDERS IN THE FORM OF " ADVISORY INSTRUCTIONS"--AND REPORTEDLY OFFENDING THEIR AFGHAN COUNTERPARTS.

10. THE SOVIET ECONOMIC INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN: SINCE THE FAMOUS BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO KABUL IN 1955, THE USSR HAS POURED APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS INTO AFGHANISTAN, MOSTLY IN THE FORM OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY LOW-INTEREST LOANS. REPAYMENT HAS BEEN EXTRACTED PARTIALLY THROUGH AFGHAN COMMODITY DELIVERIES, SUCH AS CITRUS FRUITS FROM THE SOVIET IRRIGATION PROJECTS AT JALALABAD OR NATURAL GAS FROM THE CIS-OKUS REGION. AFGHAN AUTHORITIES ASSERT THAT THE USSR HAS ACCEDED TO A KHALQI REQUEST FOR DEBT RELIEF. THE EXACT TERMS OF THE SOVIET ACCOMMODATION ARE, AS YET, NOT DEFINITELY KNOWN, ALTHOUGH A SOVIET AID OFFICIAL RECENTLY TOLD EMBASSY MOSCOW (MOSCOW 00152) THAT THE USSR HAD POSTPONED REPAYMENT OF AFGHAN ECONOMIC DEBTS FOR TEN YEARS. THE DELIVERY OF SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE TO AFGHANISTAN HAS INCREASED GREATLY SINCE THE " GREAT SAUR REVOLUTION." BUT THE TOTAL COSTS INVOLVED--AND THE NEW AFGHAN REPAYMENT COMMITMENTS ARE STILL UNKNOWN. RECENTLY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TOLD EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT USSR HAD "ALLOCATED" AROUND ONE AND ONE-HALF BILLION DOLLARS TO SUPPORT THE KHALQI REGIME'S NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN. A LARGE PORTION OF THIS AMOUNT IS PRESUMABLY COMPRISED OF SOVIET LINES OF CREDIT NOT EXPENDED BY THE PREDECESSOR DAQUD REGIME. LIKE OTHER AID DONORS HERE, THE SOVIETS FACE THE FRUSTRATION OF LIMITED ABILITY TO ABSORB AID EFFORTS. FUNDS ALLOCATED ARE NOT ALWAYS EXPENDED.

11. THE POLITICAL STAKE OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN: WHETHER MOSCOW WAS INDEED INVOLVED IN IGNITING THE SAUR REVOLUTION OR NOT--AND BOTH THE KHALQIS AND THE SOVIETS STILL INSIST THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH COORDINATION, THE USSR QUICKLY ASSUMED MAJOR SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE FLEDGLING LEFTIST REGIME AFTER THAT EVENT. AS THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP HAS FOUND ITSELF INCREASINGLY PRESSED BY THE SPREADING AFGHAN INSURGENCY, IT HAS PLACED ITS TRUST COMPLETELY--AND PUBLICLY--IN THE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION OF THE USSR. FOR EXAMPLE, PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN RECENTLY TOLD A NEWS CORRESPONDENT THAT IF AFGHANISTAN WERE ATTACKED MILITARILY, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "CERTAINLY" PROVIDE "EVERY ASSISTANCE THAT IS NEEDED" (KABUL 6563). MANY LOCAL DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BECOME THOROUGHLY AND OPENLY COMMITTED TO THIS STRUGGLE; THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE THE WORLD SOCIALIST CAMP SEE IT FAIL TO PRESERVE A FELLOW MARXIST PARTY, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), AND A "PROGRESSIVE" REVOLUTION. OF COURSE, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT PROBABLY REMAINS SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE IN MOSCOW'S EYES.

12. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT EVEN FEEL THEMSELVES IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO THE PDPA, ITSELF. LOCAL SOVIET DIPLOMATS TAKE PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT IS LIMITED TO "SAVING THE REVOLUTION" AND TO THE PRESERVATION OF ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC GAINS (E. G., THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLITERACY, THE ELIMINATION OF FEUDAL CONTROLS OVER WOMEN AND MARRIAGE, THE ABOLISHMENT OF USURY FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDITS, AND LAND REFORM). AS SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS: "THE CLOCK CANNOT BE TURNED BACK." THIS FORMULATION OF SOVIET VIEWS HAS BEEN TAKEN BY SOME OBSERVERS TO MEAN THAT THE USSR COULD LIVE WITH A NON-KHALQI SUCCESSOR REGIME WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PRESERVE THESE "PROGRESSIVE" GAINS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REALIZE THAT ALMOST ANY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT AT KABUL WOULD BE FORCED BY GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES TO MAINTAIN A PEACEFUL, STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS GREAT, NORTHERN NEIGHBOR--BUT ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKING ON THE PART OF A NEW AFGHAN REGIME TO "PRESERVE THE FRUITS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION" WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE USSR TO SAVE FACE SHOULD MOSCOW EVENTUALLY DECIDE THAT THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COST OF KEEPING THE KHALQI REGIME PROPPED UP IS UNACCEPTABLY HIGH.

13. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE: ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR IN RECENT WEEKS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SOME TYPE OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WHICH WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE WIDESPREAD DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE KHALQI REGIME, THERE NO LONGER APPEAR TO BE ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN THAT AREA. A "BROADENING OF THE POLITICAL BASE" OF THE AFGHAN REGIME IS NOT POSSIBLE AS LONG AS THE KHALQIS PERSIST IN PURGING EVERY POSSIBLE ELEMENT OF COMPETITION--EVEN DISSIDENT KHALQI FACTIONS. AT ANY RATE, A RESHUFFLING OF CABINET PORTFOLIOS AMONG THE SAME, OLD, FAMILIAR "GODLESS," "PRO-RUSSIAN," MARXIST-LENINISTS DOWN IN KABUL IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPRESS THE THOUSANDS OF MUJAHEDDIN ("HOLY WARRIORS") UP IN THE HILLS WHO HAVE BEEN FIGHTING FOR MONTHS TO RESTORE AN ISLAMIC, NATIONALISTIC IDENTITY TO AFGHANISTAN.

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14. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR RESIGNED TO CONTINUING THEIR SUPPORT OF THE TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP, BUT ON THEIR OWN TERMS. THE KHALQIS HAVE EVIDENTLY BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE RUSSIANS TO TONE DOWN THOSE ASPECTS OF THEIR REVOLUTION WHICH AROUSE OPPOSITION. MARXIST-LENINIST RHETORIC HAS BECOME MERE MUTED. THE CONTROVERSIAL LAND-REFORM PROGRAM HAS BEEN DECLARED "COMPLETED." KHALQI LEADERS HAVE STRESSED THEIR IDENTIFICATION WITH ISLAM. THE SOVIETS AND THE KHALQIS ARE TRYING DESPERATELY TO BY TIME. IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE LIFE EXPECTANCY IS ONLY 40, THE COMMUNISTS KNOW THAT THE OLDER OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WILL EVENTUALLY DISAPPEAR FROM THE STAGE. THEY ARE PLACING THEIR HOPES ON THE YOUTH. THROUGH EXPERT, SOVIET-GUIDED INDOCTRINATION THROUGH THE MEDIA NAD IN THE SCHOOLS, WE NOTE THAT KHALQISM MAY BE ACHIEVING SOME AFGAN YOUNG PEOPLE. ADDITIONALLY, AFGHAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE BEING SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION AND POLITICAL TRAINING (E.G., 1,500 RECENTLY LEFT FOR THE SOVIET UNION). MANY WILL RETURN AS INDOCTRINATED, VALUABLE CADRE--AND A FEW MIGHT RETURN AS EMBITTERED ANTI-SOVIETS.

15. THE MOST IMMEDIATE QUESTION IN THIS TIME-BUYING STRATEGY IS: HOW LONG CAN THE KHALQI REGIME HOLD OUT AGAINST A CONTINUOUS HEMORRHAGE OF ITS MANPOWER? MANY AFGHAN TROOPS ARE BEING LOST EVERY MONTH THROUGH BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES, DESERTIONS, AND DEFECTION. THE LATTER CATEGORY INCLUDES UNITS OF UP TO BRIGADE STRENGTH WHICH HAVE CROSSED OVER TO THE REBEL SIDE WITH THEIR SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS--AND THE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS FOR USING THEM. AS NOTED EARLIER, THE USSR HAS

BEEN SUPPLYING A GENEROUS STREAM OF MILITARY HARDWARE--BUT THE MANPOWER SHORTAGE HAS NOW BECOME SO CRITICAL THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH TRAINED SOLDIERS TO MAN THIS EQUIPMENT. CREWLESS TANKS ARE PARKED THROUGHOUT AFGHANIST.

16. AT SOME POINT, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP MIGHT FEEL FORCED TO ASK FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. THE AFGHAN LEADERS WOULD PRESUMABLY CITE ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEW SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF DECEMBER 5, 1978. IT IS OUR VELIEF, HOWEVER, THAT THAT ARTICLE, OBVIOUSLY DRAFTED BY CLEVER SOVIET LAWYERS, DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY COMMIT THE USSR TO ARMED INTERVENTION, SHOULD MOSCOW ELECT TO STALL. (ON THE OTHER HAND, IT ALSO APPEARS TO AUTHORIZE SOVIET INTERVENTION, EVEN IN TIME OF PEACE.) MANY LOCAL DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS THINK THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO AVOID SUCH INVOLVEMENT AS LONG AS ANY LESSER COURSE OF ACTION WAS STILL VIABLE--BUT DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE USSR MIGHT FEEL ITSELF FORCED TO DECIDE THAT IT WAS REQUIRED TO SEND IN TROOPS "TO SAVE THE REVOLUTION" AND A "FRATERNAL PARTY, IN SUCH A CASE, THE INITIAL SOVIET INVOLVEMENT COULD BE LIMITED: E.G., SPECIAL AIRBORNE FORCES "TO PROTECT INSTALLATIONS HOUSING SOVIET CITIZENS." EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET COMMITMENT WOULD PROBABLY EXPAND.

17. OTHER LOCAL DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS THINK THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WITHHOLD COMBAT SUPPORT FROM THE KHALQI REGIME, JUDGING THAT THE ODDS FAVORED MOSCOW'S CHANCES OF BEING ABLE TO DO BUSINESS WITH ALMOST ANY TYPE OF SUCCESSOR REGIME. MOSCOW HAS PROBABLY NOTED THE STATEMENTS OF AFGHAN REBEL LEADERS AT PESHAWAR, SUCH AS SYED AHMAD GAILANI, THAT THE LATTER ARE READY TO BE "PRACTICAL" ABOUT A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS MIGHT FEEL THAT THEY WOULD POSSESS THE LEVERAGE TO FORCE A SUCCESSOR REGIME TO HONOR THE "PROGRESSIVE ADVANCES" OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION, AND, IN THIS WAY, ALLOW SOME SAVING OF FACE.

18. IN THE JUDGMENT OF THIS EMPASSY, THE TIME HAS NOT YET ARRIVED FOR A KHALQI PLEA FOR HELP--NOR IS THERE YET ANY SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE USSR IS POISING ITSELF FOR ARMED INTERVENTION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. UNDOUBTEDLY, HOWEVER, THE USSR HAS PROBABLY BEEN MAKING GUNTINCENCY PLANS AND PREPARATIONS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6789

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9-10-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, US, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) PRIME MINISTER AMIN REITERATES THAT HE WANTS
"FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S."

1. (LOU) IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH SEVERAL FOREIGN JOURNAL-
ISTS PUBLISHED HERE ON SEPTEMBER 6, PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH
AMIN MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS REGARDING AFGHANISTAN'S RE-
LATIONS WITH THE U.S.:

-- "WE DO NOT ACCUSE THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA OUR-
SELVES (OF DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE INSURGENTS). WE WANT
TO HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES.
AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT IGNORE THE FEELINGS OF THESE
TWO STATES AGAINST OUR REVOLUTION. THESE FEELINGS ARE RE-
FLECTED IN THE BROADCASTS AND PROPAGANDA OF RADIO PEKING
AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA."

2. (C) COMMENT: PUBLIC PROTESTATIONS BY BOTH AMIN AND
PRESIDENT TARAKI THAT THEY WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
ARE FAIRLY STANDARD, BUT, AS AMIN ILLUSTRATES IN THIS INTERVIEW,
THEIR STATEMENTS ARE OFTEN CAVETED WITH LAMENTATIONS THAT
VOA BROADCASTS AND OTHER "PROPAGANDA" REFLECT THE "HOSTILE"
XTANCE OF THE U.S. AGAINST THIS REGIME. WHATEVER THE PUBLIC
STANCE TAKEN IN SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS, THIS GOVERNMENT'S
SUBSTANTIVE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR TOWARD OUR PROGRAMS
HERE HAS NOT BEEN ONE WHICH WOULD FOSTER THE "FRIENDLY" BI-
LATERAL RELATIONS REFERRED TO BY THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6788

E.O. 12065: GDS 9-9-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINT, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) BIOGRAPHIC TID BITS ON PM AMIN

1. (LOU) PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH SEVERAL FOREIGN JOURNALISTS PUBLISHED LOCALLY ON SEPTEMBER 6, REVEALED THE FOLLOWING AUTO-BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

-- HE IS FIFTY YEARS OLD (NOTE: WE CARRY HIM AS BEING FIFTY-TWO).

-- HE GAINED HIS POLITICAL AWARENESS IN THE UNITED STATES WHILE A STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN IN THE SUMMER OF 1958. AT THAT TIME HE TOOK SEVERAL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS COURSES, "USED TO GO TO THE SOCIALIST PROGRESSIVE CLUBS," AND "CLOSELY WATCHED CAPITALIST CONDITIONS."

-- HE WAS EITHER "OUSTED" BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR "SUMMONED HOME" BY THE AFGHAN REGIME BEFORE HE COULD COMPLETE THE ORAL EXAMINATIONS FOR HIS PHD. AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. U.S. AUTHORITIES TOLD HIM HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED HOME, BUT UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN KABUL, HE WAS TOLD THAT THE U.S. HAD "OUSTED" HIM. ALTHOUGH HE "DEMANDED" THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLETE HIS STUDIES AT HIS OWN EXPENSE, HE WAS TURNED DOWN.

-- HE FOCUSED HIS ATTENTION ON ORGANIZING AND RECRUITING PARTY CADRE WITHIN THE MILITARY IN 1973, AFTER HAVING SERVED FOUR YEARS IN THE PARLIAMENT WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE MONARCHY.

2. (C) COMMENT: IN THIS PARTICULAR INTERVIEW, AMIN ONLY CBLIQUELY BLAMES THE U.S. FOR "EXPELLING" HIM BECAUSE OF HIS OSTENSIBLY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HE HAS NOT BEEN AS POLITE. HIS LACK OF A GENUINE PHD, APPARENTLY STILL RANKLES, AND SOME OBSERVERS HERE EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO ASSERT THAT HIS PREMATURE DEPARTURE FROM COLUMBIA (FOR WHATEVER REASON) IS THE ROOT SOURCE OF AMIN'S ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS. AMIN'S ROLE AS THE PARTY'S PRIMARY MOVER AND SHAKER IN THE AFGHAN ARMY (APPARENTLY FOR THE CRUCIAL 1973-1978 PERIOD) EXPLAINS, TO A GREAT EXTENT, WHY THE KHALQI MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HAVE RETAINED, SO FAR AT LEAST, THEIR LOYALTY TO THE REGIME, DESPITE GROWING TENSIONS AND VIOLENCE. PREVIOUS INFORMATION HAS INDICATED THAT AMIN WAS ACTIVELY RECRUITING IN THE MILITARY PRIOR TO 1973, BUT HIS REMARK HERE MAY SUGGEST THAT THIS BECAME HIS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. FINALLY AMIN'S SUBTRACTION OF A COUPLE OF YEARS FROM HIS AGE COULD COMPENSATE FOR THE SEVERAL INCHES HE HAS ADDED TO HIS GIRTH SINCE THE REVOLUTION, ALTHOUGH IN THIS SOCIETY SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING TRIVIAL THINGS LIKE BIRTHDATES IS GENERALLY NON-EXISTENT.

AMETUTZ

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1979 OCT -3 AM 11:30 Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 20, 19

SUBJECT: Activities of Afghan Dissidents

PARTICIPANTS: Nanguy Tarzi

Afghan exile; former officer
of Afghan Embassy in Washington,
and of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

George G. B. Griffin

M/FSI/LT/DARI

DATE & PLACE: September 12, 1979, at Griffin home in Washington

DISTRIBUTION: INR/RNA
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Tarzi came to see me to tell me about his recent trip to Europe. He had planned to take his family to England for a visit, but just as he was about to leave, news had come of the formation of a rebel "coalition" in Germany. His brother-in-law, Syed Ahmed Gailani, telephoned to ask him to take a message to the "coalition" members about to meet in Hamburg. (Gailani did not attend the meeting.) In his message Gailani explained that his group would consider favorably an invitation to join the group. However, before his group could take such a step, Gailani and representatives of other would-be coalition members would have to discuss (and, by implication, agree upon) the "basis" for the coalition.

When Tarzi arrived in Germany, he sensed that things had changed. The group meeting there had become the creature of General Abdul Wali, King Zahir's son-in-law, who seemed to be in charge. (Also present were former General Mustagni and former Ambassador to the US Karim.) Tarzi met twice with Abdul Wali in his hotel room, but he declined an invitation to attend the group's meetings because he had no authority from Gailani to do so. (During our conversation

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Tarzi several times protested that he did not represent any group; he was "just Gailani's messenger.")

Tarzi revealed that the "coalition" had decided to try to determine whether the rebel leaders in Pakistan would accept Abdul Wali's involvement in their activities. (It was not clear to him whether Abdul Wali was acting on his own or whether he was representing King Zahir, even after he had closely questioned the king's cousin. The cousin said that until recently Zahir had not wished to become involved with the dissidents, while Abdul Wali obviously wanted to play "his" role. He implied that Zahir now wanted to help, but wanted to probe for likely reactions before committing himself.) The group in Germany asked Tarzi to offer support to the king on behalf of the Afghans in Washington, but he refused to do so because he "could not speak for the hundreds of different Afghans in Washington." He had telephoned Zahir (in Rome) from Germany "just as a courtesy," but did not discuss anything of substance. Meanwhile, Ambassador Karim was to make preparations for Abdul Wali to go to Peshawar. (They had not yet been able to obtain a Pakistani visa for the general.)

Tarzi claimed that, at his urging, the "coalition" considered drafting a set of broad policies. They agreed that such a step was necessary to avoid having Afghanistan end up like "other places" (Iran). They feared that even though the Khalqis might be ousted, they would return even stronger if their successors fell to squabbling over personalities. Thus, they also agreed that they needed to form the basis for a government where individuals could come and go without affecting its stability. However, Tarzi was told that their immediate goal was to topple the Khalq government, an effort which left no time to work out policies or build grass roots support.

Tarzi recalled that several members of the "coalition" became unnerved when they heard that the Soviets had made "tentative contact" with King Zahir. He tried hard to find out what I knew about the story, noting that it had been printed in the New York Times. I told him that I had no idea about its validity, but commented that it would be conceivable if it were true that the Soviets were trying to quell the fighting in the country by inducing Afghan dissidents to join the regime. Tarzi apparently viewed the notion of Soviet contact with the Zahir camp as dangerous.

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In any case, Tarzi noted that Ambassador Karim planned to visit Peshawar to test the Abdul Wali idea on the rebels there. Other members of the "coalition," including former Generals Mustagni and Arif (another son-in-law of the King), were to travel in Europe and the US to try to gain the support of exiled Afghan intellectuals for a "council of 10 or 12" to guide the various rebel groups, including those in Pakistan.

According to Tarzi, some "coalition" members suggested supporting those rebels most experienced in fighting Kabul -- Gul Badeen and Rabbani. However, he had urged them first to investigate Muslim Brotherhood infiltration into the rebel groups, noting that the Brotherhood had never been crushed in Egypt, Syria or Iraq, and that Nasser had jailed Haroon Mujadidi for 8 years because of his role in the Brotherhood. He said that he warned them that if Brotherhood members ever come to power in Kabul, the leftists would return within two years. He conceded that religious leaders had a role to play in charting Afghanistan's future but argued that only "moderates" should serve on governing councils. He had informed the group that Gailani insisted that extremists of any sort be excluded from the government. To illustrate his concern, he called for careful screening of his own followers, noting that they were completely under the sway of their pirs (local religious leaders).

In passing, Tarzi commented that most Afghan exiles know little about the situation in Afghanistan, and doubt that joining the mujahedin (freedom fighters) will help to guarantee their future.

Tarzi asserted that the rebels had received about \$1 or \$2 million, mostly from the Saudis. He claimed that most of it had gone to Gul Badeen and Rabbani via the (Pakistani) Jamaat-i-Islami (which took very large cuts). (He added that religious leaders in Iran had given some support to Afghan Shias, who refused to share any of it with the majority Sunnis, or to cooperate with the rebels in Peshawar.) He commented that Rabbani and Gul Badeen had used a ruse to obtain money from the Saudis. Apparently, the Saudi oil company (which handled the transaction for the SAG) had refused to make a donation until the four rebel groups in Peshawar formed a joint front. To meet this condition, Rabbani split his organization into three or four groups. He then drew up a coalition agreement, had it signed by his own men and Gul Badeen, and showed it to the Saudis as "proof" of a front. The Saudis swallowed the story and sent the money.

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Discussing other possible sources of support, Tarzi doubted that the Iranians would help if King Zahir were involved with the rebels, since Khomeini is opposed to monarchs, even if Tehran were convinced that Zahir did not want to retrieve his throne. Because Islamabad was in a "mess," with preparations for elections and its problems with the USG over the nuclear weapons issue, Pakistan was not likely to supply much aid. The Saudis would never provide support openly because of their fears of Soviet reactions.

Tarzi archly observed that Ambassador Karim had implied (without ever saying as much) that he had some sort of USG support or backing; the others had scoffed at the notion. I responded that neither Karim nor any other Afghan was supported by the USG in his efforts to overthrow the Khalqis.

Outlining his views of the situation, Tarzi noted that Afghans are slow to grasp change. This meant, he argued, that they always nailed new governments, naive in the belief that any change would be for the better. However, they now understand the dangers represented by the Khalqis and are beginning to talk openly against the regime (as they had about every other government in the past). Tarzi saw this as a healthy sign which could be of considerable benefit to the dissidents.

On the other hand, Tarzi repeated that the rebels' most urgent needs are material, mostly ammunition and fuel. (He never hinted that the USG should meet any of these needs.) He asserted that the dissidents are still hopeful that the Khalqis can be ousted before winter, but if that does not happen, they will continue their fight. In saying so, however, he expressed the fear that the winter would allow the Khalqis to further entrench themselves, and perhaps gain more acceptance in the eyes of the Afghan public.

BIO NOTES: Tarzi has never complained (as some Afghans do) that he is in need of money or other material goods. He continues to dress well and obviously travels a lot. However, he did confess to a search for employment, saying that he had been turned down by the UN because of a Kabul veto. He reported that his brother had escaped from Afghanistan in the trunk of a car in late July via Pakistan. The brother is now in Paris.

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E.O. 12065: XDS 13 SEPT 1985 (TOON, R.) OR-R

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR

SUBJECT: (U) TARAHI VISIT TO MOSCOW

REFS: (A) FEIS WASHDC 122303Z SEP 79, (B) MOSCOW 14964

1. (CLOU) JUDGING FROM TARAHI'S HIGHLY VISIBLE BUT FAIRLY SPARSELY REPORTED SEPTEMBER 9-11 STOPOVER IN MOSCOW, THE AFGHAN LEADER OBTAINED AN AUTHORITATIVE REAFFIRMATION OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO AID "THE AFGHAN PEOPLE". THERE ARE INDICATORS, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISAGREEMENT ON BILATERAL MATTERS.

2. (CLOU) THE ONLY ANNOUNCED MEETING WAS ONE WITH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO ON SEPTEMBER 10. THE "TASS" REPORT ON THAT MEETING:

-- REFERRED TO THE SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY (BUT NOT SPECIFICALLY TO ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVISIONS) IN CITING THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES TO DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ALL AREAS;

-- SAID THAT BREZHNEV ASSURED TARAHI THAT IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE WITH IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY FORCES, THE FRIENDLY AFGHAN PEOPLE CAN CONTINUE TO COUNT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE AND UNSELFISH ASSISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION;

-- SAID THAT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN A CORDIAL, COMRADELY ATMOSPHERE;

-- SAID THAT THERE WAS "COMPLETE UNANIMITY OF VIEWS" DURING THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS (BUT DID NOT USE THIS FORMULATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS).

3. (CLOU) THE "TASS" REPORT ON TARAHI'S SEPTEMBER 11 DEPARTURE STATEMENT ADDS TO THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS SOME DISAGREEMENT. TARAHI SAID THAT HIS MEETING WITH BREZHNEV WAS "HIGHLY USEFUL" AND THAT THEY DISCUSSED MATTERS OF INTEREST "IN A FRANK, FRATERNAL ATMOSPHERE".

4. (C) COMMENT: AS IN BREZHNEV'S JUNE 11 STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN (REF 2), THE SOVIET COMMITMENT OF ASSISTANCE WAS VAGUE AND WAS DIRECTED TO THE "AFGHAN PEOPLE" RATHER THAN TO THE DRA. THE FULL PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE ON SOVIET TV AND IN THE CENTRAL PRESS OF TARAHI AND BREZHNEV IN AMIABLE DISCUSSION MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED, HOWEVER, TO DEMONSTRATE AT A MINIMUM THAT TARAHI HIMSELF STILL ENJOYS TOP-LEVEL SOVIET SUPPORT.

TOON

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CHRG
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POL

CHARGE
ECON
RF
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225 321
TO RUEHBT/COMMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2386
RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7100
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 6826
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6377
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6360
RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4534
RUEHDE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1216
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATZ 240680

GENEVA FOR MARINELLI

Y.O. 12065: CDS 09/13/35 (COON, JANE A.) NZA

TAGS: PFPR, SREF, SHUM, AF, US, PE

SUBJECT: (U) AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 9794; (B) KARACHI 6864; (C) GENEVA 14632;
(D) ISLAMABAD 12263 (ALL NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SEPTOFF DAVIDSON MET WITH NEA/PAB SEPTEMBER 11 TO REPORT ON HIS RECENT TALKS WITH UNHCR IN GENEVA REGARDING THE AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN. DAVIDSON CONCLUDED THAT UNHCR DOES INTEND TO MOUNT A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ASSIST THESE REFUGEES. HE BELIEVES THE MAY UNHCR MISSION TO PAKISTAN WAS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL IN NATURE AIMED AT DETERMINING WHETHER THE UNHCR COULD WORK IN THE AREA. THE SECOND MISSION WHICH ARRIVED IN LATE AUGUST WAS DESIGNED TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS.

3. DAVIDSON BELIEVES UNHCR WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY DETERMINING WHO IS A LEGITIMATE REFUGEE AND WHO ISN'T, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE IRREGULAR CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION BY AREA TRIBES AND THE FACT THAT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE REFUGEES ARE IN CAMPS (MANY ARE STAYING WITH RELATIVES OR CAMPING ON THEIR OWN WITH THEIR FLOCKS). THE UNHCR IS

ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY THAT CAMPS AND UNHCR ACTIVITIES BE SET AT LEAST 20 KM. FROM THE PAK/AFGHAN BORDER.

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4. DAVIDSON DISCUSSED QUESTIONS OF TIMING WITH UNHCR, SUGGESTING THAT THE COMING OF WINTER ARGUED FOR INITIATING A PROGRAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNHCR IS AIMING FOR MID-OCTOBER TO COINCIDE WITH EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING SCHEDULED AT THAT TIME. DAVIDSON URGED AND UNHCR AGREED, HOWEVER, TO SEE IF SOMETHING MIGHT BE INITIATED BEFORE THEN.

5. DAVIDSON LEARNED THAT UNHCR IS CONTEMPLATING A PROGRAM OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 10-13 MILLION. FROM THE U.S., UNHCR WOULD BASICALLY BE INTERESTED IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD CASH CONTRIBUTION (IN PAST SIMILAR EFFORTS U.S. SHARE HAS AVERAGED ABOUT ONE-FOURTH TO ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL).

6. DAVIDSON ASKED UNHCR THROUGH WHOM THEY WOULD BE WORKING IN IMPLEMENTING A RELIEF EFFORT. MOST ACTIVITIES WOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, AND MIGHT INVOLVE TRIBAL LEADERS GIVEN THE PECULIAR ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FRONTIER REGION. UNICEF MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.

7. FOR ISLAMABAD: RE YOUR SUGGESTION IN PARA 12 REF A, WE SHARE EMBASSY KARACHI'S CONCERNS ABOUT TOO ACTIVE A POLICY OF U.S. OFFICIALS VISITING REFUGEE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS, BUT AGREE THAT OCCASIONS MAY ARISE WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT THE CAMPS. IN OUR VIEW THESE WOULD INCLUDE GOP OR UNHCR-ORGANIZED VISITS FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO PAKISTAN.

8. FOR GENEVA: WE UNDERSTAND THE SECOND UNHCR TEAM HAS RETURNED TO GENEVA FROM PAKISTAN. REQUEST YOU SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITE APPROPRIATE UNHCR OFFICIALS FOR AN UPDATE OF UNHCR'S PLANS BASED ON TEAM'S FINDINGS. VANDY
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7/18 - Ann - Assume
 POC will pass this up here
 001745 from
 Let me know. BL

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CHARGE
 ECON
 RF
 CHRON

POL
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Gozdi
Who's the chief?

Please get attached on 9.18.79

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 OO RUQMER
 DE RUEHC #1748 2571909
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 O R 141821Z SEP 79
 FM SECSTATE WASEDC
 TO RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1349
 INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9333
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7114
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1232
 RUZMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5420
 BT

S T STATE 241748

LIMDIS

1. 12055:GDS 09/14/85 (COON, JANE A.) NEA

TACS:PEPR, PINR, AF, UR, US, IR

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN WITH PGOI

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE WITH THE PAKISTANIS. WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A SIMILAR DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS DIALOGUE SHOULD FLOW NATURALLY FROM PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS EMBASSY HAS HAD WITH PGOI.
3. THE RECENT KABUL WRAPUPS (PART 5) ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (PART 4) PROVIDE A BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WITH PGOI. IN ADDITION YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT -- WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS HAS RECENTLY GROWN AND DELIVERIES OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP. YOU MAY DRAW FROM FIGURES IN KABUL 6097 BUT SHOULD STRESS THEY ARE ROUGH ESTIMATES.
- WE WOULD REGARD USE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

4. PLEASE KEEP US ADVISED OF PGOI VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. VANCE

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TRAFFIC (MOSTLY OF THE TYPE WHICH IS THE BASIC ADMINISTRATION COMPLETES WENT TO THE EMBASSY (ACCORDING TO THE EMBASSY IS NOW BEING PERMITTED THROUGH THE REAR GATE). THIS ZONE, COM-
PRISING IN TANKS AND BUNKERS, INCLUDES THE MAIN STREET FROM
PUSHTUNISTAN SQUARE NORTH-EASTWARD TOWARD THE AIRPORT. IT IS
NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE AIRPORT IS OPEN FOR NORMAL TRAFFIC
ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY, NORMAL COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IS BEING
PERMITTED AND TRAFFIC IS NORMAL. ALL THE INTERSECTIONS ARE
BEING GUARDED BY ARMORED VEHICLES, HOWEVER.

4. THE EMBASSY IS STILL TRYING TO PIECE TOGETHER THE PATTERN
OF EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE SEPTEMBER 14 ANNOUNCEMENT
OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING MILITARY OFFICERS FROM
THE CABINET (KABUL 6851) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAXI-
MUM SECURITY PERIMETER AROUND THE REMAINING KHALQI LEADER-
SHIP. THAT SOMETHING WAS IN THE WIND HAD BEEN NOTED OVER
THE PAST THREE OR FOUR DAYS. THE INDIAN CONSUL AT JALALABAD
NOTED AROUND SEPTEMBER 12 THAT GOVERNOR MOHD. ZARIF WAS NOT
THERE -- IN SPITE OF EXTENSIVE FIGHTING IN THAT REGION. HE
HAD WONDERED WHETHER ZARIF HAD BEEN KILLED OR CAPTURED. AS
IT TURNS OUT, ZARIF HAD APPARENTLY BEEN RETURNED TO KABUL
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PURGE OF THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE
CABINET. THE NEW MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN
DEPUTY MINISTER IN THAT SAME MINISTRY BEFORE BEING TRANS-
FERRED SOME MONTHS AGO TO KANDAHAR AS GOVERNOR. HE HAS
BEEN FRIENDLY WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN THE PAST, AND IS
REGARDED AS INTELLIGENT, COMPETENT, AND PRAGMATIC. NO-
THING IS KNOWN ABOUT THE FATE OF HIS PREDECESSOR MINISTER
SAYED MOHD. GOLABZOI.

5. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD HEARD RUMORS ON SEPTEMBER 13 THAT
FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER MOHD. ASLAM WATANJAR AND FRONTIER
MINISTER SHEER JAN MAZDOORYAR HAD BEEN "KIDNAPPED BY REBELS."
MAZDOORYAR WAS LAST SEEN BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AT THE
BULGARIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION ON SEPTEMBER 9, AND WATANJAR
LAST SEEN WHEN PRESIDENT NOOR MOHD. TARAKI RETURNED FROM
HAVANA ON SEPTEMBER 11 (AT WHICH TIME HE WAS HANDED RIGHT
AFTER AMIN AMONG THE GREETING PARTY). THE FATE OF THE
REPLACED MINISTERS WAS NOT ANNOUNCED BY THE AFGHAN RADIO.
ALTHOUGH THEY COULD CONCEIVABLY STILL BE AT LARGE -- A
POSSIBLE REASON FOR THE TIGHT MILITARY ALERT, IT IS MORE

PROBABLE THAT THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP WAS ABLE TO ARREST
THEM. A MAN AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AS WATANJAR COULD WELL
HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AFTER A QUICK "INTERROGATION" SESSION
(INDIAN DIPLOMATE NOTED HEAVY ACTIVITY AT THE SPECIAL AGSA
INTERROGATION CENTER ACROSS THE STREET FROM THEIR EMBASSY
SERVILY BEFORE NOON ON SEPTEMBER 14.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHRC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5621

INFO RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3722

RUEHJG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 741

RUEHDE/AMEMBASSY DACCA PRIORITY 880

RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9295

RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 390

RUEHKA/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4393

RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1814

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1907

RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 64

RUEHNF/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7392

RUEHNS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3275

RUEHOD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1351

RUEHFF/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 470

RUEHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY

RUEHNA/CINCEPAC PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 21 OF 2 KABUL 5874

DEPT ALSO FOR A/ST/SEC; KARACHI FOR NSS/, CINCPAC AND CINCEPAC
ALSO FOR POLAD

6. ASADULLAH, THE REPLACEMENT AGSA (SECRET POLICE) COMMANDER, WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RELATED TO WAJANJAR. THE NEW PRESIDENT-GENERAL OF AGSA, MOHAMMAD AZIZ, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ONE OF ASADULLAH'S DEPUTIES. THE RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT AZIZ'S DESIGNATION STATED THAT IT IS "A SECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE," AND NOT AS PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT A PART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR -- OR AN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION, NOT UNDER ANY MINISTRY'S CONTROL. AS ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AMIN POSSESSES DIRECT CONTROL OVER THIS RAPIDLY GROWING SECRET POLICE FORCE.

7. THE 1250 EXPLOSION AT THE ARG ON SEPTEMBER 14 WAS CLEARLY AN AIP BURST, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL WITNESSES. IT COULD HAVE BEEN AN ARTILLERY OR MORTAR ROUND FIRED AT THE ARG -- PERHAPS FOR SOME TYPE OF SIGNALLING PURPOSES. THERE WERE NO FOLLOW-UP SHOTS. ISOLATED SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS HEARD AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE CITY LATER THAT AFTERNOON -- AND AGAIN ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15. THE SIGNIFICANCE, IF ANY, OF THIS LATER ACTION IS STILL UNKNOWN.

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8. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THE SEPTEMBER 14 EVENTS BECAUSE THE FACT THAT EMBASSY OFFICERS TRAVELLING IN THE STAPY MIROYAN HOUSING AREA -- WHERE LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIETS LIVE -- SHORTLY BEFORE THE 1757 EXPLOSION YESTERDAY NOTED RUSSIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN WALKING AND PLAYING WITHOUT ANY OBVIOUS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. EARLIER TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT AREA WAS REPORTED BY THE INDIAN DOG TO BE GUARDED BY SOVIET SOLDIERS WEARING AFGHAN UNIFORMS. EMBASSY OFFICERS TOURING THE AREA AT 1202 HOURS HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF THIS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KART-I-SE IS NOW BEING GUARDED BY TWO TANKS. THREE KHALCI MINISTRIAL LIMOUSINES, WITH GUARDS WERE OBSERVED BY A BRITISH DIPLOMAT WAITING OUTSIDE THAT EMBASSY. WE ASSUME THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW IN THE PLAY.

9. THE ABSENCE OF ANY AIR ACTIVITY FOR MORE THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS STRIKES US AS NOTEWORTHY. THE AIRFORCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN GROUNDED AS UNRELIABLE -- AS WAS THE CASE WHEN DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL QADER WAS PURGED.

10. COMMENT: AMIN, WHO IS IN A POSITION TO MONITOR THE ARMED FORCES CLOSELY, MIGHT HAVE DETECTED WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS A BUDDING WATANJAR-LED PLOT -- AND DECIDED TO NIP IT IN THE BUD WITH A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. THIS ACTION HAS COMPLETELY EXCLUDED THE MILITARY FROM THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -- AND PERHAPS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AS WELL. NOW THE REMAINING MILITARY LEADERSHIP WILL REACT -- IF THEY REACT AT ALL -- REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THE KDI KABUL-AREA FORCES APPEAR TO BE HOLDING FIRM IN AMIN'S SUPPORT THUS FAR.

11. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIETS KNEW ABOUT AMIN'S MOVE IN ADVANCE -- OR WERE SUDDENLY FACED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. MOSCOW CERTAINLY CANNOT BE PLEASED THAT THE KHALCIS, CONTRARY TO SOVIET ADVICE, HAVE NARROWED THEIR POLITICAL POWER BASE EVEN FURTHER, THEREBY MAKING MORE DIFFICULT THE CURRENT STRUGGLE FOR THE REGIME'S SURVIVAL. IT MAY NOW OCCUR TO THE SOVIETS THAT A QUICK MILITARY COUP COULD STABILIZE THE CURRENT POLITICAL MEES. THIS WOULD PERMIT A COMPLETELY NEW CAST OF LEADERS TO TAKE OVER CONTROL -- PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO COULD FUZZ THEIR POLITICAL INCLINATIONS AND TONE DOWN THE MORE INFLAMMATORY ASPECTS OF THE "GREAT SAUR REVOLUTION." IN COMING DAYS WE WILL BE TRYING TO IDENTIFY SOME THESE OFFICERS.

AMSTU72

BT
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DE RUEHOC/STATE DEPT WASHDC

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01.171111Z SEP 79

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHOC/STATE DEPT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5655

INFO RUEHOC/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIO

TY 3725

RUEHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0746

RUEHJDY/AMEMBASSY DACCAR PRIORITY 0804

RUEHJED/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0811

RUEHJHA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0854

RUEHJHR/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0399

RUEHJTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1019

RUEHJCO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1913

RUEHJAL/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7405

RUEHJNA/USMISSION USMATO PRIORITY 0066

RUEHJPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3282

RUEHJED/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1357

RUEHJHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0464

RUEHJHA/CINCPAC HONOLULU PRIORITY

RUEHJAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 6936

DEPT ALSO FOR A/SY/CC; KARACHI FOR RSS; CINCPAC AND CINCEUR
ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12865: GDS 9/16/85 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

TAGS: ~~PEPR, PIR, EGV, PIR, PIR, PIR, PIR, PIR, PIR~~

SUBJ: (LOW) TENSION LESSENS IN KABUL AS PRESIDENT AMIN
DIGESTS HIS RECENT POLITICAL GAINS

REF: KABUL 6914

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: KABUL APPEARS TO BE LOSING SOME OF THE TENSION
OF RECENT DAYS AS NEWLY NAMED PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN
CONSOLIDATES HIS CONTROL OVER THE PARTY APPARATUS AND THE
GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

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CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

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3. AS OF 1500 HOURS, KABUL TIME, ON SEPTEMBER 17, THE POLITICAL TENSION OF RECENT DAYS APPEARS TO BE LESSENING IN KABUL. ALTHOUGH TANKS STILL GUARD KEY LOCATIONS AROUND THE ARQ PALACE ("HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE") AND THE RADIO AFGHANISTAN COMPLEX, THE TANK CREWS ARE RELAXING IN THE SHADE BENEATH THEIR VEHICLES. GOVERNMENT OFFICES APPEAR TO BE RETURNING TO A NORMAL BUSINESS ROUTINE. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND HIS FOLLOWERS SEEM TO STILL FIND IT PRUDENT TO PEER DOWN THE ROAD (ESPECIALLY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PUL-I-CHARKI ARMORED CORPS BASE) FOR SOME TYPE OF MILITARY REACTION TO THEIR RECENT GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY COUPS, THEY APPEAR TO BE BECOMING MORE CONFIDENT AS THE HOUR 3 PASSES WITHOUT CHALLENGE.

4. AMIN IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS THE NATION TONIGHT AT 2000 (IN PUSHTU) AND 2030 (IN DARI). AFGHANS ARE WAITING FOR A NUMBER OF SIGNALS. FOR EXAMPLE, WILL AMIN CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE RESPECTFUL TONE TOWARD THE "ILL," DEPARTING "GREAT LEADER," NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI CHARACTERIZED BY THE SEPTEMBER 16 LEADERSHIP-CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT -- OR WILL HE ELECT TO BEGIN DENIGRATING THE "GREAT TEACHER," UNDER WHOM HE ONCE SERVED AS THE "HEROIC PEOPLE"? TARAKI RECEIVED THE USUAL "OLI-OL-INDIVIDUAL" PRESS TREATMENT ON SEPTEMBER 15, BUT SINCE SEPTEMBER 15 ONLY HIS NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN THE MEDIA -- WITHOUT TITLES OR HONORIFIC PHRASES. AMIN'S DAUGHTER IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE TORN DOWN PICTURES OF TARAKI IN HER SCHOOL ON SEPTEMBER 16, AND TO HAVE DESCRIBED TARAKI AS A "BAD MAN."

5. WILL AMIN ANNOUNCE FURTHER CABINET CHANGES AMONG THOSE REPORTED TO BE ON THEIR WAY OUT -- EITHER TONIGHT OR IN COMING WEEKS -- BECAUSE OF PAST ANTI-AMIN TENDENCIES ARE: FINANCE MINISTER ABDUL KARIM NISAO, PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER DASTAGIR PAJUSHIRI, MINES AND INDUSTRIES MINISTER MOHAMMAD IZAT DAFESH, AND TRANSPORT MINISTER MOHAMMAD HASSAN BAREG-SHAFTIYEE (WHO, INCIDENTALLY, RANKED RIGHT BEHIND AMIN AND DEPOSED INTERIOR MINISTER MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR IN THE AIRPORT PARTY WELCOMING TARAKI HOME FROM HIS JOURNEY TO HAVANA AT 0000 ON SEPTEMBER 11).

BT

#036

170000Z SEP 74
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHOC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5616
 INFO RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3727
 RUEHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3747
 RUEHJOK/AMEMBASSY BACCA PRIORITY 4885
 RUEHRC/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9312
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY JEDDA PRIORITY 8395
 RUEHKG/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4408
 RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1822
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1914
 RUEHNA/USMISSION UONATO PRIORITY 2263
 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7406
 RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3283
 RUEHGO/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1358
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2485
 RUEHCHCA/CINCPAC HONOLULU PRIORITY
 RUEHAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 6906

6. WHAT HAPPENED TO TARAKI? MOST KABULIS WITH WHOM IMPASSY OFFICERS HAVE SPOKEN SINCE YESTERDAY EVENING'S ANNOUNCEMENT THINK TARAKI IS ALREADY DEAD OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS, SUFFERED DURING THE PALACE BUNBATTLE THAT FELL HIS BODYGUARD, THE INFANOUS SAYED DAUD TAROON, ON EITHER SEPTEMBER 14 OR 15 (THE EXACT DATE IS NOT YET CLEAR). IT COULD WELL BE THAT TARAKI AND TAROON WERE CAUGHT UP WILLY-NILLY IN THE VIOLENT EVENTS ATTENDING THE PURGE OF THE LAST MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, NOT HAVING BEEN SCHEDULED FOR ELIMINATION BY AMIN AT THIS TIME. THEIR TURN MIGHT HAVE BEEN FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, ACCORDING TO AMIN'S TIMETABLE. ONCE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF, HOWEVER, AMIN WOULD CHARACTERISTICALLY SEIZE IT QUICKLY. OTHERS QUESTION WHY AMIN WOULD THEN KEEP TARAKI'S DEATH SECRET WHEN HE DECREED A MARTYR'S FUNERAL FOR TAROON ON SEPTEMBER 16. STILL OTHERS BELIEVE THAT TARAKI IS STILL ALIVE, BUT SINKING -- AND THAT HIS DEATH WILL EVENTUALLY BE ANNOUNCED BY THE REGIME.

7. DURING A SEPTEMBER 17 BUSINESS CALL ON ABDOUL MAJID MANGAL, A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO ACCOMPANIED TARAKI TO HAVANA AND MOSCOW, THE A/COM COMMENTED THAT WESTERN DIPLOMATS HAD FOUND TARAKI HAPPY AND APPARENTLY HEALTHY UPON HIS RETURN TO KABUL SEPTEMBER 11. MANGAL OBSERVED THAT TARAKI MIGHT HAVE APPEARED TO BE HEALTHY, BUT THAT HE HAD SUFFERED SOME HEALTH PROBLEMS DURING THE TRIP. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT TARAKI HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A PHYSICIAN. MANGAL IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD BE LEARNING MORE ABOUT TARAKI'S "HEALTH PROBLEM" IN DUE COURSE -- PERHAPS EVEN DURING TONIGHT'S SPEECH BY AMIN. THE QUESTION IS FAST BECOMING moot, HOWEVER; THOUSANDS OF PICTURES OF TARAKI THAT HAD FESTOONED KABUL HAVE ALL DISAPPEARED. THE DE FACIO PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP AMIN HAS DISPLAYED SINCE THE REVOLUTION HAS NOW BECOME DE JURE. PEOPLE WONDER WHETHER AMIN, "THE AFGHAN STALIN," WILL PERMIT EVEN THE MEMORY OF THE "GREAT GENIUS LEADER" TO ENDURE.

8. THE SOVIET REACTION AT KABUL: AS INDICATED IN THE EMBASSY'S EARLIER REPORTING (KABUL 8374), IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT KABUL WAS PRIVY TO AMIN'S ANTI-KHATAMJAR MOVE BEFORE IT WAS LAUNCHED. FACED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI -- IF THIS SURMISE IS TRUE, THE SOVIETS HAD, IN THE SHORT RUN, NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO RIDE OUT THE FAST-BREAKING CHAIN OF EVENTS. THE KABUL PRESS REPORTED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER M. PUZANOV CALLED ON AMIN AT 1022 ON SEPTEMBER 15. ONE OF OUR SOURCES TOLD US THAT THAT MEETING LASTED UNTIL NOON. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE RISING LEADER AND HIS VITAL SOVIET SUPPORTERS WERE PRESUMABLY REACHED AT THAT SESSION.

9. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND AMONG KNOWLEDGEABLE AFGHANS IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT HAPPY -- BUT PROBABLY FIND THAT THEY HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE AT THIS TIME BUT TO SUPPORT THE AMBITIOUS AND RUTHLESS AMIN. HAVING ONCE REPORTEDLY BEEN ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO BROADEN THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE KABUL REGIME IN ORDER TO COUNTER BETTER THE INSURGENCY, THE SOVIETS NOW FIND THAT BASE EVEN MORE NARROWED -- SHARPENED TO A PENCIL POINT, AS IT WERE. THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO ONCE SAID TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE BLOODY-HANDED AMIN WAS THE PRIMARY IMAGE PROBLEM OF THE KHALQI REGIME (THE AVUNCULAR TARAKI HAD SOME POPULAR SUPPORT, EVEN AMONG SOME NON-KHALQI CIRCLES), AND WERE REPORTEDLY DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE HIM. NOW AMIN IS ALL THEY HAVE LEFT, UNTIL SOME OTHER VIABLE OPTION BECOMES AVAILABLE,

HE IS THE ONLY INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH MOSCOW CAN DEFEND A "PATERNAL PARTY" AND SAVE A "PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION," IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH LOCAL SOVIETS STRONGLY PROFESS.

12. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ACCEPTING THIS SITUATION WITH GOOD GRACE, HOWEVER. ON SEPTEMBER 17, A JUNIOR SOVIET DIPLOMAT CRUCLED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THE KHALQIS WERE A MISTAKE IN "TRYING TO DO TOO MANY THINGS TOO FAST". HE THOUGHT THE REGIME SHOULD HAVE TAKEN FOUR OR FIVE YEARS TO EFFECT WHAT THEY TRIED TO ACCOMPLISH IN A FEW MONTHS. THE SOVIET MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE KHALQIS HAD FAILED.

ASSTNTZ

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C A L 11412 DEP 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHOC/STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5680
 INFO RUEHOB/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5621
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1900
 RUEHAF/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7416
 RUEHRE/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 493
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 6978

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POL
 CHG
 CHRON
 KKKK

LIMDIS

E.O. 12865: CDS 9/18/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) -OR-M
 TAGS: FINS PINT AF
 SUBJECT: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL CRISIS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. I THINK IT MUST BE QUITE EVIDENT TO THE DEPT AND ADDRESSEE POSTS THAT WE ARE WITNESSING A VERY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT SOME ASPECTS AND SHARE SOME PERSONA THOUGHTS:

-- THE CRISIS IS NOT OVER. AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE LOYALTY OF THE DRA MILITARY UNITS IN SUCH AREAS AS GHANZI, KANDAHAR AND KUNDUZ IS NOT CLEAR, AND THERE ARE WIDE-SPREAD REPORTS (AND SOME EVIDENCE) THAT THE THREE DEPOSED MILITARY FIGURES IN THE CABINET (KATANJAR, GULABZOI, AND MAZDOORYAR) HAVE MANAGED TO ESCAPE THE CITY AND ARE AT LARGE. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT CIVIL WAR AMONG MAJOR DRA MILITARY UNITS COULD ENSUE, LED BY PRO-TARAXI OR OTHERWISE ANTI-AMIN ELEMENTS. IN KABUL, WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS TENSE. MAJOR STREETS ADJACENT TO IMPORTANT MINISTRIES REMAIN CLOTTED OFF TO REGULAR TRAFFIC, AND HERE AT THE CHANCERY, MANNED SOVIET-BUILT TANKS ARE STATIONED ASTRIDE THE THREE STREETS BORDERING THE EMBASSY PROPERTY. WE CAN'T ENTER OR EXIT BY THE FRONT GATE BECAUSE THE STREET IS CLOSED, SO WE ARE USING OUR EMERGENCY BACK GATE, BUT DO SO UNDER THE BARREL OF A LARGE T-62 TANK. IT IS ALL A BIT UNNERVING, BUT SOMETHING CERTAINLY TO WRITE HOME TO MOTHER ABOUT.

-- FOR 18 MONTHS NOW WE HAVE WATCHED THIS MARXIST PARTY (PDPA) DEVOUR ITSELF. AN AFGHAN OFFICIAL LAST NIGHT QUIETLY DESCRIBED THE LEADERSHIP TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER AS A "BUNCH OF SCORPIONS BITING EACH OTHER TO DEATH." BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, THERE HAVE BEEN 23 CABINET CHANGES SINCE THE ORIGINAL LIST WAS PROMULGATED IN APRIL 1978. THE NUMBER OF DEPUTY MINISTER CHANGES HAS BEEN EVEN MORE: 34. PURGE AFTER PURGE HAS OCCURRED, AND ONE CAN'T HELP WONDER HOW THE REGIME MANAGES TO SURVIVE. PART OF THE ANSWER IS, OF COURSE, BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF PERCEIVED OPPOSITION. THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS KILLED MAY HAVE REACHED 6,000, AND PROBABLY MORE THAN FOUR TIMES THAT NUMBER HAVE BEEN IN AND OUT OF POLITICAL JAILS.

-- THE INSURGENCY DURING THIS CRISIS PERIOD HAS BEEN INEPT AND QUIESCENT. IT HAS NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS TO PUSH ITS ADVANTAGE.

-- I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE FUTURE WILL BRING. AMIN HAS AMAZINGLY SURVIVED PLOT AFTER PLOT AGAINST HIM. SURELY THE LAW OF AVERAGES SHOULD CATCH UP WITH HIM SOMEDAY. BUT THEN STALIN DIED IN BED. PERSONALLY, I WOULD GIVE HIM NO BETTER ODDS THAN 50 PER CENT TO SURVIVE IN POWER THIS CALENDAR YEAR. I GIVE HIS CHANCES OF DYING IN BED OF OLD AGE AS NIL. I WOULD THOUGH, LAY HIGHER ODDS THAT THE PARTY ITSELF (PDPA) WILL SURVIVE IN CONTROL IN SOME FORM.

3. IT IS AN INTERESTING TIME TO BE IN KABUL. LET'S HOPE MORGOY GETS HURT.

CONFIDENTIAL

American Embassy
Islamabad, Pakistan

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/85 (SHERMAN, R.) O.L.-P

SUBJECT: Hazara Dissident Activities

PARTICIPANTS: Wali Beg, President, Alliance of Muslim Fighters
for Afghanistan

Rick Sherman, Acting Political Counselor

DATE & PLACE: September 19, 1979 - American Embassy


COPIES TO: ISLAMABAD - AMB, DCM, POL-2, SPEC-2, DAI
BIO-2, ECON, ICA, ODRP, I
AMCONSULS - KARACHI, LAHORE, PESHAWAR
EMBASSIES - BEIJING, KABUL, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI
~~TEHRAN~~
STATE - NEA/PAB, INR/DDR/RNA/SOA, INR/OIL/D

(CONFIDENTIAL - Entire Text)

Sadar Mohammed Asif Khan, erstwhile Chief of the Hazaras in Baluchistan and presently MFA Deputy Chief of Protocol at Quetta, phoned on September 17 requesting an appointment for Wali Beg. I agreed to see the Hazara leader if he came to Islamabad. He came September 19 with an interpreter and two silent colleagues.

Wali Beg explained he is the president of the first Hazara Afghan dissident organization to be formed here in Pakistan. The group is headquartered in Quetta from where they run operations in central Afghanistan. Unlike the dissident leaders headquartered in Peshawar, Wali Beg firmly believes he should have minimal people around his base and a maximum number fighting the enemy. He claims to have sent "hundreds" of his followers back to the Hazara area of Afghanistan from the "safehaven" of Baluchistan.

On his relations with the groups in Peshawar, Wali Beg said he cooperates and communicates with all (except Hezb-i-Islami) but that they have no operations in common. Of the Peshawar leaders Beg knows Gailani and Mohammed Nabi best; the latter having been a fellow parliamentarian in the Zaher Shah years. Beg does not seem to trust fully any of the non-Hazaras.

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"In Afghanistan there are six million Hazaras, all of whom are actively fighting the DRA," Beg said. Those Hazaras in the DRA military have turned on their commanders and hundreds have defected to Beg's forces. Another 1600 officers and men have been dismissed from the DRA Army, disarmed and arrested as potential security risks, he added.

Beg made the standard pitch for U.S.G. assistance to his group -- received the standard polite turn-down -- and expressed his appreciation for the American people's moral support for the rights of all men. He lamented the lack of any material support to accompany the sentiment.

Wali Beg did not think the Taraki fall from grace is significant. He sees Amin as "even worse." He also commented that as winter comes his Hazara forces will have increasing advantage over DRA forces and he expects to be able to deliver some major blows to the Kabul regime through the forthcoming winter.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:

Wali Beg says he was a two-term Member of Parliament during the Zaher Shah regime. He represented a constituency centered at Nawar in Ghazni. He appears to be in his early forties, muscular and physically fit. His colleagues appeared equally capable and tough and all exhibited the ethnic arrogance for which the Hazara are known. They give the impression of being intelligent and thoughtful as well.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5706

RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 755

RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 40

RUSBOO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9336

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1925

RUSBCE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7424

RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 498

RUDKRV/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 58 ✓

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 7025

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M

TAGS: PINT AF UR

SUBJ: COMMENTS BY TWO EASTERN EUROPEAN EMBASSIES ON AFGHAN
POLITICAL SITUATION

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I THINK IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE DEPTMENT IF I
SHARED SOME COMMENTS GLEANED FROM GDR CHARGE KLAUS MASER
AND POLISH AMBASSADOR EDWARD BARADZIEJ. OVER THE LAST
TWO DAYS, I PAID CALLS ON THEM TO ASCERTAIN THEIR VIEWS
ON THE LOCAL SITUATION. I SOUGHT THEM OUT DELIBERATELY
SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN MORE OPEN AND FRIENDLY TOWARDS US
THAN THE OTHER PRO-MOSCOW EMBASSY CHIEFS OF MISSION.

3. THE MOST IMPORTANT TIDBITS GATHERED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

-- ES-PRESIDENT TARAKI IS ALIVE AND BEING HELD WITH
HIS FAMILY IN DETENTION IN A GOVERNMENT VILLA
IN KABUL. HIS RESIDENCE IS GUARDED BY SOLDIERS.

--BOTH ENBOYS CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISSENSION WITHING
THE PDPA PARTY PRIOR TO THE LATEST PURGE. BOTH DISPUTED THE
WIDELY HELD OPINION AMONG WESTERN EMBASSIES THAT WITHIN THE PARTY
TARAKI HAD HAD A LARGER FOLLOWING THAN HAFIZULLAH AMIN. THE
POLISH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT TARAKI'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY" HAD
BEEN OFFENSIVE TO MANY PARTY MEMBERS, AND THIS HAD CONTRIBUTED
TO HIS LACK OF SUPPORT. HE ALSO SAID THAT TARAKI FAILED TO
TAKE EVEN THE MOST ELEMENTARY STEPS TO BUILD A FOLLOWING,
SUCH AS PAYING VISITS TO FACTORIES, SCHOOLS AND OTHER WORKING
ESTABLISHMENTS. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT HAFIZULLAH AMIN NEVER
PAID SUCH VISITS EITHER, THE POLE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY

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OF THE PARTY LEADER TO SET THE EXAMPLE. THE POLE ALSO FAULTED TARAKI FOR NOT CONSULTING THE PARTY MCE. SINCE NOV. 1978 UNTIL HIS FALL--A PERIOD OF 18 MONTHS--THERE HAD BEEN NO MEETING OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. (THE POLITBURO, THOUGH, MET FREQUENTLY.)

-- BOTH DIPLOMATS CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR SOME TIME NOT BEEN HAPPY ABOUT FACTIONALISM IN THE PARTY. THE POLE WAS EXPLICIT IN STATING THAT A YEAR AGO THE SOVIETS WERE DISTRESSED ABOUT THE PURGING OF THE PARCHAMISTS. HE SAID THAT MOSCOW HAD FROM THE START BEEN ENCOURAGING "UNITY OF ALL PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS." THOUGH CIRCUMSPECT IN THEIR REMARKS, BOTH ENVOYS MADE PLAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PLEASED ABOUT THE RECENT DISPUTE AND PURGE WITHIN THE TOP RANKS OF THE PARTY, WHICH SAW TARAKI AND THE THREE MILITARY-ORIGIN CABINET MEMBERS REMOVED.

-- THE POLE SAID THAT THE DUUMMIRATE OF TARAKI AND AMIN COULD NOT HAVE LASTED LONG. IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT ONE OR THE OTHER WOULD EVENTUALLY PREVAIL, HE SAID.

-- NEITHER ENVOY THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD A DIRECT HAND IN THE REMOVAL OF TARAKI. IN FACT, THE POLE WAS SURE THAT MOSCOW WAS EMBARRASSED BY IT SINCE ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE BREZHNEV HAD GIVEN A BEARING TO TARAKI IN MOSCOW. HE SAID. "THIS MUST BE KL EMBARRASSING TO MOSCOW".

-- THE GDR CHARGE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE THREE FIRED MILITARY-ORIGIN CABINET MEMBERS WERE SOMEWHERE AT LARGE. THE POLE REFUSED TO VENTURE AN OPINION AS TO THEIR WHEREABOUTS.

4. COMMENT: THESE ARE NOT WEIGHTY MORSELS BUT I SHALL THEM WIN YOU.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4943
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9704
INFO RUMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4188
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 648
RUMJOM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1860
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 3516
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 885
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 1849
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8768
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4259
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1515
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1419
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3257
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5445
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 535
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 10745

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12865: GDS 9/20/85 (SHERMAN, R) OR-P
TAGS: PINT PINS PEPR AF UR
SUBJECT: (C) JAPANESE ASSESSMENT OF TARAKI FALL

REF: (A) KABUL 7009 (NOTAL), (B) KABUL 6978 (NOTAL)

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT. PROTECT FCI.

2. JAPANESE DCM AND HIS POLITICAL AIDE BRIEFED POLOFF SEPTEMBER 20 ON JAPANESE VISIT TO KABUL SEPTEMBER 16-19. AIDE, WHO PAID VISIT, SPENT MOST OF TIME AT JAPANESE EMBASSY IN KABUL BUT DID MEET A FEW AFGHANS AND TALKED WITH FEW SOVIETS. HE MADE CLEAR HIS IMPRESSIONS ARE HIS OWN AND THAT OFFICIAL JAPANESE VIEWS SHOULD EMANATE FROM KABUL EMBASSY.

3. JAPANESE HAVE ASSEMBLED SCENARIO FROM VARIOUS SOURCES OF TARAKI'S FALL AS FOLLOWS: TARAKI WAS SUMMONED TO MOSCOW FROM HAVANA WHERE WAS "INSTRUCTED" TO BROADEN REGIME BASE BY SACKING AMIN, VATANJAR AND OTHER "RADICALS". IN RETURN FOR HIS AGREEING TO DO SO SOVIETS HEAPED FULSOME PRAISE ON "FATHER OF THE REVOLUTION" BEFORE HE DEPARTED USSR.

4. AMIN GOT WIND OF TARAKI'S PLAN AND PREPARED WELCOMING COMMITTEE TO DEPOSE TARAKI. TWO ELEMENTS MET SEPTEMBER 14 AT WHICH TIME THE CONFRONTATION TURNED VIOLENT. AN UNIDENTIFIED TARAKI-LOALISTA TRIED TO SHOOT AMIN BUT TAROON STEPPED IN FRONT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND WAS KILLED. HIS SHIELDING OF AMIN IS REPORTEDLY THE GENESIS OF HIS MARTYRDOM.

5. ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE ACCOUNT THE SITUATION THEN DETERIORATED WITH MORE SHOOTING DURING WHICH AMIN ESCAPED. THE FATE OF VATANJAR AND OTHERS IS UNKNOWN IN THIS ACCOUNT. INTERESTINGLY, THE JAPANESE SCENARIO DOES NOT INCLUDE THE NEARLY-UNIVERSAL VERSION IN WHICH TARAKI IS ALSO SHOT. THAT VERSION STILL APPEARS TO BE BASED ON LE MOUNIER'S AFP STORY FILED FROM KABUL ON SEPTEMBER 16.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5711
INFO RUMJFG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0756
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9337
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0077
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1926
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7425
RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0499
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR

BT

SECRET KABUL 7039

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CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, AF, CU
SUBJ: (S) IRANIAN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: TEHRAN 10224 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE MISSION AT KABUL IS NOT AT THIS TIME AWARE OF ANY CUBAN PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN OTHER THAN THE REGULAR STAFF AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN THIS CITY. THERE ARE NOT EVEN ANY CURRENT AFGHAN RUMORS ABOUT A "CUBAN INVOLVEMENT" HERE.

3. AS FOR FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S QUESTION ABOUT "CUBAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL," THIS "INFORMATION" MAY DATE BACK TO LATE 1973, WHEN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FIRST TRIED TO CHECK OUR REPORTS THAT "CUBAN TROOPS" WERE IN AFGHANISTAN. AT THAT TIME, OUR PAKISTANI COLLEAGUES TOLD US THAT THEY HAD HEARD THAT "SOME CUBAN ARMY DOCTORS" HAD BEEN VISITING VARIOUS AFGHAN UNITS AROUND THE COUNTRY. WE WERE NEVER ABLE TO VERIFY THIS -- BUT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY AT KABUL MIGHT HAVE REPORTED THE STORY TO TEHRAN.

4. THIS EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE PASSING OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION TO YAZDI. AMSTUTZ

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RUMMO 0545101J0571
 1P 10100
 DE RUEHC 7062 2650730
 ZNY 00000 22H
 P R 2007173 CEP 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5727
 INFO RUHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0760
 RUSEC/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9341
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1829
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1931
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7430
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3293
 RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0503
 RUHQHCA/CINCPAC
 BT

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 ECON
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 CHRN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 7062

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12865: GDS 9/22/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, US, AF
 SUBJ: (C) KHALOIS POSSIBLY WAVING OLIVE BRANCH TOWARD WASHINGTON?

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ON SEPTEMBER 22, TWO AFGHAN OFFICIALS, ONE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE OTHER FROM THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING, TOLD A USAID TCN THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN INTENDS TO IMPROVE AFGHANISTAN'S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AMONG SPECIFIC MEASURES BEING CONSIDERED BY AMIN, ACCORDING TO THE TWO OFFICIALS, IS AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF APOLOGY OVER THE FEBRUARY 14 DEATH OF AMBASSADOR DUBS.
3. COMMENT: THE TWO AFGHANS MAY HAVE INTENDED THAT THEIR MESSAGE REACH USG EARS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION AT THIS TIME ABOUT AMIN'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD US, THE LOCAL SOVIET EMBASSY IS VERY AWARE THAT THE DUBS CASE REMAINS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT IN U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN UPGRADING THE IMAGE OF AMIN, AS WE BELIEVE THEY ARE, THEY MIGHT BE ADVISING HIM TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

AMSTUTZ

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#7062

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5728
INFO RUHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0701
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9342
RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0400
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1830
RUEHNO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1932
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7431
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3294
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0504
RUHONOA/CINCPAC
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0070
BT

002099

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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 7063

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 9/22/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PGOV, PINS, SHUM, AF, UR
SUBJ: (C) LOCAL SOVIET VIEWS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN'S NEW
AMIN REGIME

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: A PROMINENT LOCAL SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAS DISCLAIMED ANY PRIOR SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S RECENT COUP. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET SAW A CHANCE THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOW ENTER A POSITIVE PHASE "UNDER THE RULE OF LAW." END .
SUMMARY.

3. AT A DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ON SEPTEMBER 20, THE A/DCM HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AT KABUL WITH SOVIET COUNSELOR VASSILIY SAFRONCHUK, WHO IS REPORTED TO BE THE KEY SOVIET POLITICAL TROUBLE-SHOOTER IN AFGHANISTAN. SAFRONCHUK MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ABOUT THE MID-SEPTEMBER COUP OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN:

A. SOVIET EMBASSY HAD ABSOLUTELY NO FOREKNOWLEDGE ABOUT AMIN'S MOVE AGAINST THE MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE CABINET OR AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI.

B. AMIN'S NAIDEN SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 17 WAS "VERY IMPORTANT" AND "SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY." AMIN WAS GOING TO BRING FORTH A CONSTITUTION -- "BECAUSE FOREIGN COUNTRIES EXPECT EVERY GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD TO HAVE A CONSTITUTION."

C. AMIN HAD PROMISED THAT "HENCEFORTH, THERE WILL BE NO ARBITRARY ARRESTS IN AFGHANISTAN." FURTHERMORE, AMIN HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE KAM (THE AFGHAN SECRET POLICE) TO STUDY THE FILES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RELEASE THOSE "BEING HELD WITHOUT CAUSE." WHEN THE A/DCM OBSERVED THAT TARAKI AND AMIN HAVE ALWAYS TOLD FOREIGN NEWS CORRESPONDENTS THAT "NO ONE HAS BEEN ARRESTED IN THIS COUNTRY WITHOUT A REASON," SAFRONCHUK SMILED, AND REPLIED, "THAT IS A MATTER OF SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT." (COMMENT: HIS CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE "REASON" OF YESTERDAY MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE THE "CAUSE" OF TODAY.)

D. THE ENTIRE PROGRAM SET FORTH BY AMIN COULD BE REGARDED AS PLACING AFGHANISTAN "UNDER THE RULE OF LAW."

E. AMIN SHOULD BE GIVEN FAIR CHANCE TO PROVE THAT HE MEANS WHAT HE SAYS.

4. SAFRONCHUK ALSO EXPRESSED IRRITATION OVER RECENT USG STATEMENTS ABOUT SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS NORTH OF THE OXUS AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS AT BAGRAM AIR BASE NORTH OF KABUL. HE REGARDED SUCH STATEMENTS AS "UNHELPFUL." THE A/DCM REMINDED HIM THAT THE USG STATEMENT ALSO CONTAINED A REPETITION OF U.S. VIEWS ABOUT FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. SAFRONCHUK MADE NO COMMENT.

5. SAFRONCHUK ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE EXCESSIVE ATTENTION HE HAS BEEN RECEIVING IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. HE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE TO BE IDENTIFIED AS "THE CHIEF SOVIET TROUBLE-SHOOTER" HERE -- AND WONDERED WHETHER THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS PUBLICITY. THE A/DCM OBSERVED THAT, AS A FELLOW DIPLOMAT, HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE SAFRONCHUK'S ANNOYANCE OVER SEEING HIS NAME SO OFTEN IN PRINT -- AND ASSURED HIM THAT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY RESPECTED HIS PROFESSIONAL PRIVACY.

6. COMMENT: SAFRONCHUK ALMOST GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE, HIMSELF, HAD WRITTEN AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 17 SPEECH. HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH EVERY SMALL DETAIL.

7. IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SUDDENLY SEIZED WITH A NESSY FAIT ACCOMPLI -- AND MUST MAKE THE BEST OF THE SNAKE LEADER WITH WORST IMAGE PROBLEM -- AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN, THE "RULE OF LAW" STRATEGY MIGHT BE ONE OF THE FEW TRICKS LEFT IN SAFRONCHUK'S LIMP BAG TO GIVE THIS REGIME INCREASED POPULAR ACCEPTABILITY. IT WILL BE A TOUGH ACT TO PULL OFF -- ESPECIALLY IF AMIN CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW AND CONTINUES TO ACT AS A BRUTAL TYRANT. ANATUTZ

POL

N CHR
ECON
RF
CHRN

TO DIRECTOR/STATE DEPT
FROM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7255
INFO RUSSIA/AMEMBASSY SAUDI PRIORITY 6532
RUSSIA/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6545
RUSSIA/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6551
RUSSIA/AMEMBASSY PESHAWAR 6795
RUSSIA/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4394
SECRET STATE 258373

E.C. 12065: RUS-2.3. 9/22/79 (CONSTABLE, PETER). NEA

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, AF, US, PS

SUBJECT: (C) SOP ANALYSIS OF AFGHAN SITUATION

REF: ISLAMABAD 18722

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. YOU SHOULD REPLY TO USMAN'S QUESTIONS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- WE HAVE DETECTED UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES NORTH OF THE GILG
INDICATIVE OF PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OUT OF
COMBISON BY SOME AIRBORNE UNITS. THIS COULD BE RELATED TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN BUT THERE IS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE
OF IT. WE HAVE NOT OBSERVED A BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES
NORTH OF THE BORDER.

-- WE HAVE NOT DRAWN ANY CONCLUSION THAT SOVIETS INTEND TO
MOVE ANY LARGER FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN AT THIS TIME. BUT
WE NEVERTHELESS FIND THIS INCREASED ACTIVITY DISTURBING.

-- INITIAL SOVIET COMMENT ON THE RECENT CHANGES IN KABUL,
INCLUDING BREZNEV'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO AMIN, HAVE
BEEN RESTRAINED. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS HAVE
LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT AMIN, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT
TERM.

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED OUR VIEWS ABOUT INTERVENTION WITH
THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST. AS FOR RECENT SIGNS OF
STRENGTHENING MILITARY ACTIVITY NORTH OF THE USSR-AFGHAN

BORDER, WE ARE STILL CONSIDERING WHAT ACTIONS BEYOND
OUR PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 10 MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE.

-- IN PAST DISCUSSIONS, SOVIETS HAVE NOT DEPARTED FROM
KORSCOV'S PUBLIC LINE THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERVENING IN
AFGHANISTAN NOR PARTICIPATING IN THE FIGHTING THERE.
SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN IS PORTRAYED IN THE
SOVIET PRESS AS A TRADITIONAL ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT
STABILITY.

3. FOR ISLAMABAD: YOU ARE INFO ADVISED C. 1-155
INFORMATION ADVISORY OF STATE DEPT TO MAINTAIN

4. FOR INFO OF OTHER INTERESTS TO

002290

WZUP VV ECAL74NJC741
OO RUEHRC
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ZNY SSSED ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2950
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 102
RUDKRE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 438
RUCMCU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2638
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 6789
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 6210
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 126
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2536
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 123
RUKGBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1106
RUCMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 422
RUEHDT/US MISSION USUN NEW YORK 2700
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1161
RUSSLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5971
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3107
RUSBDQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2450
BT
SECRET NEW DELHI 17718

LIMDIS

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/27/85 (LEVIN, HERBERT) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR AF US
SUBJECT: (S) SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) STATE 250400 B) NEW DELHI 16994 (NOTAL)

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POL COUNSELOR 27 SEPTEMBER SHARED APPROPRIATE PORTIONS REF A WITH MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOINT SECRETARY A.R. DEO (EASTERN EUROPE INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA). WE ALSO REQUESTED INDIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, NOTING IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BE INFORMED OF ANY RECENT GOI-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT.

3. DEO RESPONDED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT OFFERED GOI ANY INFORMATION OR REASSURANCES ON SOVIET ACTIVITY AS REGARDS AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, DEO HAS BEEN INSURING THAT SUBJECT ARISES IN DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIANS. THESE HAVE PROCEEDED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

4. THE RUSSIANS WERE TOLD THAT GOI POLICY IS THAT AFGHANISTAN MUST REMAIN A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. RUSSIANS REPLIED THAT USSR IS DOING NOTHING TO INFRINGE ON AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, DEO SAID HE RESPONDED TO RUSSIANS THAT SINCE THEY TOLD HIM THIS, HE BELIEVED IT. BASED ON THIS BELIEF, HE NOW REQUESTED THEM TO AVOID ANY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD LEAD ANYONE TO MISTAKENLY CONCLUDE OTHERWISE. DEO SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO THIS.

5. DEO SAID SECOND POINT HE HAD MADE TO RUSSIANS WAS THAT GOI DEFINITION OF AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENCE INCLUDED ALLOWING THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FREELY SELECT THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD. SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERFERING IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS WERE IRAN, PAKISTAN, CHINA AND THE USA. DEO TOLD RUSSIANS THAT GOI TOOK SUCH ACCUSATIONS SERIOUSLY AND WISHED TO EXAMINE HARD EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEM. RUSSIANS HAD NEVER RETURNED TO THIS SUBJECT.

6. IN RESPONSE TO POL COUNSELOR REFERENCE TO SIGNS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY NORTH OF THE USSR-AFGHANISTAN BORDER, DEO SAID GOI HAD NO INDEPENDENT MEANS OF CONFIRMING THIS. "WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING HARD EVIDENCE, SUCH AS SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY OR ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTS, WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION IN PRUSUING OUR POLICY IN SUPPORT OF AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENCE."

7. COMMENT: WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE GOI UNDER WEAK CARETAKER GOVERNMENT UNTIL END OF THE YEAR ELECTIONS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF AGREEING ON SUCH A DEVISIVE SUBJECT AS REQUESTING THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN AFGHANISTAN. EVEN IF THE INDIANS DID RAISE THE MATTER THEY MIGHT CHOOSE NOT TO INFORM US. HOWEVER, DEO HAS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR US TO RETURN TO WHAT IS APPARENTLY ALSO A MATTER OF INTEREST TO THE GOI. PROVIDING EVIDENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN REITERATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN.

GORDEN

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5820
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 777
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9376
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7464
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1949
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 522
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EXDIS

CHARGE

CHRN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7218

EXDIS

E.O.12065: GDS 9/27/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR AF US

SUBJ: CHARGE'S CALL ON PRESIDENT AMIN

REF: A) STATE 250412 (NOTAL), B) STATE 250278 (NOTAL)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. I HAD AN AMICABLE, RELAXED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AMIN THIS MORNING. HE WAS ALL CHARM AND FRIENDLINESS AND MADE A PITCH FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. NO REALLY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED. END SUMMARY.

3. THESE LAST FEW DAYS, AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES HAVE BEEN QUEUING UP TO PAY THEIR RESPECTS TO PRESIDENT AMIN ON HIS "ELECTION" AS NEW AFGHAN PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY. I WAS THE FIFTH ENVOY TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING, AND I WAS TOLD A SIXTH WOULD BE FOLLOWING ME THIS AFTERNOON.

4. AMIN WAS RELAXED, POISED AND OUTWARDLY FRIENDLY. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF HIS BEING WOUNDED IN THE REPORTED PALACE SHOOTOUT OF SEPT 14. IN OBSERVING THIS GENIAL MAN, IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS HE WHO HAS SURVIVED PLOT AFTER PLOT AND HAS EMERGED ON TOP. AS I LOOKED AT HIM, I COULD NOT HELP BUT RECALL THAT ONLY TWO YEARS AGO, IN 1977, WHEN WE DID ONE OF THOSE REQUIRED PERIODICAL EXERCISES TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL LEADERS, WE DIDN'T INCLUDE AMIN. IT WAS ALSO HARD TO REALIZE IN TALKING WITH THIS FRIENDLY FELLOW THAT IT WAS HE TOO THAT HAS BEEN DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

EXECUTION OF PROBABLY 3,238 POLITICAL OPPONENTS. IN EVERYTHING HE SAID, HE SOUNDED REASONABLE AND PROJECTED THE IMAGE OF A MAN YOU COULD REASON WITH AND REACH UNDERSTANDING.

5. AS THE DEPARTMENT KNOWS, I WAS UNDER TWO TIGHT INSTRUCTIONS: ONE TO KEEP THE MEETING SHORT; AND THE OTHER TO SAY NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE OTHER THAN TO OBSERVE THE USG DESIRE TO SHARE AMIN'S OFF-REPEATED REQUEST FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS. WHEN YOU KNOW THAT THE OBLIGATORY TEA-DRINKING DRILL WILL NOT START FOR SOME MINUTES, AND THAT A TOO HASTY RETREAT WILL BE SEEN AS AN APROPRIATE, MY STAFF AND I HAD WRACKED OUR BRAINS BEFOREHAND AS TO WHAT SMALL TALK I COULD RESORT TO TO PASS THE TIME. BUT IT ALL TURNED OUT TO BE LESS OF A PROBLEM THAN I FEARED. AMIN WAS IN A LOQUACIOUS MOOD, AND I LET HIM DO MOST OF THE TALKING. WE HAD OUR PICTURES TAKEN -- IN FACT, THAT TOOK ABOUT FOUR MINUTES -- AND TO MY ASSONISHMENT THE TWO PHOTOGRAPHERS TOOK NINE PICTURES. SINCE MY DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD THEIR PICTURES WITH AMIN FEATURED IN THE LOCAL PRESS ALL THIS PAST WEEK, I SUPPOSE MINE WILL SHOW UP THERE IN DUE COURSE.

BT

#7219

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OO RUOMHR
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O R 271223Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5821
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 778
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9377
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7465

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1957
RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 523✓

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7219

EXDIS

6. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PHOTOGRAPHERS LEFT, AMIN SAID THAT HE WANTED IT MADE CLEAR TO WASHINGTON THAT HE DESIRED "BETTER AND FRIENDLIER RELATIONS". THANK GOODNESS, I WAS ABLE TO RESPOND THAT WASHINGTON SHARED A SENTIMENT FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS, TOO. HE THEN LAID THE PITCH, WHICH HE HAS MADE SO OFTEN TO VISITORS IN THE PAST, THAT THE DRA HARBORS NO ILLWILL TOWARD ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, IN FACT WISHES TO BE ON GOOD TERMS WITH EVERY NATION, AND THAT IT SINCERELY DESIRES PEACE. HE ALSO REPEATED HIS FAMILIAR PREVIOUS LINE THAT AFGHANISTAN IS A BACKWARD COUNTRY WHICH DIPERATELY NEEDS TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, AND IT CAN ONLY DO SO WITH THE HELP OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THOUGH HE DIDN'T MENTION USAID SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE CONTEXT OF HIS REMARKS THAT HE HOPED WE COULD SOMEDAY SEE OUR WAY TO SUPPORT THE DRA'S DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS.

7. HE ALSO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO APOLOGIZE FOR NOT HAVING AN AMBASSADOR IN "MANY COUNTRIES/S (READ AMONG THESE THE USA), EXPLAINING THAT THE PARTY WAS DESPERATELY SHORT OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE WHO COULD ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE REGIME. AS A CONSEQUENCE, HE LOOKED TO ME, HE SAID, TO BE THE PRIMARY CONDUIT FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AFGHANISTAN. PURSUING THIS THEME, HE TWICE SAID THAT HIS DOOR WAS ALWAYS OPEN TO RECEIVE ME WHENEVER I WISHED TO CONSULT HIM. GOING BEING MINDFUL OF THE DEMAND OF THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT WE REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE U.S. MISSION, I TRIED TO SAY SOME POSITIVE THINGS TO LEAVE A SALUTARY IMPRESSION. I BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION THAT THE DC-7: FOR ARIANA AFGHAN AIRLINES WAS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN KABUL ON OCTOBER 7, AND I SAID THAT, "I HOPED NOTHING WOULD DEVELOP TO PREVENT ITS COMING." I THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD RECENTLY REDUCED ITS TARIFF LEVELS ON SEVEN ITEMS WHICH AFGHANISTAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S. (AS A RESULT OF THE TOKYO ROUND), AND THAT THOUGH THIS MEANT A REVENUE LOSS TO OUR TREASURY, I HOPED IT WOULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT FOR AFGHANISTAN BY INCREASING EXPORTS. FINALLY, I REFERRED TO HIS INTEREST IN SOLAR ENERGY, AND HIS HAVING MET A VISITING AMERICAN EXPERT IN THIS FIELD IN KABUL LAST JULY, AND SAID THAT USICA PLANNED A FULL-SCALE EXHIBIT ON THIS SUBJECT NEXT YEAR. HIS RESPONSE TO THAT WAS ONE OF ENTHUSIASM, AND HE SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT PRESENTATION.

9. THAT'S ABOUT ALL. I THINK MY HAVING CALLED ON HIM WAS A WISE MOVE. I THINK HE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEND THE DEPT A MESSAGE THAT HE WANTED BETTER RELATIONS, AND HE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ANY CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT. WHEN I NEXT MEET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST, I PLAN IF NECESSARY TO REFER TO AMIN'S DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS AN ARGUMENT FOR THE MFA TO EASE UP ON US ON THE MISSION STAFFING ISSUE.

10. BEARING IN MIND THE DEPARTMENT'S STRICTURE THAT I KEEP THE MEETING SHORT, I LOOKED AT MY WATCH WHEN I LEFT AND, COUNTING TO BE FOUR MINUTES WHEN THE PHOTOGRAPHERS WERE THERE, I WAS IN AMIN'S RECEPTION ROOM FOR 19 MINUTES. THE TIMING ALL AROUND WAS, I THOUGHT, JUST ABOUT RIGHT.

AMSTUTZ

BT

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 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
 TO RUEHQA/SECSTATE WASHDC 5013
 INFO RUEHQA/USICA WASHDC
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9372
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1945
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7450
 RUEHQA/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0519
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POL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KASUL 7228

R.O. 12345: SDS 9/27/70 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
 TAGS: SOUL, SOFN, PEFK, AY, UP
 SUBJ: CALL ON MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE KATAVAZI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING A CALL ON KHAYAL MOHAMMAD KATAVAZI, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, SEPT 26 AT 1100 CHARGE, THE VISITING ICA DEPT OFFICER MARILYN MCATEE, AND THE PAC, THE MINISTER CALLED FOR "INCREASED COOPERATION" BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES. THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE MINISTER'S VIEW EXPRESSED A MONTH AGO THAT "THE HOSTILITY OF VOA AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE REVOLUTION MAKES COOPERATION IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME." HE REPORTEDLY MADE THE LATTER REMARK WHEN HE ORDERED 34 STAFF MEMBERS OF HIS MINISTRY TO WITHDRAW FROM ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING AT USICA. THIS ORDER HAS NOW BEEN RESCINDED AND MINISTRY OFFICIALS WILL RESUME THEIR TRAINING.

3. THE MINISTER OPENED HIS REMARKS WITH A DESCRIPTION OF "THE GREAT CHANGES" OCCURRING IN AFGHANISTAN. HE CALLED THE COUNTRY "FREE AND INDEPENDENT" AND SAID IT WANTS "COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES WHO ARE WILLING TO HELP US." HE POINTED TO THE "SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL COOPERATION." NOW, HE SAID, "THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE. KATAVAZI NOTED PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM SUCH "DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AS YOURS" IN EDUCATION, TECHNICAL TRAINING AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING FOR GOVERNMENT STAFF.

4. COMMENT: KATAVAZI'S WARM REMARKS CONTRASTED WITH THE UNFRIENDLY TONE OF HIS VIEWS OF THE U.S. IN THE LAST MONTH OF THE TARAKI REGIME. WE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT HIS CHANGED ATTITUDE SIGNALS A GENERAL SHIFT IN POLICY

TOWARDS US, BUT WE ARE STILL GETTING CONTRARY SIGNALS IN OTHER AREAS TO BE YET SURF. THE MANNER WHEREBY THE APPOINTMENT WAS MADE ALSO IS NOTEWORTHY. INITIALLY, WHEN USICA SOUGHT COURTESY CALL APPOINTMENTS FOR MS. MCATEE WITH A VARIETY OF ERA OFFICIALS, ALL WERE REFUSED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AN OFFERED MEETING WITH THE MPA PROTOCOL CHIEF. THEN, IN A SUDDEN ABOUT FACE, THE ENTIRE LIST OF APPOINTMENTS WAS APPROVED AND ARRANGED. AMSTUTZ

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2692
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 92
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 595
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 64
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 177
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 4520
RUGMAR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 330
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 319
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 246
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 171
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 63
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 238
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 182
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3882
RUSBCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 121
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 7328

BELGRADE 7328

LINDIS

E.O. 12965: GDS 9/28/85 (DUNLOP, THOMAS P.H.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, AF, US, UR, YO
SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 250400

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON SEPT. 26 EMBASSY DELIVERED TO FSFA A NON-PAPER OUTLINING US CONCERNS RE SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN WITH REQUEST FOR YUGOSLAV VIEWS. ON SEPT 28 POLCOUNS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH DRAGOSLAV PEJIC, FSFA OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, ALSO PROVIDING PEJIC A COPY OF STATEMENT BEFORE THE CONGRESS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN APPEARING IN SEPT 26 WIRELESS BULLETIN. PEJIC THANKED US FOR THE INFORMATION AND SHARED HIS OPINIONS FRANKLY, ADMITTING HOWEVER THAT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE GOY IS SKETCHY AND CONTRADICTORY. THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO AMIN'S TAKEOVER AS WELL AS THE CURRENT SITUATION AND TARAKI'S FATE ARE "STILL UNCLEAR."

3. BRIEFLY TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE TARAKI-AMIN GOVERNMENT SINCE APRIL 1978, PEJIC SAID THAT THE RELATIVE "UNITY" OF THE REGIME HAD LASTED ONLY TWO MONTHS, UNTIL THE NOT UNEXPECTED PARCHAM SPLIT. THE GOY WAS SURPRISED AT THE RECENT EVENTS, PARTICULARLY THE VIOLENT REPLACING OF TARAKI, SINCE BELGRADE HAD THOUGHT THE KHALQ GROUPING TO BE MORE UNIFIED THAN IT WAS. PEJIC SUSPECTS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO SURPRISED, AS TARAKI WAS IN MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS REMOVAL. THE GOY HAS NO RESOURCES TO MONITOR EVENTS IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, IT COULD LOOK WITH GREAT CONCERN ON ANY SOVIET MOVE TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE, ESPECIALLY MILITARILY, IN AFGHANISTAN.

4. PEJIC ADMITTED THAT THE GOY DOES NOT KNOW WHAT DIRECTION EVENTS WILL TAKE IN AFGHANISTAN BUT DID NOT DISAGREE WITH POLCOUNS STATEMENT THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S BASE HAS NOW SHRUNKEN EVEN NARROWER. HE SAID GOY EMBASSY IN KABUL IS UNSURE OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE RECENT EVENTS, MUCH LESS WHETHER IT REMAINS UNITED OR WHAT POLICY ATTITUDES IT MAY DISPLAY IN FUTURE. BUT, HE SAID, "FOR SURE, THE MILITARY IS THE KEY TO THE FUTURE."

EAGLEBURGER

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TO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0012
INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7380
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7116
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1376
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4791

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 256809/01

E.O. 12065: G D S-9/28/85 (PECK, ROBERT)

TAGS: PEPR, SNAR, AF, UR, US, PK

SUBJECT: NEWSOM MEETING WITH AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING LENGTHY, BUSINESSLIKE SESSION IN NEW YORK, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALI TRADED MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT AGREED ON LITTLE ELSE. DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON THE DUBS ASSASSINATION AND THE DRA APPROACH TO ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. SHAH WALI AFGHAN "FUGITIVES" WERE BEING TRAINED THERE. HE MINIMIZED THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEFENDED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE DRA'S INTEREST IN CONTROLLING NARCOTICS. END SUMMARY.

3. AT US INITIATIVE, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM CALLED ON AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALI FOR A GENERAL HOUR-LONG EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SEPT 27 IN NEW YORK. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND NEA/PAB DIRECTOR PECK SAT IN. SHAH WALI HAD ONLY A NOTETAKER WITH HIM.

4. NEWSOM OPENED BY NOTING THAT WHEN HE WAS LAST IN AFGHANISTAN HE MET WITH THEN-PRESIDENT TARAKI AND FON. MINISTER AMIN. HE WANTED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FONMIN'S VISIT TO EXTEND HIS BEST WISHES TO AMIN AND TO SHAH WALI AS THEY ASSUMED THEIR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. NEWSOM SAID CHARGE AMSTUTZ HAD REPORTED THAT HE HAD A CORDIAL CONVERSATION EARLIER THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT AMIN.

5. IN RESPONSE SHAH WALI SAID THE DRA HAD FROM THE BEGINNING WANTED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION. AFGHANISTAN HAD TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE DRA HAD BEEN DESIROUS OF MAINTAINING THESE TIES. REFERRING TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION, SHAH WALI SAID " CERTAIN EVENTS" HAD ACCURRED WHICH THE DRA DID NOT WANT. THE DRA HAD DONE ITS BEST TO PROVE THAT THESE EVENTS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE ITS CONTROL.

6. NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE REACTION IN THE US TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION HAD BEEN VERY STRONG AND LED TO THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WHICH REDUCED SOMEWHAT OUR COOPERATION. WE HAVE TRIED TO EXTEND OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS LONG AS WE COULD UNDER THE LAW, AND ARE PHASING OUT OUR PROGRAMS IN AN ORDERLY FASHION. THE US WAS ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PUT OUR RELATIONS BACK ON A MORE NORMAL BASIS. WE WELCOMED WORD THAT PRESIDENT AMIN WANTED BETTER RELATIONS. WHEN THE TIME CAME WHEN BETTER RELATIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, WE WERE WILLING TO EXPLORE HOW THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY CONGRESS MIGHT BE MET.

7. IN REPLY TO SHAH WALI'S SUGGESTION THAT "FALSE PROPAGANDA" ON THIS ISSUE HAD UNDULY INFLUENCED US POLITICAL LEADERS, NEWSOM SAID IT WAS THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION THAT WERE RESPONSIBLE, NOT NEWSPAPER REPORTS. WE ALSO FELT THAT WE HAD NOT GOTTEN AS MUCH COOPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED. IN DEFENSE, SHAH WALI POINTED TO THE SERIOUS DOUBTS STILL REMAINING ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION AND REITERATED THAT THE DRA BELIEVED IT HAD DONE ITS BEST.

8. REMINDED OF PREVIOUS USG ASSISTANCE TO AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS SUCH AS THE HELMAND VALLEY, SHAH WALI SAID THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAT THE DRA CONSIDERED THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BE "ABNORMAL." HE SAW NO HINDRANCE OR PROBLEM WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED. HE DENIED THAT THE DRA WAS TURNING AWAY FROM THE PRIOR AFGHAN PRACTICE OF DRAWING ON MULTIPLE AID SOURCES AND ADVISERS IN PUTTING TOGETHER COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SHAH WALI POINTED TO THE CONTINUATION OF WORLD BANK, GERMAN AND OTHER PROJECTS, AND ARGUED THAT AFGHANISTAN'S ACTIONS IN SOME "SPECIFIC CASES"

(READ U.S.) HAD ARISEN FROM A FEELING THAT INDIVIDUALS DID NOT HAVE PROPER QUALIFICATIONS. HE ADDED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD ASKED FOR MORE PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CASES, CITING THEIR REQUEST TO CARE-MEDICO (WHICH HAD A LARGE US PERSONNEL COMPONENT) FOR MORE MEDICAL SPECIALISTS. HE ADDED WITH APPARENT REGRET THAT CARE-MEDICO HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLY, AND THAT HE HAD LEARNED SHORTLY BEFORE DEPARTING KABUL OF CARE-MEDICO'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS PERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY.

9. SHAH WALI REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE WHEN ASKED IF HE EXPECTED CHANGES IN BASIC DRA POLICIES FOLLOWING RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES. HE EXPECTED CONTINUITY SINCE THE POLICIES WERE LAID DOWN BY THE PARTY, AND THE PARTY STILL EXISTED. NEWSOM SAID WE HAD NOTICED PRESIDENT AMIN'S

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STATED DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS PAKISTAN AND IRAN. SHAH WALI SAID THIS REFLECTED THE SINCERE DESIRES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE PARTY. HE SAID DEPUTY FOMIN DOST'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN HAD RESULTED IN HAVANA AND FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI HAD ALSO TALKED WITH PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA THERE. HE WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT THE LATTER MEETING " REFLECTED THE DESIRE OF OUR GOVERNMENT". HE INDICATED THAT BOTH AGHA SHAHI AND ZIA HAD BEEN INVITED TO KABUL, BUT THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD ZIA WOULD COME ONLY AFTER AN AGHA SHAHI VISIT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

10. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, SHAH TOOK A MILD SWIPE AT PAKISTAN WHEN DISCUSSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE INSURGENCY. HE SAID THE REBELS WERE MOSTLY THOSE WHO HAD LOST THEIR FORMER FEUDAL PRIVILEGES, BUT ADDED THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS CREATED BY AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS. HE POINTED TO THE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN WHERE AFGHAN " FUGITIVES" WERE DETAINED.

HE ADDED THAT PAKISTAN ALSO SENT SOME "MILITIA" INTO AFGHANISTAN. ASKED ABOUT THE REFUGEE SITUATION, SHAH WALI ARGUED THAT AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS WERE VERY POROUS AND THAT 2.5 MILLION NOMADS CROSSED THE FRONTIERS EVERY YEAR. THE EXPLANATION, HE CONCLUDED, WAS THAT " THEY HAVE DETAINED OUR NOMADS.

11. ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHAH WALI SAID AFGHANISTAN'S TRADITIONAL GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NORTHERN NEIGHBOR HAD CHANGED LITTLE WITH THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTS OVER THE YEARS. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN'S PROFESSIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY, SHAH WALI SAID THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. A MOUNTAIN HAD BEEN MADE OUT OF MOLEHILL. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD HAD SOVIET ADVISERS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, AND SAID THE NUMBER HAD NOT CHANGED MUCH. HE DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN AS TO EXACT NUMBER THERE NOW, AND SAID THERE WERE ADVISORS FROM OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS INDIA. IN APPARENT CONTRADICTION OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT, HE CONCLUDED THERE HAD BEEN NO QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION, JUST A QUANTITATIVE ONE.

12. SHAH WALI ALSO DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN AS TO WHETHER THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN(PDPA) WAS A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. HE SAID WE COULD JUDGE OURSELVES FROM THE PROGRAM OF THE PARTY. THE PDPA, HE ADDED, REFLECTED THE SOCIALIST STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY. NEWSOM RECALLED HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THEN FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN ON THE NATURE OF THE PDPA IN LIGHT OF US LEGISLATION BEARING ON RELATIONS WITH NATIONS DOMINATED OR CONTROLLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. DID SHAH WALI CONSIDER THE PDPA A PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OR AS A PURELY AFGHAN ENTITY? SHAH WALI SAID THE PDPA WANTED RELATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES, NOT JUST THOSE IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE ASSURED NEWSOM THAT HIS WAS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNEMENT NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OR PARTY. AFGHANISTAN WAS FAITHFUL TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WANTED TO HAVE A POLICY OF ITS OWN. NEWSOM COMMENTED THAT THE US RESPECTED "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT", BUT THAT WE HAD PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITH SOME COUNTRIES' DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT--SPECIFICALLY THAT OF CUBA.

13. SAUNDERS SAID WE APPRECIATED THE DRA'S INTEREST IN CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS. DESCRIBING NARCOTICS AS A MAJOR NATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE US, SAUNDERS SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO WORK WITH AFGHAN AUTHORITIES AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COOPERATION THE DRA MIGHT GIVE. SHAH WALI BRIGHTENED VISIBLY IN THANKING US FOR MENTIONING THIS MATTER. HE SAID THE DRA HAD BURNED A CACHE OF HASHISH LAST YEAR WORTH DOLS 25 MILLION, BUT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD PAID THIS NO HEED. NEWSOM REGRETTED THE LACK OF PUBLICITY BUT SAID WE IN THE USG HAD NOTICED. WE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES COUNTRIES FACED IN INTERFERING WITH TRADITIONAL NARCOTICE CULTURE AND TRAFFICKING, PARTICULARLY SINCE NARCOTICS COULD BE AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INCOME FOR POOR FARMERS. IT WAS AN ACT OF COURAGE FOR A GOVERNMENT IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN TO TAKE A STRONG STAND, AND WE APPRECIATED THIS. HE ADDED THIS WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

14. IN CLOSING, NEWSOM SAID HE WANTED TO KEEP THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES OPEN. HE HAD ASKED A LOT OF QUESTIONS, BUT THIS HAD BEEN IN THE INTEREST OF FINDING A BASIS ON WHICH WE WOULD IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE RECEPTION PRESIDENT AMIN HAD GIVEN TO OUR DELEGATION EARLIER IN THE DAY AND HOPED THIS WOULD SIGNAL CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS. VANCE
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9-30-85 (MORLEY, GARY) OR-CA
TAGS: PEPR AF US SHUM PINR
SUBJ: (C) MFA INFORMATION CHIEF INQUIRES ABOUT CHANCE OF BETTER
RELATIONS WITH USG

REF: KABUL 7208

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ASADULLAH MATIN, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA INFORMATION DIVISION, TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A COURTESY CALL ON HIM BY PAO AND MARILYN MCAFFEE, ICA DESK OFFICER, SEPTEMBER 27 TO DECLARE THAT "THEY TOLD ME TO ASK" IF THE U.S. IS WILLING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN. MATIN DID NOT NAME "THEY," BUT HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN. DURING THE CONVERSATION, THE INFORMATION DIRECTOR MENTIONED AMIN AS BEING "PERSONALLY EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S." MATIN ADDED: "NOW IS A TIME OF OPPORTUNITY". END OF SUMMARY.

3. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, MATIN WENT IMMEDIATELY TO THE POINT THAT HE MADE THROUGHOUT THE SESSION. "I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE U.S.", HE SAID. "THEY TOLD ME TO ASK. WITH MR. AMIN'S REPLACEMENT OF TARAHI, WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WHAT CAN BE DONE FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE TO SIGNAL THAT IT ALSO IS INTERESTED?"

4. MCAFEE CITED THE "OBSTACLE" OF THE REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. MATIN ECHOED HIS GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLICY. HE BLAMED TARAKI FOR THE EXCESSES OF THE REVOLUTION. "WHEN TARAKI WAS PRESIDENT," HE SAID, "HE MADE ALL THE DECISIONS, AND MR. AMIN WAS NOT VERY ACTIVE IN DECISION-MAKING. BUT, NOW THAT MR. AMIN HAS REPLACED TARAKI," THE EXCESSES ARE BEING CORRECTED. HE MENTIONED THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS. SO FAR, HE SAID, 400 HAVE BEEN FREED -- INCLUDING MATIN'S OWN BROTHER-IN-LAW, WHO HE SAID WAS RELEASED FROM PUL-I-CHARKI. HE MENTIONED HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S "QUICK ACTION" TO FREE PRISONERS "NOT FOUND GUILTY," AND CITED AS A SYMBOL OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO JUSTICE FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S NEPHEW, ASA-DULLAH AMIN, SECOND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (AND CHIEF OF KAM, THE POLITICAL POLICE) TO HEAD THE COMMITTEE EXAMINING PRISONER RECORDS. HE DESCRIBED THE AMNESTY ORDER FOR THOSE WHO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY BECAUSE THEY WERE "MISLED." HE REMARKED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO DEVELOP A CONSTITUTION.

5. FINALLY, MATIN IMPLIED THAT QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT "BE CONSIDERED INTERFERENCE."

6. AT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVERSATION, HE RETURNED TO HIS MAIN THEME. "WE NOW WANT CLOSER AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S." AND "SEEK AN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST BY THE U.S. IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS".

7. COMMENT: MATIN'S EXPLICIT AND CANDID REMARKS ENSURE THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THEM. THE COMMENTS FIT THE TENOR OF THOSE MADE EARLIER BY MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE KHAYAL MOHAMMAD KATAVAZI, AS REPORTED IN REFTEL. AFTER INITIALLY REFUSI

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ING ICA DESK OFFICER, THE DRA APPARENTLY DECIDED TO OFFER A CORDIAL WELCOME INTERLACED WITH SIGNALS THAT IT WANTS IMPROVEMENT OF AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS UNDER THE AMIN REGIME.

AMSTUTZ

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5842
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0782
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9385
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1954
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7473
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0527
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7258

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR
SUBJ: INDICATIONS THAT DRA SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH USG:
A COMMENTARY

REF: (A) KABUL 7208, (B) KABUL 7232

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. DURING THE LAST SEVEN DAYS, WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING CLEAR SIGNALS THAT THE DRA SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH US. I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT THESE BE APPRECIATED, BUT I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER THESE SIGNS WILL BE SUBSTANTIATED IN AREAS IMPORTANT TO US. WHEN LAST WEEK I MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST ON THE EMBASSY STAFF REDUCTION ISSUE, HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS APPLIED TO THAT MATTER. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT IN THE SENSITIVE AREA OF AMERICAN EXPERTS COMING TO AFGHANISTAN, THE INFORMATION AND CULTURAL MINISTRY HAS JUST CANCELLED ITS RECENT REQUEST TO THE ASIA FOUNDATION FOR AN AMERICAN SHORT-TERM CONSULTANT. HOPEFULLY, WHEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST CALLS ME IN TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE EMBASSY REDUCTION ISSUE, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER NOTION WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN IN FACT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN DRA POLICY. END SUMMARY.

3. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT BEFORE TO THE DEPARTMENT, THE DRA HAS HERETOFORE BEEN CONDUCTING ITS POLICY TOWARDS US ON TWO PLANES. ON ONE LEVEL, THEY REPEATEDLY INFORM US THAT THE DRA WANTS BETTER RELATIONS AND THAT THEY CONSIDER THE PRESENT SITUATION "UNNATURAL." FURTHER, ON THIS PLANE, THEY DO SUCH THINGS AS SEND AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF MINISTERS (3) TO OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION, AND MOST RECENTLY PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN RECEIVED ME WARMLY AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ON ANOTHER LEVEL, IN AREAS MORE IMPORTANT TO US, SUCH AS INVESTIGATING AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH, AND CARRYING OUT OUR PEACE CORPS, USAID AND USICA PROGRAMS, WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED MANY ROADBLOCKS. ADDITIONALLY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS SOUGHT A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY. IN MY VIEW, HOW WE FINALLY COME OUT ON THIS LAST ISSUE WILL BE THE REAL TEST OF THEIR TRUE INTENTIONS TOWARDS US.

4. THE HEARTENING SIGNS THEY HAVE SENT US THIS LAST WEEK ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- AFTER FIRST REFUSING TO ALLOW ICA WASHINGTON VISITOR MARILYN MCAFEE TO MAKE CALLS ON VARIOUS DRA OFFICIALS, THIS ACTION WAS RESCINDED AND ALL THE REQUESTED CALLS WERE PERMITTED, INCLUDING ONE ON INFORMATION AND CULTURAL MINISTER KATAWAZI.

-- DURING THE CALL ON MINISTER KATAWAZI (REF B), THE MINISTER WAS CORDIAL AND MADE AN APPEAL FOR MORE COOPERATION IN THE CULTURAL AND INFORMATION AREA. HIS POSTURE IN THIS RESPECT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF A COUPLE MONTHS AGO.

-- MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHEN ICA VISITOR MCAFEE CALLED THE NEXT DAY ON THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION, ASEUNULLAH MATIN, THE DIRECTOR MADE A POINT OF DECLARING THAT THE DRA WANTED BETTER RELATIONS (REF A).

-- LAST WEEKON THE INFORMATION AND CULTURAL MINISTRY REPEALED ITS ORDER, OF A MONTH AGO, OF WITHDRAWING THE 30-ODD MINISTRY OFFICIALS STUDYING ENGLISH LANGUAGE AT THE AMERICAN CENTER.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

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INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0783

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9386

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1955

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7474

RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0528

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7258

EXDIS

-- A FEW DAYS AFTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN BECAME PRESIDENT, THE AMERICAN CENTER LIBRARIAN REPORTED THAT TWO SETS OF OFFICIALS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DEGWARED THAT IT WAS NOW "ALL RIGHT" FOR THEM TO PATRONIZE THE LIBRARY.

-- PRESIDENT PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN RECEIVED ME WARMLY ON SEPT 27, DURING WHICH MEETING HE MADE ANOTHER APPEAL FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. THAT MEETING WAS PUBLICIZED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, INCLUDING A PHOTOGRAPH (AS WERE ALSO PUBLICIZED THE CALLS OF OTHER CHIEFS OF MISSION).

-- ON THE SAME DAY IN NEW YORK CITY, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH WALI EXPRESSED SENTIMENTS FOR BETTER RELATIONS TO UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS. THE FACE OF SUCH A MEETING WAS GIVEN PROMINENT LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE.

5. WHILE THE ABOVE ARE CLEARLY ENCOURAGING SIGNS, THERE ARE OTHER SIGNALS WHICH WOULD SUGGEST NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN POLICY. THESE ARE:

-- FOREIGN MINISTER DOST'S COOL RESPONSE DURING MY MEETING WITH HIM ON SEPT 25 ON THE EMBASSY STAFF REDUCTION ISSUE.

-- CONTINUED IF NOT INCREASING PRESSURE ON OUR EMBASSY FSN'S QBSTHE AFGHAN SECRET POLICE (KAM), INCLUDING THE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AND KAM CHIEF, ASSADULLAH AMIN, THE PRESIDENT'S NEPHEW AND SON-IN-LAW. (OUR COS CAUTIONS AGAINST READING TOO MUCH INTO THIS, BELIEVING THAT SUCH PENETRATION EFFORTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE WITHOUT LET UP, REGARDLESS OF THE TEMPERATURE OF OUR RELATIONS.)

-- IN AN ACTION PROBABLY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY STAFF REDUCTION ISSUE, THE MFA CONTINUES TO LGUSE TO GIVE DRIVERS LICENSES TO ANY OF OUR NEW PEOPLE.

-- THE ASIA FOUNDATION HAS JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT THE INFORMATION MINISTRY HAS CANCELLED ITS REQUEST FOR A SHORT-TERM AMERICAN CONSULTANT TO HELP THEM ORGANIZE THE MINISTRY'S ARCHIVES.

6. CONCLUSION. THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING OF THE DRA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS WILL BE HOW THEY RESPOND ON THE EMBASSY STAFFING ISSUE. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST SHOULD BE SUMMONING ME TO SEE HIM ON THIS ANY DAY NOW. LET'S HOPE HE HAS GOOD NEWS FOR US. AMSTUTZ

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 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 784
 RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9395
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 424
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1937
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1957
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY TCEW DELHI 7475
 RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO 72
 RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 532
 RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 197
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E X D I S

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EXDIS

NOFORN

CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.12065: RDS-1 12-1-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MILI, MOPS, AF, UR
 SUBJ: (S) REPORTS OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: KABUL 5772 (NOTAL)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. TO SUPPLEMENT THE EMBASSY'S REPORTING IN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AT KABUL ARE ADDED.

3. ON SEPTEMBER 30, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOGDAN MALBASIC (PLEASE PROTECT) ASKED THE A/DCM WHETHER RECENT U.S. "NEWS REPORTS" OF TROOP ACTIVITY IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA INVOLVED AIRBORNE UNITS. MALBASIC, A FORMER ARMY GENERAL, WNET ON TO STATE THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY PREPOSITIONED SUFFICIENT ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT FOR ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION AT BAGRAM AIR BASE, NORTH OF KABUL. HE SEEMED TO BE CERTAIN OF THIS INFORMATION.

4. THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INTRODUCE COMBAT FORCES HERE ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. HE OBSERVED THAT OTHER OPTIONS SHORT OF SUCH A DRASTIC STEP WERE STILL OPEN: E.G., BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE AND POPULAR APPEAL OF THE KHALQI REGIME -- AND A QUICK MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP WITH FRESH, INITIALLY APOLITICAL PERSONALITIES.

5. ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 30, J. DAULAT SINGH, THE INDIAN DCM (PLEASE PROTECT), TOLD THE A/DCM THAT ONE OF HIS SOURCES HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS WITH A FORMER AFGHAN ARMY OFFICER, NOW A PRISONER AT PUL-I-CHARKI, WHO HAD, BEFORE HIS ARREST, SERVED AT THE "HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE" HEADQUARTERS OF THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP. THE AFGHAN OFFICER REPORTEDLY SAID THAT WHEN HE LAST WAS IN A POSITION TO HAVE ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, THERE WERE 9,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE INDIAN DCM DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT DATE OF HIS INFORMATION, BUT WAS OF THE OPINION THAT IT WAS FAIRLY RECENT. SINGH HIMSELF THINKS THE CURRENT FIGURE IS BETWEEN 10,000 AND 20,000 (HE LEANS TOWARD THE UPPER END OF THAT RANGE) -- AND SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY REPORTED THIS SPREAD TO NEW DELHI.

6. ON SEPTEMBER 30, A WEST GERMAN EMBASSY OFFICER TOLD THE A/DCM THAT GERMAN TRUCK DRIVERS USING THE REBEL/ARMY-DEserter/BANDIT-INFESTED HERAT-TO-ZANDAHAR ROAD RECENTLY REPORTED SEEING WHAT WERE CLEARLY ETHNIC RUSSIAN SOLDIERS MAN THE LEAD ARMORED VEHICLE IN THEIR ROAD CONVOY. HE CLAIMED THAT THEY TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS AS PROOF. THE GERMAN OFFICER THOUGHT SOME WESTERN NEWS PUBLICATION WOULD PAY MUCH FOR THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS.

7. COMMENT: THE ABOVE VIEWS ARE BEING REPORTED WITH SOME RESERVATIONS. THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION ABOUT PREPOSITIONED ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT AT BAGRAM REFLECTS THE SITUATION NOTED AT OTHER LOCATIONS AROUND AFGHANISTAN (E.G., THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE) WHERE LARGE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT, TANKS, AND OTHER MILITARY ITEMS ARE NOW BEING PARKED -- AN ASSEMBLY OF ARMAMENT WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE FAR MORE THAN THE AFGHAN ARMY ITSELF COULD MAN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE YUGOSLAV'S REPORT OF PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR AN AIRBORNE DIVISION.

8. AS FOR THE OBSERVATION OF SINGH, A SOUND DIPLOMAT WHO IS NEVERTHELESS GIVEN OCCASIONALLY TO UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE INFORMATION DRIFTING ABOUT IN THE KABUL RUMOR MILL, IT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT IF HE HAS INDEED PROVIDED THE 10,000-TO-20,000 FIGURE TO THE DECISION-MAKERS AT NEW DELHI. WE KNOW OF NO OTHER SOURCE HERE CITING A FIGURE THAT HIGH AND

WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) BELIEVE IT OURSELVES.

9. ALTHOUGH AMERICAN OFFICERS HAVE OCCASIONALLY SEEN SOVIET SOLDIERS AROUND KABUL, WEARING AFGEAN UNIFORMS (A CUSTOMARY PRACTICE FROM THE ROYAL AND DAUDIST ERAS), NO US OFFICER HERE HAS YET SPECIFICALLY SPOTTED WHAT COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A "SOVIET COMBAT UNIT." ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, WELL-HIDDEN SOVIET COMBAT FORCES ARE UNDOUBTEDLY ALREADY INSIDE THE COUNTRY. OUR BEST CURRENT ESTIMATE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THOSE GUARDING BAGRAM AIR BASE, IS PERHAPS 4,000 WITH AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 MILITARY ADVISORS.

10. AS FOR THE GERMAN STORY, IT PROBABLY ILLUSTRATES HOW SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO REGULAR AFGHAN ARMY UNITS CAN BE EMPLOYED IN DIRECT OPERATIONAL ROLES AT TIMES.

AMSTUTZ

BT

#7252

RR RUQMHR
DE RUQMGU #7248 2741450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011420Z OCT 79
RM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8507
INFO RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 132
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 208
RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3821
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 132
RUSBLY/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1840
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1468
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1609
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6160
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 3878
BT
CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 7248

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 (KUX, DENNIS) OR-P
TACE: MOPS, PEPR, TU, AF, UR, PK
SUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON USSR-AFGHANISTAN:FOLLOW-UP

REF : (A) STATE 250373, (B) STATE 250400, (C) ANKARA 7201

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE (SEE PARA 7).

3. SUMMARY: POLOFF FOLLOWED UP REF(C) DEMARCHE WITH WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFFICER WHO HAD SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TARAKI REVOLUTION. THE OFFICIAL STATED THERE WAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR A TURKISH DEMARCHE TO THE RUSSIANS ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT. THE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON AND RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION. THE MFA OFFICIAL SPECULATED ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ETEMAADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND THE USSR, AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN. END SUMMARY.

4. GOT-USSR DEMARCHE: MFA MIDDLE EAST SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU INFORMED EMBOFF (RICCIAR-DONE) SEPTEMBER 28 THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR AN UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE FONMIN WAS NOW IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD TAKE TIME BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN. IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE GOT WOULD MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIONS (IF ANY) TO THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN. KARAOSMANOGLU REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S SEPTEMBER 19 PRESS STATEMENT AS A SIGN OF US INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

(COMMENT: THROUGHTOUT THE CONVERSATION KARAOSMANOGLU MADE IT CLEAR THE GOT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON INCREASED US INTEREST AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE FORMER CENTO REGION (SEE ANKARA 720] (NOTAL)).

5. USSR INTERVENTION: KARAOSMANOGLU REITERATED THE GOT'S BELIEF THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEND MILITARY FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN UNLESS A CRISIS DEVELOPED IN WHICH RUSSIAN LIVES BECAME THREATENED. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER HORSE TO BACK IN VIEW OF AMIN'S NARROW BASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS BELIEVED THAT ETEMAADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND LATER TO ISLAMABAD, WOULD BE A LIKELY CANDIDATE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE AT THE MOMENT " TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM". KARAOSMANOGLU SAID ETEMAADI HAD RETURNED TO KABUL FROM PAKISTAN THE DAY BEFORE THE TARAKI COUP, AND HAS BEEN IN JAIL SINCE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE ADDED THAT ETEMAADI HAD HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT HAVE HAD CONTACTS AMONG EXTREMIST PARHAMIST GROUPS IN EXILE IN MOSCOW. KARA OSMANOGLU ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF ETEMAADI AS A SUCCESSOR TO AMIN.

6. MILITARY INSUBORDINATION INCIDENT: THE TURKS HAD HEARD THAT SOME 20 AFGHAN PILOTS HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ASSIGNED THE MISSION TO BOMB HERAT DURING THE TROUBLE THERE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THE PILOTS DELIBERATELY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS OFF TARGET, RETURNED TO BASE, AND WERE REPLACED BY RUSSIAN PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE ASSIGNED TARGETS IN DOWNTOWN HERAT. THE AFGHAN PILOTS WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOR THEIR INSUBORDINATION.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: PER PARA 5 EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S EMBASSY KABUL'S COMMENT ON TURKISH VIEW THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING ETEMAADI AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN.

SPIERS

BT

#7248

NNNNVV ESA687MJC629
PP RUGMR
DE RUSBLK #7281/1 2751110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 021059Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5860
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 785
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9391
RUMRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 199
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 405
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1839
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1958
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7478
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3305
RUGMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 531
RUMQGA/CINCPAC

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ET
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7281

EXDIS

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

IE.O.12065: RDS-1 10-2-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPH PGOV PINS AF UR YP PINR
SUBJ: (C) AFGHANISTAN'S AMIN ROUP: LOCAL YUGOSLAV AND SOVIET
VIEWS.

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR AT KABUL, THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF A DEVELOPING TENSION BECHIEF AFGHANISTAN'S FORMER PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN FOR "SEVERAL MONTHS" BEFORE THE MID-SEPTEMBER CRISIS THAT LED TO AMIN'S VIOLENT TAKE-OVER OF FULL POWER. THE SOVIETS DISCLAIM ANY FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP ITSELF, HOWEVER. MOSCOW APPEARS TO BE WILLING TO WORK WITH AMIN, NOW THAT HE HAS PRESENTED THE SOVIETS WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. END OF SUMMARY.

2. REQUESTING ABSOLUTE PROTECTION AS A SOURCE, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOGDAN MALBASIC BRIEFED THE A/DCM ON SEPTEMBER 30 ABOUT A RECENT CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER M. PUZANOV CONCERNING HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S MID-SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT. (MALBASIC EXPLAINED THAT HE OCCASIONALLY HAS LONG CHATS WITH PUZANOV, AND HAS FOUND HIM RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING IN SUCH SESSIONS. PUZANOV PRO-FESSES A CONTINUING FRIENDLY INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA, WHERE HE SERVED FOR SEVERAL YEARS.)

4. ACCORDING TO MALBASIC, PUZANOV PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND TO THE DRAMATIC POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE KHALQI HIERARCHY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT -- BUT WAS "STILL NOT CERTAIN" ABOUT ALL THE EVENTS THAT HAD ATTENDED AMIN'S TAKE-OVER. HE DISCLAIMED ANY FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLENT SEPTEMBER 14 CONFRONTATION, AND OBSERVED THAT THIS SURPRISE DEVELOPMENT CAUGHT THE LOCAL SOVIET COMMUNITY WITHOUT ADEQUATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. (NOTE: AMERICAN OFFICERS SCOUTING AROUND KABUL THAT DAY WHO HAD NOTED INCREASING NUMBERS OF AFGHAN SOLDIERS AND POLICE IN THE STREETS, DID OBSERVE THAT RUSSIAN DEPENDENTS WERE MOVING ABOUT NORMALLY, AND THAT SOVIET HOUSING AREAS DID NOT HAVE ANY OBVIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.)

5. PUZANOV TOLD MALBASIC THAT THE STRAIN BETWEEN FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI AND AMIN HAD BEEN INCREASING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. PUZANOV WAS CRITICAL OF TARAKI'S "CULT-OF-295/3-INDIVIDUAL" PUFFERY -- AND CITED TARAKI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO PASS THE FULL RANGE OF PRIME MINISTERIAL POWERS OVER TO AMIN WHEN THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS "FIRST MINISTER." PUZANOV NOTED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT TARAKI CONTINUED TO CHAIR SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -- AND THIS GREATLY ANNOYED AMIN.

6. PUZANOV RECALLED THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS STARTED AFTER TARAKI'S RETURN FROM HAVANA AND MOSCOW ON SEPTEMBER 11. AT A SEPTEMBER 12 CABINET SESSION, AMIN "INDICATED THE NEED" FOR CABINET CHANGES -- I.E., THAT MINISTER OF INTERIOR MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR, MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS SHER JAN MAZDOORYAR, AND MINISTRE OF COMMUNICATIONS SAYED MOHAMMAD GULABZOI BE REPLACED IMMEDIATELY. TARAKI OBJECTED, TAKING ISSUE WITH AMIN OPENLY.

7. ACCORDING TO PUZANOV'S ACCOUNT, "THE QUARREL CONTINUED ON SEPTEMBER 13," AND CAME TO A HEAD ON SEPTEMBER 14, WHEN AMIN WENT AHEAD WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE CABINET CHANGES. TARAKI "CALLED AMIN OVER" TO DISCUSS THAT ACT -- AND THE GUNFIGHT ENSUED. PUZANOV SAID THAT HE HAD HAD "TWO MEETINGS" WITH THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP DURING THESE CRITICAL DAYS. HE DID NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE FIRST. THE SECOND WAS THE MORNING SESSION HE HAD WITH AMIN ON SEPTEMBER 15, THE DAY BEFORE THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS TARAKI'S SUCCESSOR. (NOTE: THIS MEETING WAS REPORTED BY THE PRESS).

BT

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P R 021059Z OPM 79

20 OCT 79 11 31Z

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5861
INFO RUHJPGAXAMEMBASSY BEIJING 0786
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9392
RUDMRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0200
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0406
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1840
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1959
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7479
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3306
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0532
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7281

EXDIS

8. MALBASIC HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS TALK WITH PUZANOV THAT THE SOVIETS FOUND THEMSELVES COMPELLED TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR AFGHAN POLICY TO AMIN'S FAIT ACCOMPLI, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT INDICATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM. WHEN HE COMMENTED TO PUZANOV ABOUT AMIN'S WEAK POINTS, SUCH AS HIS BAD PUBLIC IMAGE, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR REPLIED, "AMIN IS STRONG AND WELL-ORGANIZED. OF COURSE, HE HAS SOME FAULTS, BUT WHAT LEADER DOESN'T?"

9. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, PUZANOV WENT ON TO COMPLIMENT THE FIRED WATANJAR AS "A GOOD MAN." (NOTE: FREQUENTLY HEARD POST-COUP RUMORS PORTRAYED WATANJAR AS HAVING SOUGHT ASYLUM IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY -- AND THE INDIAN EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PUZANOV HAD TRIED TO INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF WATANJAR AND THE OTHER FIRED MILITARY MINISTERS ON SEPTEMBER 14.)

10. MALBASIC GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EXTRACTED CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM AMIN IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR POST-COUP SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT TARAKI BE KEPT ALIVE. MALBASIC OBSERVED THAT AMIN IS NOW COMPLETELY DEPENDENT UPON THE SOVIETS -- AND "MUST PAY THE PRICE."

11. MALBASIC OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOW ENDEAVOR TO MAKE AMIN "MORE PALATABLE" AS A LEADER. FAILING THIS, THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES SHORT OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, SUCH AS A QUICK COUP D'ETAT BY THE "AFGHAN" ARMED FORCES. HE DID NOT RULE OUT AN EVENTUAL RESORT TO THE USE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES, HOWEVER -- BUT THOUGHT IT RATHER UNLIKELY THAT THAT EXTREME STEP WOULD BECOME NECESSARY.

12. COMMENT: MALBASIC'S ACCOUNT SQUARES IN GENERAL WITH THE KEY ELEMENTS OF VERSIONS HEARD FROM OTHER REASONABLY RELIABLE SOURCES. AS CAN BE EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THE KABUL RUMOR MILL HAS PRODUCED A GREAT VARIETY OF ACCOUNTS. MOST STORIES BEGIN WITH TARAHI'S SEPTEMBER 9-10 TALKS WITH BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW. SOME SAY HE WAS THEN TOLD BY THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT HE WAS SHED -- BUT THAT SOMBER NEWS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO LINK WITH AMIN'S BUOYANT DEMEANOR WHEN HE RETURNED TO KABUL ON SEPTEMBER 11. OTHERS SAY THAT BREZHNEV TOLD HIM TO GET RID OF AMIN -- AND THAT HE MUFFED THE JOB. THIS EMBASSY IS INCLINED TO FAVOR THE VIEW THAT THE COMING LEADERSHIP CRUNCH WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT ALL IN MOSCOW -- AND THAT TARAHI FIRST CONFRONTED IT UPON HIS RETURN. (INCIDENTALLY, WATANJAR WAS THE SECOND-RANKING MAN IN HIS AIRPORT WELCOMING PARTY--STANDING NEXT TO AMIN.)

13. AS FOR PUZANOV'S OWN ROLE, THE INDIAN EMBASSY VERSION, TO WHICH REFERENCE WAS MADE IN A FOREGOING PARAGRAPH N EVEN HAS AN ARMED PUZANOV PARTICIPATING IN THE SEPTEMBER 14 SHOOT-OUT AT THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THIS, WE DO THINK IT PROBABLE THAT PUZANOV AT SOME POINT MIGHT HAVE TRIED TO INTERVENE IN BEHALF OF THE WATANJAR GROUP -- AS HIS POST-COUP COMMENT TO MALBASIC INDICATES.

14. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS WHO THINK THAT THE SOVIETS OPT FOR TTA "IRON FIST" (IN THIS CASE, AMIN) SOLUTION WHENEVER THERE IS A TOUGH PROBLEM TO BE LICKED (E.G., THE CURRENT AFGHAN INSURRECTION), WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY IN THE PICTURE AS THEIR VIOLENT, DIFFICULT-TO-CONTROL HALQI CLIENTS STAGED THEIR INTERNAL CONFRONTATION, LIKE SCORPIONS IN A JAR. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PUBLIC PLACES AT KABUL DURING THE DEVELOPING SEPTEMBER 14 CRISIS, AS WELL AS THE CONTINUING SOVIET MEDIA PLAY OF TARAHI'S MOSCOW VISIT AFTER AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 16 TAKEOVER, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY EMBASSY MOSCOW AND FBIS, INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PERT QS INDEED SURPRISED.3D

15. PUZANOV APPEARESTO HAVE FAILED IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP STABLE THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT HERE. BECAUSE PUZANOV WAS OFTEN REPORTED TO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN AT SERIOUS ODDS WITH AMIN DURING THE PAST YEAR, THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IS ROSSIPING ABOUT HIS CONTINUED TENURE HERE. AN AFGHAN SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN USUALLY RELIABLE IN THE PAST, TOLD THE A/DCM ON SEPTEMBER 27 THAT MOSCOW HAD REQUESTED AGREEMENT FOR PUZANOV'S SUCCESSOR. THE SOURCE DID NOT HAVE THE NAME. END COMMENT. AMSTUTZ

BT

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CFVV ESA852MJC554

CO RUQMR

DE RUSSLK #7319 2761140

ZNY SSSSS ZZHZDK

CR 031117Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5879

INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2789

RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9399

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0408

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1841

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1962

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7484

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0073

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0535

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC

RUSNAAA/CINCEUR

BT

SECRET KABUL 7319

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EXDIS
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NOFORN

MILITARY ADDRESSEES PLEASE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/3/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

TACS: PEPR, PINS, MILI, MOPS, AF, UR

SUBJ: (S) SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEFINITION OF SOVIET COMBAT PERSONNEL: WHEN EMBASSY KABUL USES THE TERM "COMBAT TROOPS" TO REFER TO SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN, IT INCLUDES: (A) CLEARLY DISTINCT SOVIET MILITARY UNITS, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS' SPECIAL 600-MAN "REACTION FORCE" WHICH APPEARS TO BE PROVIDING THE INTERIOR DEFENCE CURRENTLY FOR BAGRAM AIR BASE; (B) SOVIET COMBAT SPECIALISTS, SUCH AS THE SOME 500 TO 1,000 SOVIET ARMORED-CORPS SOLDIERS CURRENTLY STATIONED AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE; (C) THE SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL YOUNG SOVIET SOLDIERS BEING SIGHTED AROUND KABUL, WHO ARE BELIEVED TO PERFORM, INTER ALIA, SPECIAL SENTRY ROLES FOR SOVIET INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING AREAS (MANY HAVE CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE SLAVIC FEATURES, AND THEIR AFGHAN UNIFORMS ARE CONSPICUOUSLY NEATER THAN THOSE OF REGULAR AFGHAN SOLDIERS); (D) ANY SOVIET MILITARY MAN HERE WHOSE OPERATIONAL ROLE APPEARS TO BE MORE THAN THAT OF A TRAINING ADVISOR, SUCH AS THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS WHO SERVICE THE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND ARMORED VEHICLES NOW BEING USED HERE IN ACTION AGAINST THE REBELS.

3. NUMBER OF SOVIET COMBAT PERSONNEL: ACCORDING TO THE BEST INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO US, INCLUDING DATA CONFIRMED BY OTHER SENSITIVE USG SOURCES, THERE ARE PROBABLY 4,200 SOVIET COMBAT PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN AT THIS TIME. THIS FIGURE CAN BE REGARDED AS CONSERVATIVE. AS NOTED ABOVE, THERE ARE AT LEAST 600 SOVIET TROOPS GUARDING BAGRAM AIR BASE. THE ACTUAL NUMBER COULD BE HIGHER. THE OTHER CATEGORIES DISCUSSED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH TOTAL 3,600, AT THE VERY LEAST. IT IS HARD TO BE PRECISE IN CERTAIN CASES, HENCE THE 500-TO-1,000 FIGURE WE ARE CITING FOR SOVIET ARMORED COPTS PERSONNEL AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE. AS THESE FIGURES ARE REFINED AND VERIFIED, THE TOTAL COULD GO HIGHER. FOR FURTHER DETAILS, PLEASE CHECK NHK-4008 OF SEPTEMBER 8, NHK-4047 OF SEPTEMBER 22, AND NHK-4056 OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1979.

4. DEFINITION OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY PERSONNEL: WE USE THE TERM "SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS" TO DESCRIBE ONLY THOSE PERSONS WHO PRIMARY ROLE APPEARS TO BE TO TRAIN THE AFGHAN FORCES AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL ADVICE. BECAUSE SO MANY SOVIET "ADVISORS" ASSIGNED TO AFGHAN COMBAT UNITS ARE ASSUMING DIRECT OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS DURING COMBAT WITH REBEL FORCES, HOWEVER -- INCLUDING, IN SEVERAL CASES, DIRECT COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIB

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5#3 "MILITARY ADVISOR -

AND "COMBAT FORCES" CATEGORIES. SOME OF THESE SOVIET OFFICERS SHIFT BACK TO ADVISORY ROLES DURING PERIODS WHEN THEIR REGIONS BECOME STABILIZED; OTHERS RETAIN COMMAND AUTHORITY. AT LEAST THREE OF THE SOVIET COMMANDERS IN THE FILED ARE OF GENERAL RANK, INCIDENTALLY.

5. NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORS: WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE SOME 3,000 SOVIETS ASSIGNED HERE AS MILITARY ADVISORS, BUT, FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, SOME HUNDREDS OF THIS TOTAL PROBABLY SHOULD BE SHIFTED TO THE "COMBAT TROOPS" SIDE OF THE LEDGER AT TIMES. WE UNFORTUNATELY LACK PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR CATEGORY AT THIS TIME. IT IS EASIER TO SPOT AND EVALUATE LARGE BLOCKS OF SOVIET TROOPS AT BAGRAM AND PUL-I-CHARKI THAN IT IS TO WEIGH THE VARYING ROLES OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN AFGHAN UNITS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.

6. TOTAL SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN: THE 4,200 CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE COMBAT TROOPS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH SOME 3,000 MEN WHOSE PRIMARY ROLE SEEMS AT THIS TIME TO BE IN THE TRAINING AND ADVISORY LEVEL GIVES A TOTAL OF 7,200 SOVIET UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN THIS COUNTRY. MOST OF THEM, OF COURSE, COULD BE REGARDED AS "COMBAT TROOPS" IN A CRUNCH SITUATION HERE REQUIRING A QUICK SOVIET REACTION. AS NOTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FIGURES ARE ON THE CONSERVATIVE SIDE; THEREFORE, WE SUBJECT THEM TO CONTINUING REEVALUATION. ADDR SEE POSTS WILL HENCEFORTH BE INFORMED WHEN THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THESE STATISTICS. AMSTUTZ

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NNNNVV ESB056MJC416
RR RUQMER
DE RUSBLK #7318 2761119
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5878
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9398
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1961
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7483
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 534
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 7318

POL
CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

20c AFGH

E.O.12065: GDS 10/3/35 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT AF UR
SUB: SOVIET OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON STATUS OF TARAHI AND THE
PURGED MILITARY OFFICER CABINET MINISTERS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL DESCRIBES TARAHI AS
BEING HELD A PRISONER ALONE IN THE PEOPLE'S PALACE COMPLEX,
AND THAT TARAHI ALONG WITH THE THREE RECENTLY PURGED
MINISTERS (WATANJAR, GULABZOI AND MAZDOORYAR) HAVE BEEN
EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE AIRPORT TODAY, I RAN INTO SOVIET COUNSELOR VILIOR
G. OSADCHIY, WHO WAS IN THE VIP LOUNGE (A RARE PRIVILEGE)
AWAITING EMBARCATION ON AN AEROFLOT FLIGHT TO MOSCOW. (THE
IMPORTANCE OF OSADCHIY, AND THAT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, WAS
UNDERLINED BY HIS BEING ALLOWED TO USE THE VIP LOUNGE
FOR A VACATION TRIP TO THE USSR, WHICH PRIVILEGE IS
SOMETHING DENIED TO MOST AMBASSADORS EXCEPT WHEN THEY
FIRST ARRIVE OR LEAVE PERMANENTLY.)

4. OSADCHIY HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF THE FRIENDLIEST AND
MOST OPEN OF SOVIET OFFICIALS HERE, AND I SEIZED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HIM SOME QUESTIONS. HIS ANSWERS
WERE, I THINK, WORTH RECORDING:

-- TARAHI IS BEING HELD A PRISONER "ALONE" IN THE PEOPLE'S
PALACE COMPLEX (WHERE PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN ALSO LIVES);
THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT HIS FAMILY IS NOT WITH HIM. HE IS
DEFINITELY ALIVE AND WAS NOT WOUNDED BY ANY WEAPON. WHEN I
ASKED OSADCHIY ABOUT A RUMOR THAT TARAHI MIGHT BE GOING TO
MOSCOW FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT, OSADCHIY REPLIED, "POSSIBLY
LATER BUT NOT RIGHT NOW."

HE IGNORED MY INQUIRY ABOUT THE EXACT STATE OF
TARAHI'S HEALTH.

-- EX-MINISTERS WATANJAR, GULABZOI AND MAZDOORYAR
ARE AT LARGE, BUT OSADCHIY PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW THEIR EXACT
WHEREABOUTS. HE SAID THERE WAS A RUMOR THAT THEY HAD ESCAPED
TO A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. WHEN I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE SOVIET
UNION, HE CHUCKLED AND SAID: "POSITIVELY NOT. IF THEY HAD,
WE WOULD NOT KEEP THAT A SECRET. AFTER ALL, WE ARE NOT
DENYING THAT BABRAK KAMAL IS LIVING IN PRAGUE."

-- WHEN I OBSERVED THAT WE HAD JUST HEARD THAT TARAHI AND
THE THREE EX-MINISTERS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY,
OSADCHIY REPLIED, "THAT IS CORRECT."

5. OSADCHIY SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO MOSCOW FOR CONSUL-
TATIONS AND THEN FOR A MONTH'S HOLIDAY IN THE CRIMEA.
HE SAID HE WAS WORN OUT AND THAT THE LOCAL POLITICAL
SITUATION HAD MADE HIS WORK DIFFICULT. AS WE SEPARATED,
HE SAID SOFTLY, "WE NEVER KNOW WHAT TOMORROW WILL BRING
HERE."

AMSTUTZ

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DE RUQMR #7548 3020730

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R 0646Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7803

INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 216

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4302

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 304

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 472

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2794 ✓

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 489

RUSBQD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 7548

EO 12065: XDS-1 10/28/89 (PLACKE, JAMES A) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, AF, UR, PINT, SA

SUBJ: (C) DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) KABUL 7350, B) STATE 273949

1 (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING OCT 23 MEETING WITH SAUDI MFA ARAB AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ISMA'IL ALSHURA, POL OFFICER DELIVERED A NON-PAPER DRAWN FROM REFTELS OUTLINING US VIEWS OF INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND CURRENT STATUS OF SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS. AL-SHURA THANKED US FOR THIS INFO. HE REITERATED SAG'S CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SAID HIS GOVT BENEFITED GREATLY FROM ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITH US ON THIS QUESTION.

3. ASKED FOR SAG'S COMMENTS ON SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AL-SHURA REVIEWED SAUDI ARABIA'S PAST EFFORTS AT BRINGING ABOUT SOME KIND OF UNITY BETWEEN TWO OF RESISTANCE FACTIONS LED BY SEBQATTALAH MOJEDIDI AND SYED AHMAD GAILANI. HE SAID SAG INITIALLY HAD WITHHELD FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO BOTH OF THESE GROUPS IN HOPE THAT THEY COULD THEREBY BE PUSHED INTO SOME KIND OF COMMON FRONT ARRANGEMENT. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, SAG ALTERED ITS VIEW. ALTHOUGH AL-SHURA WAS CAREFUL TO QUANTIFY SAUDI ARABIA'S ASSISTANCE AS "VERY MODEST", HE SAID SAG HAD NOW DECIDED THAT ANTI-DRA RESISTANCE EFFORT HAD TO BE SUPPORTED, EVEN IF GAILANI AND MOJEDIDI AND OTHERS COULD NOT COME TO TERMS. (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT PROBABILITY SAG WOULD KEEP TRYING.) AL-SHURA SAID SAG'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO HELP KEEP WATERS STIRRED AND TO PREVENT WEAKENED KHALQI REGIME FROM REGAINING ITS BALANCE. PLACKE

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FM USMISSION USNATO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2795

INFO RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0121

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0084

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0031

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6607

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7074

RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3247

RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0025

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0540

RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0078

BT

*SECRET USNATO 06927

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/10/09 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD) OR-P

TAGS: NATO. PEPR, PINS, AF, UR, US,

SUBJECT: (S) SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

REFS: (A) STATE 261991, (B) USNATO 6783 (NOTAL),

(C) USNATO 5582 (NOTAL)

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING OCTOBER 9 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, CANADIAN REP MADE POINTS CONTAINED PARA 5 OF REF B (BEING REPEATED TO OTTAWA) REGARDING CURRENT CANADIAN INCLINATION TO FOCUS MORE ON IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHAN INSTABILITY FOR PAKISTAN THAN ON LIKELIHOOD THAT THAT INSTABILITY COULD PROVOKE DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED CANADIAN REP WITH COMMENTS TRANSMITTED REF A AND REPEATED THEM IN RESPONSE TO CANADIAN INTERVENTION IN POLADS. ON BOTH OCCASIONS, CANADIAN REP REGISTERED OTTAWA'S INTEREST IN RECEIVING FURTHER INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES NORTH OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER, WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN REASSESSING THE CANADIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS AND WE NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE A STANDING REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON KEEP USUP-TO-DATE IN THIS REGARD (REF C).

3. NETHERLANDS REP REPORTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON A RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR IN ISLAMABAD AND THE LOCAL TASS REPRESENTATIVE IN WHICH THE LATTER COMPLAINED THAT, AS WITH TARAKI BEFORE HIM, AMIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ADVICE AND WAS PRESSING REFORMS IN A CRUDE AND HASTY WAY WHICH EXACERBATED DIVISIONS WITHIN THE TRIBAL AFGHAN SOCIETY. THE AMBASSADOR, NETHERLANDS REP ADDED, INTERPRETED THESE REMARKS AS POSSIBLY INDICATIVE OF SHRINKING SOVIET BACKING FOR AMIN. GLITMAN.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2586
INFO RUHHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7312
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2241
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1080
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0606
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1562
RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7358
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0253

CN: 2766

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 23627

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET MEDIA REPORT TARAHI'S DEATH

1. SOVIET NEWSPAPERS ON OCTOBER 10 AND 11 CARRIED A
TERSE, ONE-SENTENCE TASS REPORT QUOTING THE AFGHAN NEWS
AGENCY'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF TARAHI'S DEATH. THE TELEVISION
EVENING NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA CARRIED THE SAME REPORT,
SPOKEN IN SOLEMN TONES, ON OCTOBER 10. SOVIET MEDIA HAD
NOT MENTIONED TARAHI SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS RESIG-
NATION FOR REASONS OF HEALTH SEPTEMBER 16.

2. COMMENT: SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF AFGHANISTAN IN
GENERAL AND AMIN IN PARTICULAR HAS DECREASED NOTICEABLY
SINCE SEPTEMBER 16. THIS DEVELOPMENT MAY REFLECT SOVIET
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ABOUT
AMIN'S POSITION ITSELF AFTER THE COUP AGAINST TARAHI.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5258

INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 234

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 47

RUSMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 898

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9759

RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8895

RUQMKV/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 232

ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE

RUCMNT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 070

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1511

ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

RUQYHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5464

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 11647

E.O. 12065: CDS 13/13/85 (SHERMAN, RICK) CR-P

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, PK, XF, AF

SUBJ: (C) MUFTI MAHMUD CONCERNED RE ASSISTANCE TO AFHAN EXILES/REFUGEES.

REF: ISLAMABAD 11449 (NOTAL)

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN MEETING WITH EBOFFS OCT 7 (REFTEL), MAULANA MUFTI MAHMUD, CHIEF OF PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (PNA), RASISED INTER ALIA SUBJECT OF FINANCIAL AND OTHER MATERIAL ASSISTANCE

FOR AFGHAN DISSIDENTS. HE MADE PITCH FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE. AND EMOFF EXPLAINED U.S. POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHAN SITUATION.

3. MUFTI THEN PROCEEDED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT MIDDLE EAST ARAB COUNTRIES' (ESPECIALLY GULF NATIONS) PROVISION OF CASH ASSISTANCE TO REBELS -- BUT ONLY TO CERTAIN GROUPS. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID GULF STATES ARE SENDING FUNDS TO PROFESSOR BURANHUDDIN RABANI'S JAMAAT ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN (JIA) WHICH IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH MUFTI'S NEMESIS, JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI (JI) OF PAKISTAN. MUFTI ASKED, "WHY CAN THE ARABS NOT SPREAD THE WEALTH AMONG A BROADER CROSS-SECTION OF THE REBELS?"

4. MUFTI ALSO ASKED WHAT THE U.S. COULD DO IN TERMS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. EMOFF DESCRIBED BRIEFLY UNHCR VISITS TO PAKISTAN AND PREDICTED A SIZABLE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF PROGRAM WILL SOON BE ON THE GROUND IN PAKISTAN. EMOFFS ALSO SAID U.S. LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO UNHCR EFFORT. MUFTI REMARKED THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND U.S. NOT WANTING TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED FOR GLOBAL POLITICAL REASONS AND THAT HE APPRECIATED WHATEVER ASSISTANCE U.S. CAN PROVIDE TO U.S. EFFORT TO ASSIST REFUGEES. HE TRUSTS U.S. EFFORT WILL BENEFIT ALL REFUGEES REGARDLESS OF ANY AFFILIATIONS THEY MAY HAVE WITH SPECIFIC DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

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R 180515Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY KARUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0716

INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 002

RUSBCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0436

RUENMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1003

RUSBAT/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7535

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 534

RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KARUL 7537

STATE PLS PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12065: GDS 12-17-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) CR-M

1. (U) ON OCTOBER 11, AFGHANISTAN'S OFFICIAL BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY ANNOUNCED THAT USAID HAD REIMBURSED 75 PERCENT OF THE COST OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (RDD) PROJECTS IN NANGARHAR, NIMPOZ, AND GHARNI PROVINCES. THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT WAS 121,256 DOLLARS.

2. (U) ON OCTOBER 15, THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AFGHAN MEDIA WIDELY PUBLICIZED A 25,227-DOLLAR USAID GRANT FOR THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT'S ROADWAY PROJECT ON THE SOKHTA BAKHTAR STREAM IN THE DEE SAST MOLESWALI OF KARUL PROVINCE. THE BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT NOTED THAT THE PAYMENT WAS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH A "PREVIOUS AGREEMENT," BUT UNDERSTANDABLY DID NOT MENTION THE RECENT TERMINATION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN BY THE U.S. CONGRESS. BAKHTAR CONCLUDED WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE USAID ASSISTANCE WAS "ACCEPTED WITH THANKS."

3. (C) COMMENT: SINCE THE 1978 REVOLUTION, THE KHALQIS HAVE CHARACTERISTICALLY MADE LITTLE PUBLIC REFERENCE TO U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE DOWNPLAYING OF OUR AID ROLE WAS RELATED TO A KHALQI STRATEGY OF REDUCING THE WIDESPREAD POPULARITY OF AMERICAN AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

4. (C) THESE GRACIOUS LITTLE ANNOUNCEMENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE TO THE AFGHAN POPULATION THAT PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S NEW GOVERNMENT IS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM THE USG. IT IS PROBABLY ALSO RELATED TO RECENT STATEMENTS BY KHALQI OFFICIALS TO EMBASSY OFFICERS ABOUT THE DRA'S HOPES FOR AN EVENTUAL RESTORATION OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THIS COUNTRY.

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ZNY SSSSS ZZE
P 192004Z OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFERS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 1927
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1211
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 4227
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCAREST PRIORITY 4231
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 3719
RUMJCM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1172
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY Dacca PRIORITY 0690
RUKORT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 6925
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1738
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1845
RUEPCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5057
RUEKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 9054
RUEHNL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1332
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 2336
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0285
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7571
RUMJET/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0772
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 9259
INFO RUSBLT/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0203
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7964
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6190
RUHQQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 4622
BT
SECRET SECTION 21 OF 22 STATE 273949/21

LIMDIS

E.O. 12365: GDS, 10/17/85 (COON, JANE A.), NEA

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, AF, UR

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INR HAS PREPARED FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET-
AFGHAN RELATIONS AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
FROM WHICH ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION DRAW
IN CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON
SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE POINTS SUPPLEMENT
INFORMATION PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY IN STATE 83740, DATED
APRIL 19, 1979.

File AFGH

3. DURING THE SIX MONTHS PRECEDING THE SEPTEMBER 14-16 AMIN TAKEOVER, MOSCOW EMPLOYED A SERIES OF POLITICAL TACTICS TO DEAL WITH A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN:

(A) IT FIRST TRIED TO PERSUADE THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF SUPPORT AND TO MODERATE ITS POLICIES. THIS ADVICE WENT LARGELY UNHEEDED.

(B) FOR A WHILE THEREAFTER, MOSCOW DISTANCED ITSELF SOMEWHAT FROM AMIN AND TARAKI AS INDIVIDUALS, WHILE CONTINUING PUBLICLY TO SUPPORT THE AFGHAN "REVOLUTION."

(C) HOWEVER, MOSCOW EVENTUALLY SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED (ABOUT AUGUST) THAT THERE WAS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME (ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT MOSCOW INTENDED TO BACK THE MORE MODERATE TARAKI AGAINST AMIN).

AT ANY RATE, WHEN TARAKI PASSED THROUGH MOSCOW EN ROUTE HOME FROM THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, HIS MEETING WITH BREZHNEV WAS GIVEN EFFUSIVE PUBLICITY IN A PARTY-TO-PARTY CONTEXT THAT CAME CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) AS A COMMUNIST PARTY.

4. DURING THE SAME SIX-MONTH PERIOD, SOVIET POLITICAL EFFORTS WERE SUPPLEMENTED BY MILITARY MOVES:

-- THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL INCREASED TO ABOUT 3,500 OR 4,000, INCLUDING ADVISERS AND MILITARY SUPPORT PERSONNEL, SOME OF WHOM ARE ATTACHED DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL IN THE AFGHAN MILITARY.

-- INCREASINGLY, SOVIET ADVISERS HAVE TAKEN OVER ROLES THAT EXCEEDED STRICTLY ADVISORY ONES, E.G. IN COMMAND FUNCTIONS AND REPORTEDLY IN SOME COMBAT FUNCTIONS AS WELL. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, NO RELIABLE INDICATION THAT SOVIET FORCES HAVE PARTICIPATED IN COMBAT AGAINST INSURGENTS AS UNITS.

-- SOVIET UNEASINESS ABOUT THE AFGHAN SECURITY SITUATION IN THE FACE OF THE INSURGENCY AND ARMY MUTINIES LED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ON SOME DIRECT SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES, E.G. AT BAGRAM AIR BASE WHERE THERE IS A FORCE OF 400 SOVIETS.

5. AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 14-16 SEIZURE OF POWER BY ALL INDICATIONS OCCURRED WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO MOSCOW

BUT DETAILS OF WHAT HAPPENED REMAIN UNCLEAR. SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV APPARENTLY KEPT IN TOUCH WITH EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLDED.

-- THERE WAS A BRIEF PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCOW, E.G. WHEN SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUED TO PUBLICIZE TARAKI'S LEADERSHIP AFTER HE HAD ALREADY BEEN OVERTHROWN. MOSCOW'S INITIAL MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO AMIN ON HIS "ELECTION" TO TARAKI'S POSTS WAS NON-COMMITTAL, BUT SINCE THEN SOVIET MEDIA HAS INDICATED SUPPORT FOR THE NEW REGIME.

-- IT IS LIKELY THAT SOVIET ADVICE WAS REFLECTED IN AMIN'S INITIAL SEPTEMBER 17 SPEECH AND IN SOME OF HIS

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8879

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1845

INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3831

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1469

RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6169

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 21 OF 22 ANKARA 07966

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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (XUX, DENNIS) OR-P

TAGS: MOPS, PINR, PEPR, AF, TU, UR

SUBJECT: (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION

REFS: (A) STATE 273949; (B) ANKARA 7248; (C) KABUL 7352;
(D) STATE 260348; (E) KABUL 6936

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE; SEE PARA 9.

3. SUMMARY: DURING DISCUSSION OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, AN MFA OFFICER TOLD US THAT THE TURKS CONCURRED WITH THE U.S. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS. THE TURKS BELIEVED THAT THE THREE MINISTERS WHO FLED FROM AMIN MIGHT BE IN HIDING IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY; THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WAS PRESENT AT THE ARG PALACE AT AMIN'S INVITATION WHEN THE BULLETS FLEW; AND THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER ETEMADI WAS DEAD. THE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN REPORTS THEY HAD RECEIVED THAT AMIN HAD HAD SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT BAGRAM AIRBASE. THEY HAD ALSO HEARD THAT TARAKI'S FORMER AIDE DE CAMP, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF YAKUP, MIGHT BE HEADED FOR A PURGE, AND THAT MINPUBLIC WORKS PANJSHIRI HAD LEFT FOR MOSCOW "FOR HEALTH REASONS". END SUMMARY.

4. AMIN/USSR STRAINS: EMBOFFS CALLED ON MFA MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU OCTOBER 24 FOR A DISCUSSION BASED ON REF (A). ACCORDING TO KARAOSMANOGLU, THE TURKS SHARED THE U.S. ASSESSMENT THAT THERE WERE STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS. KARAOSMANOGLU POINTED TO AMIN'S OCTOBER 10 SPEECH BEFORE A MEETING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, IN WHICH HE USED THE MARXIST BUZZWORDS "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" AND "STATE OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION", AS AMIN'S

CLEAREST PUBLIC DECLARATION TO DATE OF THE KHALQI PARTY'S COMMUNIST AFFILIATION. KARAOSMANOGLU SURMISED THAT SUCH STATEMENTS AT THIS TIME MUST IRRITATE THE SOVIETS, WHO WOULD PROBABLY PREFER AMIN TO APPEAR AS MODERATE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO BROADEN HIS BASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS INTERPRETED ANOTHER INCIDENT AS AN INDICATION OF USSR-AMIN STRAINS: SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV, "PERHAPS PLAYING THE ROMAN CONSUL", HAD SENT HIS DCM IN HIS PLACE TO ATTEND FOREIGN MINISTER SHABALI'S RECENT BRIEFING FOR SOCIALIST BLOC AMBASSADORS.

5. ASYLUM: AT THE SAME BRIEFING, SHABALI REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT AFGHAN OFFICERS HAD SEEN WATANJAR AND THE OTHER TWO MINISTERS PURGED SEPTEMBER 13 ENTERING THE SOVIET EMBASSY THE SAME DAY. KARAOSMANOGLU BELIEVED THAT THE THREE MINISTERS MIGHT WELL STILL BE INSIDE THE SOVIET EMBASSY; IN ANY CASE, HE WAS SURE THEY WERE NOT DEAD, CITING AS SUPPORT AMIN'S RECENT STATEMENT TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS THAT HE KNEW WHERE WATANJAR, ET AL, WERE, BUT THAT THEY COULD NOT BE REACHED BY TELEPHONE.

6. PUZANOV: THE TURKS "KNOW" THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WAS PRESENT AT THE ARG PALACE WHEN THE SHOOTING STARTED. THEY RECONSTRUCTED EVENTS THUS: TARAKI HAD SUMMONED AMIN TO THE PALACE. AMIN, MINDFUL OF A SIMILAR INVITATION THE PREVIOUS YEAR TO A RECALCITRANT MINISTER WHO WAS EXECUTED UPON APPEARING AT THE PALACE, ASKED PUZANOV TO BE PRESENT, HOPING THAT HE WOULD CONSTITUTE A SORT OF LIFE INSURANCE. THE TURKS DID NOT KNOW WHO STARTED THE SHOOTING, AND, GIVEN PUZANOV'S INVITED PRESENCE, THEY BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE THAT AMIN MIGHT NOT HAVE PLANNED TO STRIKE AT TARAKI, AT LEAST NOT AT THAT MOMENT.

7. ETEMADI: THE TURKS NOW BELIEVED FORMER PRININ NUR AHMAD ETEMADI (REFS B, C, D) HAD BEEN EXECUTED. AFGHAN CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE ASADULLAH AMIN HAD REPORTEDLY TOLD "SOME OF HIS FRIENDS" THAT ETEMADI HAD BEEN EXECUTED ON TARAKI'S ORDERS. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TENDED TO CONFIRM THIS, IN THE TURKISH VIEW: SINCE ETEMADI'S IMPRISONMENT THE DAY AFTER THE TARAKI REVOLUTION, HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN PERMITTED, WITHOUT SEEING HIM, TO BRING FRESH FOOD AND CLOTHES TO THE PRISON AND TO EXCHANGE LETTERS WITH HIM. ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO THESE PRIVILEGES WERE CUT BACK, AND TEN DAYS AGO, EVEN THE LETTER EXCHANGE WAS STOPPED.

8. SAMS: THE TURKS HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT AMIN HAD HAD SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT BAGRAM AIRBASE.

THEY SAW THIS AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IF TRUE; THE ONLY FORESEEABLE TARGETS OF SUCH WEAPONS COULD BE

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8880
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1846
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3832
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1489
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6170
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 07966

AFGHANISTAN'S OWN AIRCRAFT. IF AMIN HAD IN FACT INSTALLED WEAPONS AGAINST THE EVENTUALITY OF A STRIKE BY HIS OWN AIR FORCE, THIS WAS NEW EVIDENCE OF FURTHER REAL OR PERCEIVED EROSION OF AMIN'S CRUCIAL MILITARY SUPPORT. KARASMANOGLU ASKED US TO CHECK THE REPORTS OF THE SAM INSTALLATIONS AT BAGRAM.

9. PURGES: THE TURKS HAD HEARD THAT AFGHAN CHIEF OF STAFF AND FORMER TARAHI AIDE DE CAMP GENERAL YAKUP WOULD BE PURGED. THEY ALSO "KNEW" THAT MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS PANJSHIRI (REF E, PARA 5), "ONE OF THE LAST OF THE PACHEMITES" IN THE AMIN GOVERNMENT, HAD DECAMPED FOR MOSCOW "FOR HEALTH REASONS" ONLY FIVE DAYS AFTER ASSUMING HIS PORTFOLIO.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CONFIRMATION OR COMMENTS DEPARTMENT OR KABUL CAN OFFER ON THE TURKISH REPORTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE INFORMATION OF THE BAGRAM SAM INSTALLATION, FOR USE IN OUR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS. SPIERS

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6093
INFO RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0816
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9466
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0043
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1867
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2011
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7577
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3336
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0571
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
BT

003349

POL

CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

J
CONFIDENTIAL KABUL 7706

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PINT, AF, UR, GE
SUBJ: (LOU) NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO REPLACE CENTRAL
FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER'S REPORTED ATTEMPT TO BROADEN
REGIME'S POLITICAL BASE

REF: KABUL 6309 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: A NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN NAMED TO KABUL TO REPLACE HERMANN SCHWIESAU, A CENTRAL FIGURE HERE IN LAST SUMMER'S PURPORTED SOVIET ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE KHALQI REGIME "BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE." WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FIRE BEHIND THAT POLITICAL SMOKE REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEN PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, THE REPORTED TARGET FOR THIS "CAMPAIGN" FOR WHICH SCHWIESAU WAS A MAJOR MOUTHPIECE, KNEW ABOUT THE AFFAIR. SCHWIESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARTED KABUL ABOUT THE TIME IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT AMIN'S POWERS WERE NOT BEING CURTAILED, BUT FIRM EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS DEPARTURE AND REPLACEMENT HAS NOT YET COME TO LIGHT. AT ANY RATE, FOR THE SHORT TERM AT LEAST, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO BACK AMIN'S EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTION.
END OF SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 24, THE DRA ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD GIVEN AGREEMENT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF KRAFT BUMBEL (AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES INSIST THAT IS THE CORRECT SPELLING) AS THE NEW AMBASSADOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO KABUL. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE INCLUDED IN THE BRIEF REPORT.

3. (C) COMMENT: BUMBEL REPLACES FORMER GDR AMBASSADOR HERMANN SCHWIESAU WHO WAS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER'S REPORTED SOVIET "CAMPAIGN" TO PERSUADE THE DRA LEADERSHIP TO "BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE OF SUPPORT." ALONG WITH SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILY SAFRONCHUK, SCHWIESAU AT THAT TIME WAS EXTREMELY OUTSPOKEN WITH HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES REGARDING THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE KHALQIS, AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE DRA'S NEED TO BROADEN ITS SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. SOME UNCONFIRMED REPORTS WERE HEARD THAT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS ALLEGED SOVIET EFFORT WAS THE THEME THAT THEN PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S POWERS HAD TO BE CURTAILED, SINCE HE WAS THE PERCEIVED VILLAIN BEHIND THE DRA'S REPRESSIVE AND RADICAL POLICIES.

4. (C) AS TIME PASSED, AMIN'S REAL POLITICAL POWER APPEARED TO INCREASE, DESPITE THE OSTENSIBLE SOVIET EFFORT TO CLIP HIS WINGS, AND AMIN DROPPED SEVERAL PUBLIC HINTS THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE SOVIET "MANEUVERINGS" WHICH SAFRONCHUK AND SCHWIESAU WERE PUBLICIZING ALL OVER TOWN. NOT LONG AFTER IT BECAME CLEAR THAT AMIN'S POWERS WERE NOT DECLINING, SCHWIESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARTED KABUL, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE HE HAD SUFFERED A BROKEN LEG WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SIX MONTHS IN GERMANY TO HEAL. OUR GDR COLLEAGUES HERE GAVE NO INDICATION THEN OR IN THE INTERIM THAT SCHWIESAU WOULD NOT RETURN TO KABUL TO TAKE UP HIS AMBASSADORIAL ASSIGNMENT.

5. (C) AS WITH MOST ELEMENTS OF THIS MURKY STORY, THE REASONS BEHIND BUMBEL'S APPOINTMENT ARE NOT CLEAR, AND SCHWIESAU'S PERMANENT DEPARTURE COULD HAVE SEVERAL EXPLANATIONS. THE MOST OBVIOUS IS THAT HIS MEDICAL PROBLEMS HAVE REQUIRED THE GDR TO FILL THE VACANCY HERE, RATHER THAN TO WAIT FOR SCHWIESAU'S FULL RECOVERY. ANOTHER EXPLANATION IS THAT SCHWIESAU HAD SERVED HIS PURPOSE IN ANY "ERODING THE BASE" CAPER, AND THAT HIS SERVICES AS A SOVIET "SPOKESMAN" WERE NO LONGER NEEDED IN KABUL. IT COULD ALSO BE, HOWEVER, THAT AMIN, THE SUPPOSED PRINCIPAL TARGET OF ANY EFFORT TO DEFUSE THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, ORDERED SCHWIESAU'S ABRUPT DEPARTURE POSSIBLY AS A DEMONSTRATION THAT AMIN WAS, IN FACT, A LEADER OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHING HIS POWER EVEN IF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES WERE SOMEHOW WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT SCHWIESAU'S ABRUPT DEPARTURE AND REPLACEMENT COULD WELL HAVE BEEN IN SOME WAY POLITICALLY AND NOT MEDICALLY MOTIVATED. WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE, AS A RESULT OF THE STILL UNCLEAR SEPTEMBER 14 SHOOTOUT IN KABUL, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE SHORT-TERM CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT AMIN IN HIS ATTEMPT TO QUELL THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY AND CONSOLIDATE THE SECURITY OF THE REVOLUTION.

BLOOD

ET
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BT
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NNNNVV ESA343MJC964
PP RUQMR
DE RUSBLK #7784/1 3231120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 300949Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3743
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0819
RUSEQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9480
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0421
RUHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2015
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7588
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0576 ✓✓
RUHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6137
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0283

POL

CHRG
ECON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KAZUL 7784

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/29/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINR, AF, UR, TU
SUBJ: (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: ANKARA 7966 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PURSUANT TO EMBASSY ANKARA'S REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE REFTTEL, THIS EMBASSY HAS THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS TO MAKE ABOUT THE POINTS DISCUSSED BY KARAOZMANOGLU:

(A) AMIN-SOVIET STRAINS: ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS IN THE PAST THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED SOME OTHER POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE UNSTABLE AFGHAN SITUATION THAN THE CONTINUED LEADERSHIP OF THE RUTHLESS AND UNPOPULAR HAFIZULLAH AMIN, MOSCOW IS NOW CLEARLY STUCK WITH HIM, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN. WE AGREE WITH KARAOZMANOGLU THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW UNDOUBTEDLY GUIDING AMIN TO FOLLOW A MODERATE COURSE IN ORDER TO BROADEN, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, HIS OWN BASE OF SUPPORT. WE ALSO FOUND THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR PUZANOV FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH WALI'S UNUSUAL OCTOBER 6 BRIEFING A POSSIBLE INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET ROLE ON SEPTEMBER 14 COULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS ANTI-AMIN. HOWEVER, IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT, SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK TRIED TO DOWNPLAY PUZANOV'S SEPTEMBER 14 ROLE, DESCRIBING IT AS AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE PEACE BETWEEN THE WARRING FACTIONS OF THE AFGHAN PARTY. ON OCTOBER 29, PUZANOV PRAISED AMIN HIGHLY TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILLIER-FRY. (WE SHOULD ADD THAT THERE ARE SOME OFFICERS IN THIS EMBASSY WHO BELIEVE THAT PAST TALK OF STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN A "SHELL GAME" -- AND THAT THE TOUGH STRONGMAN HAS BEEN MOSCOW'S MAN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE KHALQI ERA.)

AMIN'S REFERENCE TO "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" IN HIS OCTOBER 10 SPEECH IS NOT NEW. HE AND FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI HAVE OCCASIONALLY USED THIS TERM IN THE PAST. HIS STATEMENT THAT "...ALL THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF PRODUCTION WILL BE CONSIDERED PUBLIC PROPERTY" WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSURING THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (A PROMISE FREQUENTLY MADE BY THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP TO AFGHANISTAN'S "NATIONAL CAPITALISTS"), WHILE THREATENING TO DEPRIVE POSSESSORS OF "SOCIAL PRODUCTS" FROM "THE POWER TO SUBJECT THE LABOR OF OTHERS THROUGH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP THEREOF." THIS FORMULATION ALSO REPEATS A THEME WE HAVE HEARD HERE BEFORE.

(B) ASYLUM: WE DO NOT THINK THE THREE EXPELLED MILITARY MINISTERS ARE STILL WITHIN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, IF, INDEED, THEY HAD ONCE SOUGHT PROTECTION THERE. THE MOST COMMONLY HELD LOCAL VIEW IS THAT WATANJAR, PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY GULABZOI, IS IN HIS HOME PROVINCE OF PAKTIA. SAFRONCHUK RECENTLY TOLD A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT THAT THAT PAIR IS "STILL AT LARGE." THEY ARE BELIEVED BY SEVERAL LOCAL OBSERVERS TO BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES WITH DISAFFECTED MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT WATANJAR AND GULABZOI MAY BE IN THE USSR SO THAT THE SOVIETS COULD KEEP THEIR ACTIVITIES UNDER CONTROL, ALTHOUGH A HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER DENIED THIS TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON OCTOBER 3 (KABUL 7318). MANY BELIEVE MAZDOORYAR TO BE DEAD, BUT A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT STATES THAT HE WAS RECENTLY TOLD BY SAFRONCHUK THAT MAZDOORYAR IS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN HIS QUARTERS AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNDER SOVIET PROTECTION FROM AMIN (THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW CONTROL THAT BASE), WHO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE HIM KILLED IMMEDIATELY IF HE COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER KHALQI CONTROL. THE SOVIET MOTIVE IN SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE TO MAINTAIN LEVERAGE AGAINST AMIN, WHO MUST BE PAINFULLY AWARE OF THE EXILED AFGHAN LEADERSHIP THE SOVIETS ARE KEEPING ON THE SHELF (E.G., THE PARHAMISTS).

BT

#7784

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NNNNVV ESA352JCS67
PP RUEHRE
DL RUSLTK #7784/2 323114Z
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 301949Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHCU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3744
INFO RUEHJPC/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2822
RUEHCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9431
RUEHHA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2422
RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2616
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7589
RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TATHAN 2577/
RUEHHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0133
RUEHGA/CINCPAC
RUEHNA/USMISSION WASHINGTON 2184
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7784

(C) PUZANOV: JUDGING FROM SHAH WALI'S WELL-REPORTED REMARKS TO THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS ON OCTOBER 6, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT PUZANOV WAS PROBABLY AT THE PALACE AT LEAST IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTOUT -- IF NOT THROUGHOUT THE EPISODE. WE ALSO THINK IT PLAUSIBLE THAT TARAKI MIGHT HAVE BECOME A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY PREMATURELY FOR AMIN AT THAT TIME -- AND THAT THE LATTER MIGHT NOT HAVE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED THE "GREAT LEADER'S" DENISE FURING THIS PARTICULAR PURGE OPERATION. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY "RECALCITRANT MINISTER" HAVING BEEN EXECUTED AT THE PALACE IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. TO WHOM WAS KARAOSMANOGLU REFERRING? (FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL GADER, WHO WAS TRICKED INTO COMING TO THE PLACE -- WHERE HE WAS ARRESTED, IS BELIEVED TO STILL BE ALIVE AT PUL-I-CHARKI PRISON.)

(D) ETEMADI: AFTER WIEGHING SEVERAL RELIABLE REPORTS, WE TOO HAVE SADLY CONCLUDED THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER NUR AHMAD ETEMADI HAS INDEED BEEN EXECUTED. ALTHOUGH THE AMIN REGIME HAS REPORTEDLY TRIED TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR THAT ACT ON TARAKI AND FORMER AGSA CHIEF ASADULLAH, THE EXECUTION PROBABLY OCCURRED AFTER AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 14 TAKEOVER. THE CONSTANT REPORTS ABOUT SOVIET PLANS TO UTILIZE ETEMADI FOR A POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE TO AMIN APPARENTLY SEALED THE OLD MAN'S FATE.

(E) SAMS AT BAGRAM: BAGRAM AIRBASE IS UNDER SOVIET CONTROL, AND AMIN IS, THEREFORE, NOT ABLE TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL WEAPONS INSTALLED THERE WITHOUT SOVIET CONCURRENCE AND SUPPORT. THE AFGHANS HAVE HAD SAMS SINCE THE DAUDIST ERA, PRESUMABLY TO CONTEND PARTIALLY WITH THE RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE PAKISTANI AIR FORCE. THERE IS NO INDICATION, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, SOVIET-CONTROLLED, REPRESENTS ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT TO AMIN AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS DESIRE TO SEE HIM REMAIN IN POWER.

(F) PURGES: CHIEF OF STAFF YAGHUB DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN ANY POLITICAL TROUBLE AT THE IMMEDIATE TIME. IN FACT, HE WAS RECENTLY NAMED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RULING PARTY. PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER PANJSHIRI, WHO IS BELIEVED TO ONCE HAVE HAD PARCHAMIST LEANINGS, INDEED DID LEAVE FOR MOSCOW FOR "MEDICAL TREATMENT" AFTER AMIN'S COUP, AND HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED SINCE IN THE MEDIA. HE COULD WELL BECOME A VICTIM OF THE NEXT ROUND OF PURGES. IN SUCH A CASE, THE SOVIETS COULD POSSIBLE ALSO OFFER HIM REFUGE ON THEIR "RESERVE SHELF."

3. PLEASE CONVEY TO KARAOSMANOGLU THE GREETINGS OF HIS AMERICAN EMBASSY COLLEAGUES WHO REMEMBER HIM FONDLY FROM HIS DAYS AS TURKISH CHARGE AT KABUL. BLOOD

BT
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CHARGE
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NNNNVV ESB056MJC719
RR RUQMR
DE RUSBD #2425 3041120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311100Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4211
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 670
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 914
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9821
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 9041
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1542
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1592
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5090
RUHQQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 12425

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/31/95 (HUMMEL, A.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, AF, PK, US
SUBJ: (C) AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH ADDITIONAL FOREIGN
SECRETARY PIRACHA ON MATTERS AFGHAN

REFS: (A) STATE 278279 (B) STATE 282436 (C) KABUL 7726
(D) STATE 283208

1. C (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MET OCT 31 WITH RIAZ PIRACHA WHO HAS NOW COMPLETED ABOUT
THREE WEEKS AS ADDITIONAL SECRETARY IN MFA, HAVING COME
DIRECTLY FROM HIS AMBASSADORSHIP IN KABUL. PIRACHA IS
RUNNING THE MFA IN ABSENCE OF BOTH AGHA SHAHI AND PONSEC
SHAHNAWAZ. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS AND
PIRACHA BY MFA AMERICAS DIRECTOR RANA.

3. USING TALKING POINTS IN REFTELS A AND B I BROUGHT
PIRACHA UP-TO-DATE ON OUR VIEW OF DRA STANCE VIS-A-VIS
RELATIONS WITH US. I THEN GAVE HIM HIGH POINTS OF CHARGE
BLOOD'S MEETING OCT 27 WITH DRA PRESIDENT AMIN (REF D).
PIRACHA LISTENED AND TOOK NOTES THROUGHOUT.

4. WHEN I FINISHED PIRACHA MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- IT IS INTERESTING BLOOD SAW AMIN INSTEAD OF SHAH WALI.
PE-- THIS SIGNIFIES DRA DESIRE TO "WARM" RELATIONS MORE
THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALK WOULD INDICATE.

(U)
--AMIN MAY WELL FEEL HIMSELF TOO CLOSE TO SOVIETS AND WANTS TO SIGNAL MOSCOW AND OTHERS THAT HE IS NOT TOTALLY COOPTED.

--AFTER SEPT 19 THERE WERE MANY RUMORS IN KABUL CONCERNING THIS DESIRE TO IMPROVE DRA-US RELATIONS AND IT OCCURS TO GOP THAT POSSIBLY THE IMPRESSION IS REALLY BEING GIVEN AT BEHEST OF THE SOVIETS.

--THE THREE INHIBITING FACTORS IN US-DRA RELATIONS (DOBS KILLING, EMBASSY STAFFING AND DRA INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON USSR) SEEM NOT TO HAVE BEEN MEASURABLY CHANGED BY THE TALK WITH BLOOD.

--AMIN IS TRYING OUT "NEW IMAGE" USING NEW MOTTO OF "SECURITY, JUSTICE AND LEGALITY". PERHAPS THE CONCILIARY ATTITUDE TO RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE US AND PAKISTAN IS PART OF THIS IMAGE.

3. I ASKED PIRACHA ABOUT DRA RELATIONSHIPS AND HE OFFERED THE FOLLOWING NEW ITEMS:

--AMIN AND THE DRA ARE TALKING WITH NEW ENTHUSIASM ABOUT RECIPROCAL VISITS. AS OF NOW THREE ARE PLANNED BUT NOT SCHEDULED: AGHA SHAHI TO KABUL; SHAH WALI TO ISLAMABAD; AND ZIA ULHAQ TO KABUL. AGHA SHAHI WILL DECIDE ON A DATE FOR HIS VISIT AFTER THE EID HOLIDAY (BEGINS NOV 1) AND WILL PROBABLY AGREE TO GO IN LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER. SHAH WALI'S RETURN VISIT WILL FOLLOW BUT NO CLEAR TIMING AVAILABLE. FINALLY, ZIA MAY GO AT A LATER DATE. FORMAL INVITATIONS TO BOTH FOREIGN ADVISOR AND PRESIDENT HAVE NOW BEEN DELIVERED.

--GOP REALLY DOES NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH SUBSTANCE TO COME OF THE SERIES OF MEETINGS.

--THE NEW PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO KABUL, ALTAF SHAIKH, IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT POST ON NOV 6.

6. I THINK PIRACHA WILL HAVE A FINE AFTER EGO TO SHAHNAWAZ AND WILL TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN MPA SUSTINENCE. HE IS GARRULOUS AND OBVIOUSLY HIS FAVORITE SUBJECT NOW IS AFGHANISTAN. WE WILL SEE HOW HE PERFORMS ON SUBJECT MATTER IN WHICH HE IS NOT SUCH AN ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERT. I HAD KNOWN HIM FAVORABLY WHEN WE WERE AMBS IN RANGOON. HUMMEL
BT

#2425

CAR T 312115Z AUG 79 STAFF

FR/LOS ANGELES 20781 SECTION 1 OF 2 (UNSERVED LATER)

KABUL DIRECTOR INFO FRANKFURT GERMANY ISLAMABAD ROM
IRAN.

NYTELRYBAT AJAJA FORRES SCSWIRL WIMOLD DELABEL REPIASCTC

REF: A. DIRECTOR 504525
B. ISLAMABAD 40289
C. KABUL 24581
D. KABUL 24580
E. ROME 77466

1. A COB INTRODUCED BASE OFFICER ABB MONTE TO DELABEL
NY1) EVENING 30 AUGUST. IN OVER-1-HOUR MEETING BASE OBT
FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO OR IN CONJUNCTION W
OVERHITS. ALSO OBTAINED RECORDED CASSETTE TAPE WITH
BASSA FOR DUBS' MURDER STORY WHICH IS AT VERY LITTLE VA
TE WAA 1E AND 1E OF WASHINGTON 499380 (NOT SENT ALL A
SEE SUMMARY BELOW. OBTAINED PHOTOGRAPH OF PRESENT K BUT
CHIEF LAL M O E A M M E D AND ARMY OFFICER MAJOR Q AND
DESCRIBED AS SUPPORTER OF ABDUL ALI. TAPE AND PHOTOGR
BE BOUGHED HQS.

2. SUMMARY DUBS' ASSASSINATION: KABUL CHIEF OF POLICE
AIR FORCE COLONEL AND TWO OF HIS ASSISTANTS (JAMES BERN
ON CABLE) WERE INVITED TO L/1'S HOME. LAL MOHAMMED (REPA
SECRETLY LEAVING HIS TWO SUBORDINATES WHO PROCEEDED TO
INTOXICATED. THESE TWO MEN ARE THE SOURCE OF L/1'S
THEY WERE ASSIGNED TO FIRE MACHINE GUNS FOR APPROXIMATE
TWENTY SECONDS INTO THE HOTEL ROOM WHERE AMBASSADOR D
WA BEING HELD BEFORE LAL MOHAMMED AND SOME OTHER POL
OFFICERS WERE TO STORM THE ROOM. LAL WAS NOT SURE HO
TIMING OF THESE EVENTS TOOK PLACE. BUT APPARENTLY EVERYTH
WENT OFF ON SCHEDULE. THE TWO MEN OPENED FIRE ON THE
FROM THE ROOF OF THE BANK ACROSS THE STREET AND AS S
THEY CEASED FIRING THE DOOR WAS FORCED BY THE LAL MO
PARTS. AMBASSADOR DUBS WAS, ACCORDING TO THESE TWO

2. FR/L/S ANGERS 20791 S E C T
TING IN A CHAI COVERED WITH BLOOD. AND THE ARRE
AD ON VERY NEAR DEATH WHEN THE MOHAMMAD PARTIEN WRE
ROOM. L/1 BELIEVES LAL MOHAMMED PERSONALLY KILLED THE
BASSADOR BUT CANNOT GIVE ANY REASON OR PROOF FOR THE
KILL. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE TWO DRUNKEN POLIC
OFFICERS DOES NOT SUPPORT L/1'S VIEW. L/1 SAYS THAT LAL
MOHAMMED PERSONALLY TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD KILLED OVER 2,000
AFGHANS. L/1 HATES LAL MOHAMMED AND BELIEVES HIM TO BE A
MUTCHER AND CAPABLE OF ANYTHING.

3. L/1 STATED THAT RECENT MEETING IN KANDAHAR IS BEING
ORGANIZED AND LED BY Q U D U S HAN, AN AFGHAN ARMY MAJOR
NAMED I S N A T. AND A MULLAH NAMED ABDU N A Y A I Q U S.
HIS CHIEF HAS HAD ONE SON KILLED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
AND ANOTHER IMPRISONED AND POSSIBLY ALSO DEAD. Q U D U S HAN IS A
MEMBER OF THE AFGHAN SENATE. THIS GROUP PER L/1, SUPPORTS
WALI.

4. SANDAR WALI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN A HAKI AMI
NISA. HIS INFORMATION OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM SANDAR WALI
DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH L/1 ON 20 AUGUST.

5. FELLOW STUDENTS IN L/1 GROUP ARE DISCUSSING RUMORS
THAT SOVIETS HAVE TALKED WITH KING IN ROMES BUT THIS ONLY
REMOES SAME GOES FOR RELEASE OF NUR AHMED ET AL AND I.
WHO ALSO RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS.
L/1 BELIEVES IF STANADI HAD BEEN RELEASED SOMEONE WOULD
SEE HIM AND REPORTED SUCH.

6. L/1 PLANS TAKE VACATION SOMETIME DURING MIDDLE OF
NOVEMBER AFTER COMPLETION DOGLAS TRAINING AND BUSY HAJ
SEASON. HE AGREES WITH TRAINING IN WASHINGTON DURING THE
PERIOD AND WILL WORK OUT DETAILS WITH KABUL STATION.

7. L/1 WOULD LIKE HAVE COPIES OF CASSETTE TAPE GIVE
FRANKFURT IN ORDER DISTRIBUTE TAPES TO AFGHAN CONTACTS.
TAPES HE PREVIOUSLY DISTRIBUTED HAD A MESSAGE FROM SHAH
MOHAMMAD K A N D A H A R I WHO REPUTED TO BE AFGHAN
NUMBER THREE MAN UNDER AYAH LAH KHOMEINI IN ROM. L/1
NOT MET HANDEHARD BUT HAS SENT HIM MONEY UNDER ASSUMED

FR/LOS ANGELES 22701 S E O R E T
L/1 SAID KHOMEINI IS ACTIVELY SUPPORTING
KANDHARI'S EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVIDING MONEY AND
EVEN FOR AFGHANS IN IRAN. HE IS ALSO AGREEING TO PROVIDE
MILITARY TRAINING FOR THOSE AFGHANS WHO WANT IT AND TO RETURN
TO AFGHANISTAN.

L/1 REQUESTS AND HOPES WASHINGTON WILL SEND ANY TYPE OF
MONEY, BETWEEN \$50 AND \$1,000 SUPPORT TO KANDHARI WHO
RESIDES IN COM. MONEY SHOULD BE SENT TO CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
(BANI-E-MELI), CITY BRANCH, ACCOUNT NUMBER 7009. ACCOUNT
NAME IS AFGHAN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION (HAKIMAT-E-ISLAM) IN
AFGHANISTAN. L/1 ADDS THAT KANDHARI IS 100 PERCENT AGENT
AND ALL THE MONEY WILL BE USED FOR MEDICINE AND HUMANITARIAN
SUPPLIES FOR PEOPLE IN HERAT AREA. MONEY SHOULD BE DOWN IN
THE NAME OF SARBAAZ AND RECEIPT RETURNED TO L/1. L/1 SAYS
THAT HE HAS GIVEN APPROXIMATELY \$20.00 OF HIS OWN MONEY TO
THIS CAUSE.

9. L/1 WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY VISIT DR. A. H. I. FOR
A SARDAR WALI MAN AND FOUNDER OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT (ANLF). BASHIR'S MAILING ADDRESS IS P.O. BOX 2
NORWOOD, NEW JERSEY 07648. WALI SUGGESTED THE TWO MEN MEET
AND L/1 IS DETERMINED TO DO SO AND WOULD LIKE WASHINGTON TO PAY
FOR TRIP. L/1 PLANS TRAVEL BETWEEN 17-20 SEPTEMBER WHEN
HE HOPES TO HAVE SOME FREE TIME. PLEASE COMMENT ON THIS
TRAVEL PLAN.

10. L/1 WOULD ALSO LIKE COPIES OF FAMILY PHOTOGRAPHS FOR
HIS RETENTION. THESE PHOTOGRAPHS INCLUDED IN FILM PASSED
FRANCOIS T.

11. DR. KARMOOD M O H E A M E, EYES HOSPITAL,
SCHEDULED, NEW YORK 11238, IS L/1'S COUSIN
REPORTED TO BE STRONG SUPPORTER OF CURRENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
SOVIET. KARMOOD IS ALSO REPORTED TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN
PRINTING PRO-SOVIET MATERIALS IN THE U.S.

12. L/1 WILL PROVIDE BASE WITH LIST OF CURRENT AFGHANS
#97413

RE/LOS ANGELES 28703-1 C E T
AT DOUGLAS COURSE AND NAMES ON SEVERAL AFGHANS IN
RECORDS AREA WHO ENTERED THESE STUDENTS ON REGULAR
CLASSES ARE HELD TO BE YET. L/1 WILL PASS STUDENTS
TO KAHUN STATION APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS BEFORE COMING
FOR PASSAGE FINAL. E/1 EXPECTS TO RETURN TO DOUGLAS
TRAINING FOR WEAPONS TRAINING AND THIS ALREADY CONTRACTED
FOR AN AIRCRAFT IN DOUGLAS.

13. BASE MADE TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH GEPLASTIC 1 ON 2
JUST AND HEARS HOLD MEETING WITH HIM WEEK OF 4 SEPTEMBER

14. BASE HAS TALKED WITH LOS ANGELES-BASED SCOWIE
OFFICER TO DISCUSS L/1'S REPORTING ON DUBB ASSASSINATION
THOUGH PREPARED TO COMPLY WITH EARLIER REQUESTS FOR L/1
FROM SCOWIE ON HIS DUBB REPORTING. BASE IS NOT CERTAIN
IF IS ESSENTIAL GIVEN LIMITED DETAIL E/1 PROVIDED.
BASE HIGHLY WISE RECOMMENDATION WHETHER THIS NECESSARY PER
HE GIVEN SCOWIE SOME 6 TO 8 MONTHS PREVIOUSLY IN NEW YORK.

15. FILE: 201-820322, 201-806200. RVN 11AUG69 D9C1

ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

28
28718

29 SEP 79 0718E

R R T 281314Z SEP 79 STAFF

NEW DELHI 51270

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INTO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, KABUL, TEHRAN, KARACHI, DACCA, COLOMBO, LONDON, KATHMANDU, BONN, GERMANY, COPENHAGEN.

MINTEL LWBHLL QRCOBLE GECARRION QRMYSTIC

1. NEW DELHI 51235 (SENT DIRECTOR, ISLAMABAD, KABUL ONLY)
2. DIRECTOR 538018 (SENT NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KABUL ONLY)
3. AFTERNOON 28 SEPTEMBER "ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF PATRIOTIC
STUDENTS IN INDIA" (IAPASI) MOUNTED A NOISE DEMONSTRATION
FRONT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI PROTESTING SOVIET
POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AFGHAN STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO
PRESENT SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICERS WITH AN OPEN LETTER TO SOVIET
PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV. THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE
LETTER. THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS FUNDED BY NEW DELHI STATION AND
DIRECTED AT STATION REQUEST BY UNILATERAL ASSET GECARRION/1 (Q/2).
IAPASI OFFICER. QRMYSTIC WROTE THE OPEN LETTER TO THE
PRESIDENT. THE FACT THAT THE DEMONSTRATION WAS TO TAKE
PLACE WAS EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN NEW DELHI NEWSPAPERS THE
NEXT DAY (REF A). THE DEMONSTRATION ITSELF WAS
COVERED BY INDIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTERS AND FILMED BY INDIAN
TELEVISION. STATION ANTICIPATES GOOD COVERAGE OF THE EVENT ON
NEWS TONIGHT (29 SEPTEMBER) AND IN THE PAPERS TOMORROW MORN-
ING. STATION ATTEMPTING THROUGH ICA TO OBTAIN STILL PHOTOS AND
FILM OF THE DEMONSTRATION FOR POSSIBLE REPLAY ELSEWHERE. ANY-
WAY, ADDRESSEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAN DO TO REPLAY
GIVEN THE DEMONSTRATION IN NEW DELHI WILL BE APPRECIAT-

4. DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, TEHRAN, COPENHAGEN: AN IAPASI
MEMBER TOLD THE PRESS THAT SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE SCHEDULED
TO TAKE PLACE 29 SEPTEMBER IN THE U.S., GERMANY, IRAN AND
JAPAN. PLEASE ADVISE IF THEY IN FACT DID.

5. FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM TEXTS OF REPORTS WHICH WERE MOVED ON

PAGE 2 NEW DELHI 51275 S E C R E T
THE TWO INDIAN PRESS WIRE SERVICES ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER THE
DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE.

A. NEW DELHI, SEPT 28 (PRESS TRUST OF INDIA): OVER
200 STUDENTS TODAY STAGED A NOISY DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE
SOVIET EMBASSY, CALLING FOR AN END TO THE RUSSIAN AID TO THE
KHALQI REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN.

THE DEMONSTRATORS, WHO INCLUDED AFGHAN, PALESTINIAN AND
INDIAN STUDENTS WITH A SPECKLING OF GIRLS, SHOUTED PRO-ISLAMIC
AND ANTI-RUSSIAN AND ANTI-AMIN SLOGANS.

THE HOUR-LONG DEMONSTRATION WAS ORGANISED BY THE ISLAMIC
ASSOCIATION OF PATRIOTIC AFGHANS.

IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET PRESIDENT MR. LEONID
BREZHNEV, THE STUDENTS CALLED FOR THE STOPPAGE OF RUSSIAN AID
TO THE KHALQI REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY URGED THE SOVIET
PRESIDENT TO USE THE RUSSIAN MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES FOR
LIFTING THE POOR AND DOWNTRODDEN OF AFGHANISTAN.

THEY EXPRESSED PAIN AT THE GENOCIDE IN THEIR COUNTRY AND
URGED MR. BREZHNEV TO RECONSIDER HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF
ARMING AND SUPPORTING THE KHALQI REGIME.

A SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LETTER
SAYING "WE ONLY TAKE OFFICIALS LETTERS. LET THEM GIVE THE LETTER
TO THEIR EMBASSY WHICH SHOULD FORWARD IT TO US." THE STUDENTS SAID
THEY WOULD POST THE LETTER.

B. NEW DELHI, SEPT 28 (UNITED NEWS OF INDIA): THE
SOVIET EMBASSY TODAY REFUSED TO ACCEPT A LETTER URGING PRESIDENT
LEONID BREZHNEV TO RECONSIDER THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIANCE WITH
THE PRESENT OPPRESSIVE AND TYRANNICAL REGIME OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE LETTER WAS PRESENTED BY THE ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF
PATRIOTIC AFGHAN STUDENTS IN INDIA.

ABOUT 80 PERSONS CONGREGATED IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET

PAGE 3 NEW DELHI 51278 S E C R E T
DEMONSTRATORS HERE TO PROTEST AGAINST SOVIET SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT
KARZAI AMIN'S REGIME WHICH IS CARRYING OUT ORGANISED GENO
CID AGAINST THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS.

THE DEMONSTRATORS WANTED TO SUBMIT THE LETTER TO THE
EMBASSY BUT THE AUTHORITIES THERE TURNED DOWN THE REQUEST
THE LETTER STATED: "SHAMED AND ALARMED BY THE BLOODSHED
AND VIOLENCE IN OUR COUNTRY, WE THE AFGHAN STUDENTS REQUEST YOU
WITH HONESTY TO RECONSIDER YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF
SUPPORTING THE KARZAI REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN."

THE LETTER ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE CONFLICT AND TURMOIL
IN THAT COUNTRY HAD SO FAR LEFT MORE THAN 200,000 KILLED OR
WOUNDED, MORE THAN 2,000 PRISONERS WERE CROWDING THE JAILS AND
WERE BEING TORTURED.

AN ENDLESS STREAM OF REFUGEES WERE CROSSING OVER TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, IT ADDED.

IT REPRESENTED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT TO THE KABUL
REGIME THAT IS PERPETRATING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE NAME
OF ISLAM.

EARLIER THE DEMONSTRATORS SHOUTED SLOGANS DENOUNCING THE
RUSSIAN AND AFGHAN PRESIDENTS.

A SPOKESMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION TOLD US THAT THE AFGHAN
STUDENTS WERE TODAY HOLDING SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, WEST GERMANY, IRAN AND DENMARK.

THE DEMONSTRATORS INCLUDED STUDENTS FROM DELHI AND
JAWAHAR NERU UNIVERSITY.

FILE: 200-124-179/31 201-8958561. RM 28SEP90 DRW D9C.1.1.

NEW LUSHELL WOODSLE SECARRION ORNYSTIC

NEW DELHI 51273

1. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS IN LOCAL PRESS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE IN IRAN. WILL ADVISE IF WE TURN INFO TO THE CONTRARY.

2. FILE: 255-124-179/3; 251-8958561. RW 30 SEP 99
ALL SECRET.

20 OCT 79 13 13

SECRET 221234Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE COPENHAGEN 2807
TO: NEW DELHI INFO DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, DE
UNTEL LWSHEL GRCOBLE GECARRION GYSTIC
REF: NEW DELHI 01273
1. STATION EMBASSY AND LIAISON HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF
APAST OR ANY DEMONSTRATION HELD IN COPENHAGEN ON THEIR BEHALF.
2. FILE: 200-124-175-3; 201-958561. 20 OCT 79
SECRET

3 OCT 19 15 38 Z

C R T 23 1332Z OCT 79 STAFF

NEW DELHI 5 1298

TO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE ISLA HEAD, K BUL TEHRAN,
JINDA, KARACHI, DACCA, COLOMBO, LONDON N H MAND, BOB GERMANY

W NENTL WENELL WCOBELE GECARRION CRMYSTIC

REPT A. DIRECTOR 524448
B. NEW DELHI 5 1273

1. MORNING 29 SEPTEMBER FOUR OUT OF FIVE NEW DELHI DAILY
SPARE S CARRIED COVERAGE OF REF B. AFGHAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
SIDE SOVIET EMBASSY (PRO-SOVIET "STATESMAN" AND "INDIAN EXPRESS" CARRIED PHOTOS
OF DEMONSTRATING AFGHAN AND INDIAN STUDENTS HOISTING BANNERS.

2. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF REPRESENTATIVE ARTICLE
FROM THE "INDIAN EXPRESS": "AFGHAN STUDENTS HELD RALLY AT SOVIET
EMBASSY BY A STAFF REPORTER - NEW DELHI 29 SEPTEMBER 29
AFGHAN STUDENTS TODAY HELD A DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE
THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN CHANAKYAPUR TO PROTEST AGAINST THE
SUPPORT OF THE "KHALD" REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN. THERE WERE
INDIAN STUDENTS ALSO AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS.

"MARCHING FROM TEEN MURTI, THE STUDENTS CHANTED SLUGS LIKE
"WE WANT JUSTICE", "DOWN WITH THE KGB", "ALLAH HO AKBAR" TWO
STUDENTS CARRYING A BANNER WITH THE LEGEND "GOD IS ONE AND
NO HABIBAD IS HIS PROPHET" IN PERSIAN FORM. THE VANGUARD

"AND THE STUDENTS TRIED TO HAND OVER MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED
TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV BY THE "ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN"
AFGHAN STUDENTS. AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID THEY COULD NOT
ENTER THROUGH THE AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY.

"THE MEMORANDUM NOTED THAT AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR HAD
LIVED AS PEACEFUL NEIGHBOURS FOR 60 YEARS BEARING THE

PAGE NEW YORK 5129 SECRET
RELATIONS IN FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL RESPECTS, BUT
THIS EACH FOR COEXISTENCE WAS SHATTERED IN 1978 WHEN
A GROUP WITH NO POPULAR SUPPORT WAS PUT IN POWER
POWER BY BLOOD MILITARY COUP D'ETAT. RESPECTS
OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN.

THEY APPEALED TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV FOR SUPPORT
COMING FROM THE PRESENT REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN.

3. PUNCHING CLIP TO CHIEF, RTWING, 11/13/78.

FILE 200-24-17973; 200-29586-3007-200 D9C.
ALL SECRET
SECRET

NNNNVV, 4-ESAG 19BRA953

PP RUEHRC

DE RUEHC #6505/01 2850604

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 112202Z OCT 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2972

RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC

BT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 266505/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 10/11/85 (GREENE, MYLES L.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 914 - OCTOBER 11, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE

PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY

DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM

OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. (S) SAUDI ARABIA-AFGHANISTAN REBELS: A CIA ANALYSIS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: SAUDI ARABIA IS PROVIDING LIMITED FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE TRIBAL DISSIDENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SAUDI SUPPORT REFLECTS RIYADH'S WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL, WHICH THE SAUDIS VIEW AS A SOVIET-CREATED THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ALL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN. THE LIMITED NATURE OF SAUDI SUPPORT IS IN PART AN INDICATION OF THE SAUDIS' DISENCHANTMENT WITH COVERT OPERATIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL.

2. (S) SAUDI MOTIVATION: THE SAUDIS LONG HAVE HAD FAIRLY GOOD TIES WITH AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO THE AFGHAN MONARCHY BEFORE IT WAS TOPPLED IN 1973, AND THEY REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAN AND PRINCE ABUL WALI. PRESIDENT DAUD MADE A PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS OVERTHROW AND DEATH IN APRIL 1978, AND THE SAUDIS AGREED TO PROVIDE SOME FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS REGIME.

3. (S/NF) THE SAUDIS INTERPRETED THE MARXIST TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN LAST YEAR AS PART OF A SOVIET-DIRECTED CAMPAIGN TO ENCIRCLE THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA WITH RADICAL REGIMES IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUBVERSION OF THE CONSERVATIVE, OIL-RICH MONARCHIES IN THE AREA. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARXIST COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN ARE SEEN IN RIYADH AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE OIL WEALTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN REPORTED IN MAY 1978 THAT THE AFGHAN COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP A BASE FROM WHICH TO SUBVERT IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN REVOLUTION IS AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVE FOR THE SAUDIS, WHO SEE THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARXIST COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE OIL WEALTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN REPORTED IN MAY 1978 THAT THE AFGHAN COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP A BASE FROM WHICH TO SUBVERT IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN REVOLUTION IS AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVE FOR THE SAUDIS, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS DEFENDERS OF ISLAMIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

POL

CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

4. (S) ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS RECOGNIZED THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KABUL RELATIVELY SOON AFTER ITS ESTABLISHMENT, THE SAUDI MEDIA WERE AN EARLY CRITIC OF THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME--OFTEN CHARGING IT WITH ANTI-ISLAMIC PRACTICES AND WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. BY EARLY 1979 AFGHAN DISSIDENT LEADERS WERE TRAVELING REGULARLY TO SAUDI ARABIA TO ELICIT SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE. ONE GROUP--THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT--OPENED AN OFFICE IN JIDDA IN LATE 1978. SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS APPARENTLY BEGAN IN EARNEST SOME TIME AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR.

5. (S) THE LIMITS OF SAUDI AID: THE LIMITED NATURE OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHANS REFLECTS SEVERAL FACTORS. THE SAUDIS ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE NUMEROUS SIONS WITHIN THE AFGHAN DISSIDENT-MOVEMENT AND HAVE TO USE AID AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE GREATER UNITY. THE SAUDIS HAVE TOLD THE VARIOUS AFGHAN LEADERS THAT GREATER COOPERATION AMONG THEM IS A PREREQUISITE FOR GREATER SAUDI AID. THE SAUDIS ALSO MAY BE DISAPPOINTED THAT NOT ENOUGH OF THEIR AID ACTUALLY GOES TO THE INSURGENTS BUT RATHER IS KEPT BY EXILES.

6. (S) THE HALFHEARTED NATURE OF SAUDI SUPPORT ALSO REFLECTS SOME DISENCHANTMENT IN RIYADH WITH COVERT FUNDING OF ANTILEFTIST GROUPS. IN THE EARLY AND MID-1970S THE SAUDIS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF ISLAMIC GUERRILLA GROUPS IN SOUTH YEMEN AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS STILL GIVE THEM SOME AID, THESE GROUPS FAILED TO UNSEAT THE LEFTIST REGIMES THEY OPPOSED. THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO SECURE GREATER WESTERN, ESPECIALLY US, SUPPORT FOR THESE CAUSES.

7. (S) DESPITE THESE DISAPPOINTMENTS, SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN REBELS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY THE REBELS' MILITARY SUCCESSES AND WILL DOUBTLESS ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP UP THE GOOD FIGHT FOR ALLAH.

8. (LOU) BLACK LEADERS-HISTADRUT: HISTADRUT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS INVITED A GROUP OF AMERICAN BLACK LEADERS TO ISRAEL AND THAT THE GROUP HAS ACCEPTED. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY BENJAMIN HOOKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NAACP.

9. (U) ARAB SUMMIT: ACCORDING TO RADIO BEIRUT, THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WILL BE CONVENED ON NOVEMBER 17. THE MAJOR ISSUE AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

BT

#65 05

NNNNVV ESA621BRA957
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #6505/02 2850605
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P 11222Z OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2973
RUEKJCS/DCD/ISA WASHDC
BT
SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 268505/02

14. (C) EGYPT-IRAQ: US INTERESTS SECTION BAGHDAD REPORTS THAT IRAQ APPEARS TO BE MAINTAINING A STRICT SEPARATION BETWEEN POLITICAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH EGYPT. THE IRAQI UNIVERSITIES AND SCHOOLS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE NOT ONLY RENEWED THE ANNUAL CONTRACTS OF SOME 2,300 EGYPTIAN TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS, BUT ALSO MOSUL UNIVERSITY HAS HIRED AN ADDITIONAL 300 EGYPTIAN PROFESSORS FOR THIS ACADEMIC YEAR. RECRUITMENT OF EGYPTIAN LABORERS HAS ALSO CONTINUED UNABATED. AT THE SAME TIME EGYPT IS CONTINUALLY ATTACKED BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND PRESS.

15. (U) IRAN-SYRIA-BAGHDAD: THE MANAMA GULF NEWS AGENCY REPORTED THE ARRIVAL OF THE SYRIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND THE IRANIAN VICE PRIME MINISTER ON OCTOBER 10 AS ENVOYS OF SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD AND IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. THEY MET WITH THE BAKRAINI PRIME MINISTER AND DISCUSSED UNDISCLOSED TOPICS.

16. (U) EGYPT-SYRIA: ON OCTOBER 10 THE CAIRO PRESS HIGHLIGHTED THE CONTINUING TURMOIL IN SYRIA AND PREDICTED THAT CIVIL WAR WAS IMMINENT BECAUSE OF ASSAD'S INABILITY TO CURB VIOLENCE AND SECTARIAN DISTURBANCES.

17. (C) JORDAN-PLO: EMBASSY AMMAN REPORTED ON OCTOBER 9 THAT A JORDANIAN-PLO DELEGATION LED BY THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND A PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL MEMBER WILL TRAVEL WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK TO LIBYA AND ALGERIA TO PRESS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY PLEDGED AT THE 1978 BAGHDAD CONFERENCES. THE FUNDS ARE TO BE USED TO SUPPORT PLO EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE "STEADFASTNESS" OF THE INHABITANTS OF ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. LIBYA AND ALGERIA ARE THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT FULFILLED THEIR PLEDGES.

14. (U) ARAFAT TO VISIT USSR: A RUSSIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED ON OCTOBER 9 THAT ARAFAT WILL MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN LATE OCTOBER.

15. (U) WEST BANK EXPANSION: PRESS SERVICES REPORT THAT WEST BANK JUSH EMMUNIM SETTLERS SEIZED AN ARAB-OWNED OLIVE GROVE NEAR THEIR COMMUNITY OF BADDUMI ON OCTOBER 2. THEY WERE PROTESTING THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ALLOCATE ARAB LAND FOR EXPANSION OF JUSH SETTLEMENTS. THE IDF HAS NOT YET INTERVENED.

16. (U) UNIFIL-PALESTINIANS: CENTER REPORTS THAT TRAVELERS COMING INTO ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON SAY THAT PALESTINIAN FORCES FIRED ON UNIFIL TROOPS THROUGHOUT THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 13.

17. (U) DAYAN-BUTTERFIELD: THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS MET ONLY AT A NEWS CONFERENCE IN STRASBOURG ON OCTOBER 13 FOLLOWING THEIR APPOINTMENT TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. DAYAN SAID THAT IF THE PLO TOOK CONTROL OF AN AUTONOMOUS WEST BANK AND USED IT FOR GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES ISRAEL WOULD SEND IN TROOPS. BUTTERFIELD REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO REINVADE THE WEST BANK, AND THAT "PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENTS WILL NEVER ACCEPT ANY FORM OF PROTECTION."

18. (U) LEBANON-EXTREMISTS: FIVE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT FRANKIYAN'S CLAN REPORTEDLY WERE KILLED AT 11:00 ON OCTOBER 12. THE KILLINGS WERE ATTRIBUTED BY SOME CALLING THEMSELVES "ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTION OF THE NORTH." OTHERS SAID THE KILLINGS WERE THE WORK OF PHALANGIST ELEMENTS. A PHALANGIST LEADER HAS SAID A PHALANGIST GROUP INITIATED THE KILLINGS TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP. IN A RELATED REPORT, THE PHALANGISTS WERE SAID TO HAVE SOUGHT TO OVERTHROW THE PRESIDENT'S CLAN.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WNINTEL--NOFORN

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. SEVEN AS OF 1530 HOURS
LOCAL 15 OCTOBER 1979
(DOI: 15 OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: THIS IS AN AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
PREPARED AT 1530 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 15 OCTOBER
1979

1. SOURCES IN THE USAID COMPOUND IN THE WESTERN SECTION OF KABUL REPORT HEARING MANY HEAVY AND LIGHT EXPLOSIONS FROM THE WEST OF KABUL DURING THE PAST THREE HOURS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE EXPLOSIONS APPEAR TO BE COMING FROM THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE 7TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AT RISHKOR, WHICH IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 6-8 KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH OF KABUL.)

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 1225 HOURS, SEVERAL FIRETRUCKS AND AMBULANCES WERE SEEN LEAVING KABUL, HEADED SOUTH-EAST. (FIELD COMMENT: THE DISPATCH OF FIRE TRUCKS AND AMBULANCES BY THE GOVERNMENT INDICATES THAT THE OPPOSITION IS INFLECTING SOME CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE ON GOVERNMENT FORCES AND/OR INSTALLATIONS.)

3. CURRENTLY SIX T-62 TANKS (IN THE AFGHAN ARMY'S 500 SERIES) ARE STRUNG OUT ALONG THE TWO-MILE ROAD FROM DOWNTOWN KABUL TO DARULAMAN PALACE. THE HELMETED AFGHAN TANKERS ARE COMBAT-READY AND ARE ON ALERT ON THE OUTSIDE OF THEIR TANKS. ALL TANK BARRELS ARE POINTING WESTWARD, WITH THE SOLE EXCEPTION OF THE TANK BETWEEN THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND DARULAMAN, WHICH IS POINTING EASTWARD AND SOMETIMES TO THE SOUTH. THE SQUAD MANNING THE TANK NEAR DARULAMAN APPEARS VERY NERVOUS AND CHANGES POSITION FREQUENTLY.

4. AT 1230 HOURS, AN MI-24/25 GUNSHIP CAME FROM THE NORTH OVER THE AID COMPOUND, DESCENDED IN A TURNING,

SHALLOW DIVE FROM AN ELEVATION OF AN ESTIMATED 7000 FEET AND LEVELLED OFF IN WESTWARD FLIGHT AT AN ELEVATION OF APPROXIMATELY 200-300 FEET AS IT HEADED WESTWARD IN THE DIRECTION OF DARULAMAN PALACE (NOW MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS), ABOUT ONE MILE SOUTH OF AID IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF 7TH DIVISION HQS AT FISHKOW. (FIELD COMMENT: IT APPEARED THE CRUISE WAS GIVING THE SOUTH KABUL AREA A THOROUGH EXAMINATION.)

5. COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY TRAFFIC ALONG THE TWO-MILE ROAD FROM DOWNTOWN KABUL TO DARULAMAN APPEARS NORMAL DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE TANKS.

6. ALTHOUGH A COMPANY OF TROOPS IS STILL DEPLOYED IN FRONT OF THE PALACE, THE REST OF THE TOWN IS RELATIVELY NORMAL. IN ADDITION, AN EARLY MORNING DRIVE 6-7 KILOMETERS EAST ALONG THE JALALABAD ROAD REVEALED NO TANKS OR APC'S DEPLOYED ALONG THIS ROAD. COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC WAS NORMAL.

7. VERY FEW SOVIETS OR SOVIET VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SEEN IN KABUL.

8. AS OF 9 OCTOBER 1979 THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISSENSION AMONG THE RANKS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED 7TH DIVISION ENLISTED PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLUNTARILY EXTENDED IN THE ARMY BEYOND THEIR TWO-YEAR ENLISTMENT PERIOD.

9. ACC: AFGHANISTAN, KABUL (15 OCTOBER 1979).
FIELD REPORT NO. NHK-4892.

10. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DATT AT KABUL.
ALSO SENT: LONDON, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KARACHI, TEHRAN, JIDDA, CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSANAVEUR, CINCUSAF, COMSIXTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, COMAIRMED, CINCUSAC, CINCPAC, CSG, IPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, USNMF SHAPE FOR GENERAL ROGERS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
RW 15OCT99 DRU D9C.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WAINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON
COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/CHINA
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION OF AFGHAN SITUATION DURING THE VISIT OF
A CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION TO PAKISTAN
(DOI: 20-29 OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A GENERALLY RELIABLE PAKISTANI FIELD GRADE OFFICER WHOSE
PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

1. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONFIDANT ON 27 OCTOBER
1979, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (DMO) BRIGADIER MIAN MOHAMMAD
A F Z I A I SAID THAT DURING THE 12 DAY VISIT (20-29 OCTOBER) OF A
CHINESE "MILITARY GOODWILL DELEGATION" HEADED BY Z H A N G C A O Q I A N,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF (CGS) OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
ARMY, THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. THESE
DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED A BRIEFING BY SENIOR PAK MILITARY OFFICERS AND
ATTENDED BY GENERAL Z I A I A F I - S A O ON THE INSURGENCY BEING CONDUCTED
AGAINST THE AFGHAN REGIME BY MUSLIM INSURGENTS.

2. AT ONE POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS DEPUTY CGS ZHANG CAOQIAN
COMMENTED THAT IF THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS DID NOT RECEIVE SUFFICIENT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT, THE REGIME OF AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMJIN
WOULD BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION AND THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE
TO FURTHER INSTABILITY AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGIME. THIS
STATEMENT PROMPTED GENERAL ZIA TO ASK WHY THE CHINESE WERE NOT
SUPPORTING THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS IF THEY (THE CHINESE) WERE DISTURBED
ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. ZHANG CAOQIAN REPLIED THAT
WHILE SYMPATHETIC TO THE INSURGENT CAUSE, THE CHINESE COULD
NOT PROVIDE AID TO THE INSURGENTS BECAUSE SHOULD THIS BE DISCOVERED
IT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AND WOULD
AFFECT THE TALKS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION CURRENTLY
BEING HELD IN MOSCOW. TO PROTECT THE CHINESE POSITION, ZHANG
CAOQIAN REITERATED AN EARLIER REQUEST MADE BY THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
IN ISLAMABAD THAT NO CHINESE ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE PAKISTAN
ARMY INVENTORY SHOULD BE SUPPLIED TO THE AFGHAN MUSLIM INSURGENTS.
(FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDFIRDP-315/15822-79, DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1979,
FROM THE SAME SOURCE, WHICH REPORTED GENERAL ZIA'S ORDER THAT NO
WEAPONS, AMMUNITION OR OTHER SUPPLIES OF CHINESE ORIGIN SHOULD BE
SUPPLIED TO AFGHAN INSURGENTS WHO ARE BEING COVERTLY SUPPLIED BY
THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

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3. ACQ: PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD (30 OCTOBER 1979). FIELD NO. NPR-2117.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AN KABUL, KARACHI, NEW DELHI, JIDDA FOR CINCPAC, COMIPAC, COMIPACFLT REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CON OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORI RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

DEPART AT ISLAMABAD. SENT TO LONDON, CINCSAC, CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE COMSEVENTHFLT AND POLAD ONLY). NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE. ULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION INATOR. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9C.1 BY PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND

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SECRET--WINTTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

CONCERN OF AFGHAN DISSIDENTS OVER THE MAJOR DR
PUNISHMENT IN PAKISTAN PROVINCE
APPROVAL BY GOP TO PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPLY OF
MUNITION TO AFGHAN INSURGENTS
0001 21 - 31 OCTOBER 1979

FORMER MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO
FLED TO PAKISTAN IN MID-JULY 1979. MAINTAINS CLOSE
CONTACTS WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT (ANLF) AND OTHER AFGHAN GROUPS IN
PAKISTAN. HE IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE. HE
OBTAINED HIS INFORMATION FROM AFGHAN KILL LEADERS IN
PAKISTAN.

REPORTS REACHING AFGHAN DISSIDENT LEADERS IN PAKISTAN
THAT ON APPROXIMATELY 21 OCTOBER 1979 AFGHAN (DRA) ARMED
FORCES UNDER THE CONTROL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS LAUNCHED A
OFFENSIVE IN PAKISTAN PROVINCE. AFGHAN TRIBAL INSURGENTS, WHO
HAD FLED TO PAKISTAN IN THE WAKE OF THE DRA OFFENSIVE, REPORTED
THAT THE DRA HAD SENT APPROXIMATELY 300 TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES,
SUPPORTED BY MIG-21 AIRCRAFT AND MI-24 HELICOPTERS GUNSHIPS, TO
THE JAZI TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN PROVINCE, RECAPTURING
SEVERAL TRIBAL AREAS (33-41N, 68-22E) AS WELL AS LARGE ARMS WHICH HAD BEEN
STOCKPILED FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AROUND AFI KANDAK
(33-57N, 68-43E) AND CHAMIANI (33-48N, 69-49E).

2. A LARGE NUMBER OF HANGEL AND JAZI TRIBAL INSURGENTS
ALONG WITH THEIR FAMILIES HAVE FLED ACROSS THE BORDER TO PAKISTAN
IN THE AREA OF PARACHINAR (33-54N, 70-56E) AND MIRAM SHAH
(33-51N, 70-54E). THE INSURGENTS WHO FLED WILL LEAVE THE
FAMILIES IN PAKISTAN AND WILL RETURN TO THEIR HOMELANDS
IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE INSURGENCY AGAINST THE DRA. AFGHAN
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ANLF) LEADER SEBQATULLAH
MOMANDI RECENTLY TRAVELED TO PARACHINAR WITH
MEDICAL SUPPLIES, MEDICINES AND FOOD FOR THE TRIBAL INSURGENTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES. LATER, APPROXIMATELY 500 TRIBAL INSURGENTS
HAD COME TO PARACHINAR FOR TREATMENT OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN
DRA FORCES IN PAKISTAN PROVINCE.

3. TRIBAL INSURGENTS WHO RECEIVED THE BRUNT OF THE DRA OFFENSIVE FOLLOWING OF AFGHAN NATIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. SYED SAID A I L A M I, WHO IS PRESENTLY IN SAUDI ARABIA, SEEKING SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENT CAUSE. GAILANI, WHO HAS BEEN IN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH HIS ADVISORS IN PAKISTAN SINCE THE DRA OFFENSIVE BEGAN, IS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AND PLANS TO RETURN TO PAKISTAN TO RESUME COMMAND OF HIS FORCES IN PAKISTAN SOON AFTER THE EID HOLIDAY (2-3 NOVEMBER). MEANWHILE, HE HAS REQUESTED HIS ADVISORS TO CONTACT GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (GOPT) OFFICIALS TO SEEK MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBAL INSURGENTS.

4. ON 28 OCTOBER, ONE OF GAILANI'S ADVISORS MET WITH PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY, TANVIR AHMED A H A N, AND ACTING FOREIGN SECRETARY, RIAZ P I R A C H A, TO BRIEF THEM ON THE SITUATION IN PAKTIA AND TO SEEK GOP SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBAL INSURGENTS. TANVIR AND PRIACHA SAID THAT THEY WERE ALREADY AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE DRA OFFENSIVE IN PAKTIA AND THAT PAK INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN KABUL HAD REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ADVISED AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH A M I N TO CONCENTRATE HIS FORCES UNDER THE DIRECTION OF SOVIET ADVISORS TO SUPPRESS THE INSURGENCY IN PAKTIA PROVINCE. THE GOP HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE PAKTIA OFFENSIVE BASED IN PART ON REPORTS FROM TRIBAL INSURGENT SOURCES WHO HAD OBSERVED MANY SOVIETS IN PAKTIA DRESSED IN AFGHAN MILITARY UNIFORMS.

5. PRIACHA ADVISED THE AFGHAN DISSIDENT LEADER TO RETURN TO PESHAWAR WHERE HE SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH A PAKISTANI ARMY MAJOR WHO WOULD PROVIDE THE AFGHAN DISSIDENTS WITH AMMUNITION FOR THE TRIBAL INSURGENTS IN PAKTIA. ON 30 OCTOBER ANOTHER GAILANI ADVISOR CONTACTED THE PAK ARMY MAJOR IN PESHAWAR AND WAS GIVEN AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION AS PROMISED. THE PAK ARMY MAJOR ACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE THIS LIMITED SUPPORT FROM HIGH AUTHORITIES IN ISLAMABAD AND THAT FURTHER (UNSPECIFIED) AID WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

6. (FIELD COMMENT: ALSO SEE PDPFIRDB-315/18968-70, DATED 29 OCTOBER 1979, FROM A PAKISTANI SECURITY OFFICIAL, FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE MAJOR AFGHAN ARMED FORCES OFFENSIVE IN PAKTIA)

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T W N I N T E L / N O F O R M / N O C O N T R A C T I N O N T R A C T / O N C O M

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/USSR

SUBJECT: INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN (STATION IN KABUL)
(DOI: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYE
IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE. HE ACQUI
PARAS ONE THROUGH FOUR FROM AN AFGHAN M
OFFICER AND PARAS FIVE AND SIX FROM PER
OBSERVATION.

1. AT PUL-I-CHARKI MILITARY GARRISON IN THE
RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING TANK DRIVERS, THE NUMBER
INSTRUCTORS HAS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 18 IN LATE
TO BETWEEN 80-100 AS OF LATE OCTOBER 1979. (SOUR
SUB-SOURCE DOES NOT HAVE FREE ACCESS TO THE OTHER
AREAS OF PUL-I-CHARKI BUT STATES IT IS HIS IMPRES
GAINED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER AFGHAN OFFIC
NUMBER OF SOVIETS ASSIGNED TO OTHER AREAS OF THE
HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY.

2. AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI GARRISON, THERE ARE PRESENTLY
ABOUT 200 TANKS, ALL IN OPERATING CONDITION. THIR
TAKEN FROM INSIDE THE SHEDS AT THE GARRISON, WHERE
WERE STORED ON THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET ADVIS
SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT AN ATTACK ON THE SHE
INCAPACITATE THE TANKS. THERE HAS NOT BEEN A DR
INCREASE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS AT THE FAC

3. PRESENTLY THERE ARE NO AFGHAN INDIVIDUALS
GOING TANK TRAINING AT PUL-I-CHARKI. THE RANGE
20-24. MOST ARE RELATIVES OF COMMITTEED
[SUB-SOURCE COMMENT: THEIR CURRENT LEVEL OF COM
NOT ALLOW THEM TO OPERATE THE TANKS AT PUL-I-CHA

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: SUB-SOURCE STATES CATEGORICALLY
THE RUSSIANS (SOVIETS) HAVE TAKEN COMMAND OF

BARRACKS. THE DECISION MAKING POWER IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE RUSSIANS (SOVIETS). SUB-SOURCE IS DEPRESSED BY THE FACT THE SOVIETS NOW ARE RUNNING THE AFGHAN MILITARY. HIS MORALE AND THAT OF OTHERS LIKE HIM, WHO WERE BASICALLY AFGHANS, IS VERY LOW.)

5. THERE HAS BEEN A LARGE INFLOX OF YOUNG SOVIETS INTO THE MICRO RAYON HOUSING COMPLEX. ON 27, 28, 29 AND 30 OCTOBER, BETWEEN 1600-1700 HOURS, A ROUGH COUNT WAS MADE OF YOUNG SOVIETS WATCHING AND PLAYING VOLLEYBALL ON THREE COURTS IN THE BLOCK 5 AREA. ABOUT 300 SOVIETS WERE COUNTED. (SOURCE COMMENT: PRIOR TO AUGUST 1979 THERE WAS ONLY ONE VOLLEYBALL COURT.) THE SOVIETS, SOME OF WHOM WERE DRESSED IN AFGHAN FATIGUES APPEARED TO BE 21 AND 22 YEARS OLD. THEY HAD VERY SHORT "MILITARY" HAIR CUTS. IT IS EASY TO SORT THESE NEW SOVIETS OUT FROM THE SOVIET "ADVISORS". THE ADVISORS ARE OLDER, USUALLY WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHES, HAVE LONGER HAIR AND ARE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ADVISORS LIVING AT THE COMPLEX AS WELL. ON 27 AND 30 OCTOBER, THREE AFGHAN, SOVIET ORIGIN, BUSES WERE OBSERVED HAULING SOVIET YOUNGSTERS TO SCHOOL FROM THE COMPLEX. THE BUSES WERE FULL. THE THREE HELD ABOUT 100 CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO HIDE THEIR INCREASED PRESENCE AT MICRO RAYON. IT IS ALMOST AS IF THEY ARE SAYING, "WE ARE HERE TO STAY, GET USED TO US").

6. AS ONE ENTERS THE OLD SECTION OF MICRO RAYON FROM THE NAZIR AREA AFTER CROSSING THE BRIDGE OVER THE KAHUL RIVER IF ONE TURNS LEFT, ONE WILL PASS TWO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THE FIRST IS UNDER AFGHAN GUARD; THE SECOND, A COMMUNICATION FACILITY, IS UNDER THE GUARD OF AFGHANS COMMANDED BY A YOUNG SOVIET. THE SOVIET WHO IS BLOND, WEARS AN AFGHAN UNIFORM WITH BETTER TAILORING--CARRIES A KHALASHNIKOV AND NIGHTLY INSPECTS HIS AFGHAN TROOPS. HE CAN BE SEEN THERE AT VARIOUS HOURS OF THE NIGHT.

7. ACC: AFGHANISTAN, KABUL (30 OCTOBER 1979).
FIELD REPORT NO. NRK-4132.

FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DATT AT BUL. SEN
 TO LONDON, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KARACHI, HRAN, JID
 CIN EUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUS E, COMSIX
 COM DEASTFOR, COMPAIRMED, CINCSAC, CINCPAC CSG, PAC
 PAC LT, USNMR SHAPE FOR GENERAL ROGERS.
 REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE-INT LIGENCE
 AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATION
 REL ASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/COM UTANTS-D
 AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATO
 RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.
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UNRECORDED SOURCE INFORMATION

ARRESTS OF PRO-SARAKI MILITARY OFFICERS.

(OCTOBER 1979)

LEVEL SYRIAN MILITARY OFFICER SOURCE
HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.
OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM SENIOR OFFICERS
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

FOCUSED THE FOLLOWING PRO-SARAKI MILITARY
OFFICERS:

ABDULLAH FAYAN, MEMBER OF THE
COUNCIL, CHIEF OF SIGNALS, HE WAS RELEASED
VADUR.

MAJOR GUL HASAN T U R H A T
INSPECTION, GUL HASAN T U R H A T
AMMAD ASLAM W A T A R E E D. THEY ARE BOTH
DISTRICT AND ARE PASTERS.

MAJOR KHUDAY DOST A B D A R. CHIEF
OF ORGANIZATION AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (1979).

MAJOR GUL B A R A R. CHIEF OF PERSONNEL
(1979).

DEPUTY CHIEF OF ORGANIZATION. A SENIOR OFFICER.
COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME.

(SOURCE COMMENT: ADDITIONAL ARRESTS HAVE ALSO BEEN

(FIELD COMMENT: SEE WH-4150 FOR A SUMMARY REPORT
ARRESTS OF PRO-SARAKI SUPPORTERS IN THE MILITARY.)

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WHINTEL MOTHER DOCTRINE ORIGIN
COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: 1. APPARENT ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT
HAFIZULLAH AMIN.

2. AMBUSH OF BUSES ON OUTSKIRTS OF KANDU.
(DOI: LATE OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE
REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE
ACQUIRED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN AFGHAN ARMY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

1. IN LATE OCTOBER, A TRUSTED KHALAJ OFFICER WHO
STANDS GUARD DUTY AT THE PEOPLE'S HOUSE WHERE PRESIDENT
HAFIZULLAH AMIN WAS HIS OFFICE WAS ARRESTED WHEN
HE TRIED TO SMUGGLE A PISTOL INTO AN AREA WHERE
WEAPONS ARE ALLOWED. EXCEPT THOSE CARRIED BY AMIN'S
PERSONAL BODYGUARDS. INTERROGATION OF THE KHALAJ OFFICER
INDICATES HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO HIDE THE PISTOL IN THE
PROHIBITED AREA PRIOR TO ITS BEING USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO
ASSASSINATE AMIN. (SOURCE COMMENT: PRIOR TO AMIN'S
SEIZURE OF POWER FROM BARAKI, TRUSTED KHALAJ OFFICERS, SIMILAR
TO THE ARRESTED OFFICER WERE PERMITTED TO CARRY WEAPONS IN THE
PRESENCE OF AMIN AND HIS WIFE. SINCE AMIN'S ASSASSINATION OF THE
PRESIDENT, ALL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM CARRYING WEAPONS
IN THE AREA OF THE PALACE WHERE AMIN LIVES AND WORKS. AFGHAN
VISITORS TO THE PALACE ARE SEARCHED AT LEAST TWICE WITH BOTH
BODY SEARCHES AND X-RAY EQUIPMENT. A SMALL DETENTION LOCATED IN
PISTOL THE KHALAJ WAS HIDDEN ON HIS BODY.)

2. ON ABOUT 22 OCTOBER, TWO "MOTHER" BUSES (SOURCE COMMENT:
PROBABLY BUSES) WERE STOPPED AT THE PASS LOCATED JUST BEYOND THE
PASTEL DOCTRINE TOWER ON THE SALAM PASS ROAD ON THE IMMEDIATE
OUTSKIRTS OF KANDU. THE "MOTHER" BUSES STOPPED AT A FURNISHED
AND VISITORS WERE SEARCHED. WHEN ONE OF THE "MOTHER" BUSES
ATTEMPTED TO BE RESEARCHED FOR A GUN, HE WAS STOPPED BY THE BYE.

REF: CLASS S E C R E T UNINTEL MOTORS NOCONTRACT
INTEL: AFGHANISTAN/USSE
SUBJECT: AMMUNITION FLIGHTS TO THE KABEL AREA.
(DOI: OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN AIR FORCE OFFICER WHOSE
PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.
HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IN THE NORMAL COURSE
OF HIS DUTIES.

1. DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF OCTOBER 1979
APPROXIMATELY TEN AN-12 (CUB) AMMUNITION FLIGHTS PER WEEK
ARRIVED AT KAWAJA REVERSE (KABUL) AND BAGRAM AIR FORCE BASES
FROM THE USSR. THIS IS TWICE THE NUMBER OF AMMUNITION
FLIGHTS AS THOSE WHICH ARRIVED DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS
OF OCTOBER.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: AMMUNITION COMING FROM THE
SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO BE FERIED TO FORWARD BOMB
AREAS BY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY SOVIET CREWS.)

3. ACQ: AFGHANISTAN, KABEL (31 OCTOBER 1979).
FIELD REPORT NO. NRK-4133. NEW DELHI, KARACHI, TEHRAN,
ALSO SENT LONDON, ISLAMABAD, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR,
JIDDA, CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, COMAIRMED, CINOSAC, CINCPAC,
COMSINTHFLT, COMDEASTFOR, COMMR SHAPE FOR GENERAL ROBERTS,
CSM, INAC, PACAF, PACFLT, USMC, USN, USN, USN, USN,
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS - NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANT
REV 1 NOV 99 DRV DDC.A BY SEC, EDDED REPORTING OFFICER, ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT

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CITE DIRECTOR 516886

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO KABUL

WMINTEL INTED

REF: TEHRAN 54242 (NOT SENT/NEEDED KABUL)

1. FOR KABUL: REF REQUESTS THAT TEHRAN BE ADDED ON AFGHAN SITUATION. REF KABUL COMPLY.
2. AS A CONTINUATION OF THE STEPS TAKEN TO BEGIN A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, WE WILL CHARGE LAINGEN TO PROVIDE SELECTED INTEL ORALLY RPT ORALLY AFGHANISTAN TO YAZDI OR BAZARGAN. THESE ITEMS WOULD BE CAP TO STATION BY HQS TO PASS TO LAINGEN. THE FIRST OF THIS INFO FOLLOWS BELOW. LAINGEN SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT INFO BEING PROVIDED AS PART OF EFFORT BEGUN BY THE 22 AUGUST BRIEFING IN TEL. HE SHOULD ALSO REQUEST BAZARGAN OR YAZDI FOR ANY CORROBORATION OF THIS INFO WHICH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE OR BE ABLE GET. WE WANT THIS TO ENCOURAGE INTEL DIALOGUE RPT DIALOGUE. YOU MAY ASSURE LAINGEN STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMED OF THIS REQUEST, AND CONCURS.
3. ON 17 AUGUST, A SENIOR SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION LED BY A FOUR STAR GENERAL ARRIVED IN KABUL. THE GENERAL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY 12 OTHER GENERALS AND SIX COLONELS. THE DELEGATION WAS EXPECTED TO REMAIN FOR ABOUT 25 DAYS TO STUDY THE EMERGENCY SITUATION. THE SOVIET ADVISORY ROLE WITH THE AFGHAN MILITARY HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. IN ADDITION, EARLY SEPTEMBER WE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT SOVIET TROOPS IN BRIGADE STRENGTH HAD ARRIVED IN KABUL POSSIBLY TO PROTECT SOVIET CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. WE DO HAVE RELIABLE INFO THAT APPROXIMATELY 400 SOVIET TROOPS ARE STATIONED AT BAGRAM AIRFIELD IN KABUL.
4. ADDRES WILL NOTE STATE-241748 OF 14 SEPTEMBER REGARDING INTEL DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN WITH GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 51056 SECRET
MESSAGE MAY HAVE BEEN STIMULATED BY OUR CLEARING CASE
POSAL WITH STATE. BUT IN ANY CASE ITS THRUST AND BOA
ARE INTENDED TO BE COMPLEMENTARY. FOR EXAMPLE WHERE
ATOMAN SITUATION IN GENERAL WITH YAZDI OR BAZARGAN. LA
SHOULD PASS PART THREE INFO AND ASK FOR IRANIAN COORDIN

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